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* "With regard to foreign concerns, the king is the delegate or reprefentative of his people. It is impoffible, that the individuals of a state in their collective capacity can. tranfact the affairs of that ftate with another community equally numerous as themselves. Unanimity must be wanting to their meafures, and ftrength to the, execution of their counfels. In the king therefore, as in a center, all the rays of his people are united, and form by that union a confiftency, fplendor, and power, that make him feared and refpected by foreign potentates, who would fcruple to enter into any engagement, that muft afterwards be revised and ratified by a popular affembly. What is done by the royal authority with regard to foreign powers, is the act of the whole nation; what is done without the king's concurrence, is the act only of private men.”

t "The king has the military power; but ftill with respect to this, he is not abfolute. It is true, in regard to the fea-forces, as there is in them this very great advantage,

that they cannot be turned against the liberty of the nation, at the fame time that they are the fureft bulwark of the island, the

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King complete

representative

of the nation in foreign treaties.

King can keep

up what fea

forces he
pleases.

But cannot raife obtaining the means of doing it.

land forces

without the

liament.

king may keep them as he thinks proper; and in this respect he lies only under the general restraint of applying to parliament for But in regard to land forces, as they may become an confent of par- immediate weapon in the hands of power, for throwing down all the barriers of public liberty, the king cannot raise them without the confent of parliament. The guards of Charles II. were declared anti-conftitutional; and James's army was one of the causes of his being at length dethroned.

The nature of

our prefent

"In these times, however, when it is ftanding army. become a custom with princes to keep those numerous armies, which ferve as a pretext and means of oppreffing the people, a state, that would maintain its independence is obliged in great measure to do the fame. The parliament has therefore thought proper to establish a standing body of troops, which amounts to about thirty thousand men, of which the king has the command.

"But this army is only established for one year; at the end of that term it is (unless re-established) to be ipfo facto disbanded; and as the queftion, which then lies before parliament is not whether the army fhall be diffolved, but whether it fhall be established anew, as if it had never exifted, any one of

the

the three branches of the legislature may, by its diffent, hinder its continuance.

"Befides, the funds for the payment of this body of troops are to be raised by taxes, that never are established for more than one year; and it becomes likewife neceffary, at the end of this term again to establish them."

Against any abuses of the king's prerogative in commencing, carrying on, or concluding wars, or in making treaties, leagues, or alliances with foreign ftates, is the constitutional security of parliamentary impeachments of the minifters, who fhall have advised or induced the crown to an imprudent, detrimental, or injurious exertion of the prerogative.

"Another capacity, in which the king is confidered in domestic affairs, is as the foun

tain of justice, and general confervator of the peace of the kingdom. By the fountain of juftice the law does not mean the author or original, but only the diftributor. Juftice is not derived from the king, as from his free gift; but he is the fteward of the public, to difpenfe it to whom it is due. He is not the spring, but the refervoir, from whence

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right and equity are conducted, by a thou-
fand channels, to every individual. And
hence it is, that all jurisdictions of courts are
either mediately or immediately derived from
the crown, their proceedings run generally in
the king's name, they pafs under his feal, and
are executed by his officers.

"It is probable, and almost certain, that
in very early times, before our conftitution
arrived at its full perfection, our kings in
perfon often heard and determined caufes
between party
and party; but at present, by
the long and uniform ufage of many ages,
our kings have delegated their whole judicial
power to the judges of their several courts,
which are the grand depofitory of the fun-
damental laws of the kingdom, and have
gained a known and stated jurifdiction, re-
gulated by certain and established rules, which
the crown itself cannot now alter but by act

Independence of parliament. And, in order to maintain of the judges. both the dignity and independence of the judges in the fuperior courts, it is enacted by the ftatute 13 W. III. c. 2. that their commiffions shall be made (not as formerly, durante bene placito, but) quamdiu bene fe gefferint, and their falaries afcertained and established; but that it may be lawful to remove them on the addrefs of both houfes

of

1

of parliament. And now, by the noble improvements of that law, in the ftatute of

I Geo. III. c. 23. enacted at the earnest re* commendation of the king himself from the throne, the judges are continued in their offices during their good behaviour, notwithstanding any demife of the crown (which was formerly held immediately to vacate their feats) and their full falaries are abfolutely fecured to them during the continuance of their commiffion; his majesty having been pleased to declare, that he looked upon the independence and uprightnefs of the judges, as effential to the impartial administration of justice, as one of the best securities of the rights and liberties of his fubjects, and as most conducive to the honour of the crown."

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