granting, or denying aids or monies for the public fervice, and fhould have the firft commencement and confideration, and the fole modelling in their houfe not only of all laws for impofing taxes, and levying and raifing aids or money upon the people for the defence and fupport of the state and government; but also of all laws touching the taking from any man his property; and fhould have power to enquire into, and judge of the ufes and occafions, for which monies are to be demanded and given; and to appropriate the fame to those ufes, and to inquire into the applications, and to cenfure the misapplications thereof; and that this right should be so inviolable, that neither of the other two eftates fhould propound any thing, nor interpofe, nor meddle in any of their debates or proceedings, touching these matters; and that these powers and privileges fhould be, and be accounted hereditary, and as the most eminent pillars of this constitution; and that the commons in parliament affembled should also have the terrible power of inquiring into grievances, and questioning and impeaching fuch malefactors, as fhould be found fubverting, or endeavouring to fubvert, or advising the fubver-. fion. or alteration of the fundamental form of this government."

Right of the infpeach state

commons to

delinquents.

Election of the commons must be free.

As the members of the house of commons are to be freely chosen to represent the free people of England in parliament, fo the conftitution will not permit the flightest deviation from the principle free-election, in any one of them. *« If any part of the representative body be not chofen by the people, that part vitiates and corrupts the whole. If there be a defect in the reprefentation of the people, that power, which alone is equal to the making of laws in this country, is not complete, and the acts of parliament, under that circumstance, are not the acts of a pure and entire legiflature. I fpeak of the theory of our conftitution; and whatever difficulties or inconveniences may attend the practice, I am ready to maintain, that as far as the fact deviates from the principle, fo far the practice is vicious and corrupt."

"It is the ancient indifputable privilege and right of the house of commons, that all grants of fubfidies, or parliamentary aids do begin in their house, and are first bestowed by them; although their grants are not effectual to all intents and purposes, until they' have the affent of the other two branches of

the legislature. The true reafon arising

* Junius, Letter xxxix. p. 207.
+ Black. Com. b. i. c. 2. p. 169.

from

from the spirit of our conftitution seems to
be this: the lords being a permanent here-
ditary body created at pleasure by the king,
fuppofed more liable to be influenced by the
crown, and when once influenced to con-
tinue fo, than the commons, who are a tem-
porary elective body, freely nominated by the
people, it would therefore be extremely
dangerous to give the lords any power of
framing new taxes for the fubject; it is fuf-
ficient, that they have a power of rejecting,
if they think the commons too lavish or
improvident in their grants. But fo reafona-
bly jealous are the commons of this valua-
ble privilege, that herein they will not fuffer
the other house to exert any power, but that
of rejecting; they will not permit the least
alteration or amendment to be made by the
lords to the mode of taxing the people by
a money bill; under which appellation are
included all bills, by which money is di-
rected to be raised upon the subject, for
any purpose, or in any fhape whatsoever,
either for the exigences of government, and
collected from the kingdom in general, as
the land tax; or for private benefit, and
collected in any particular district, as by
turnpikes, parish rates, and the like.
Ee 3

<< In

In the election of commoners, confifts the exercife of the democratic part

of the conftitution,

"In the elections of knights, citizens, and burgeffes confifts the exercise of the democratical part of our conftitution; for in a democracy there can be no exercife of fovereignty but by fuffrage, which is the declaration of the people's will: in all democracies therefore it is of the utmost importance to regulate by whom, and in what manner the fuffrages are to be given. And the Athenians were so justly jealous of this prerogative, that a stranger, who interfered in the affemblies of the people, was punished by. their laws with death; because fuch a man was efteemed guilty of high treason, by ufurping thofe rights of fovereignty, to which he had no title. In England, where the people do not debate in a collective body, but by reprefentation, the exercise of this fovereignty confifts in the choice of reprefentatives. The laws have therefore very ftrictly guarded against ufurpation or abuse of this power, by many falutary provifions, which may be reduced to thefe three points: 1. The qualifi cations of the electors; 2. The qualifications of the elected; 3. The proceedings at elec tions."

It may not be improper to preface the confideration of these three points with some obfervations

obfervations upon the general complaint of the malcontents of the day, against the prefent representation of the people in parliament, which they moft loudly reprobate, as partial, inadequate, and corrupt.

The principle of our conftitution undoubtedly is, that the representation of the people fhall be full, free, and unbiaffed; and as far as the nature of circumftances will allow, it has from time to time enforced and fupported this principle by the wifeft rules, orders, and regulations. If at present they conftitutional do not chufe, or think it expedient and advifeable, to make or introduce any changes

delicacy in al

tering the mode

of electing representatives.

or alterations into the parliamentary reprefentation of the people, it must be attributed to a very laudable and conftitutional averfion from innovating upon the declaration and fettlement of our rights at the revolution. Such an event is never more likely to happen in this country; it was a temporary diffolution of the government, effected not by the act of the people or governed, but by that of the crown or governor, which there- The opportunifore afforded an unprecedented opportunity ty our ancestors to the people of recurring to their primeval rights of modelling and fquaring that form of government, by which they chofe in fu

enjoyed of al

tering what defective in the

ever they found

reprefentation.