that being in all ancient times, and fo late as Henry VII.'s time looked upon to be the province of the king and lords, for at that time citizens and burgeffes were refient of cities and boroughs, and not country gentlemen of great landed interest.

"In Henry VII.'s time and Henry VIII.'s, minifters of ftate, officers of the revenue, and other courtiers, found an account in creeping through boroughs into the house of commons, and to make room for them, the boroughs from one hundred and twentyfix (the number in the latter end of Henry VIII.'s time) is near doubled, by reviving dormant rights and privileges claimed by ancient boroughs after they had been obfolete for fome centuries."

The members for many ancient boroughs were both chosen and returned by the lords, and fometimes by the ladies of the manors or boroughs; which was certainly a groffer deviation from the freedom of election, than any usage or custom, under which returns are at this day made for the most corrupt boroughs. * Thus in the 14th and 18th of queen Eliz. Dame Mary Packington, the

Some boroughs Loft their privilege of fend

ing members to parliament.

widow of Sir John Packington, made return of burgeffes in these words, viz. "Know ye, that I Mary Packington, &c. have chofen, named, and appointed my trufty and wellbeloved Thomas Lichfield and George Burden, efqrs. to be my burgeffes for my faid borough of Aylesbury, &c."

It was anciently the practice for the crown to fummon pro re nata, the moft flourishing towns to fend reprefentatives to parliament; but this discretionary prerogative of the crown has been long fince difufed. As fome towns however formerly encreafed in trade and grew populous, they were admitted to the right of fending deputies or representatives to parliament; thus the number of the house of commons encreased, as I have already specified; but the deferted boroughs continued the privilege or right of fending members to parliament, though fome of them finding it burthenfome to maintain their members, as was the ufage of those days, by their own petition were eafed of the expence, and at the fame time loft their right of fending reprefentatives or members to parliament. For various reafons the number of the house of commons has been encreased from three hundred, about which number it was fup

་

1

pofed

posed to be in Fortescue's time*, to more than five hundred, exclufive of the members of Scotland. From the change in the policy, manners, and cuftoms of the kingdom, the

* Fort. de Laud. Leg. Ang. c. xviii. p. 35. This great man fays, "The ftatutes of England are produced quite in another manner, not enacted by the fole will of the prince, but with the concurrent confent of the whole kingdom by their reprefentatives in parliament. So that it is morally impoffible, but that they are and must be calculated for the good of the people, and they must needs. be full of wisdom and prudence, fince they are the refult not of one man's wisdom only, or an hundred, but fuch an affembly as the Roman fenate was of old, more than three hundred select perfons." Under correction, I beg leave to fuggeft, that Judge Blakiston and most other writers upon the rights of the commons, as Prynne, Petit, Selden, &c. have mistaken and misreprefented this paf, fage of Fortescue; the error may have proceeded from attending to the English verfion of this refpectable author, which I have copied above. The bare statement of the original words, dum nedum principis voluntate, fed & totius regni affenfu ipfa conduntur, will, I think, fufficiently prove, that in mentioning the number three hundred, he included the lords Spiritual and temporal, as well as the commons, without whose consent no act of parliament could then pafs, any more than at prefent. His affimilation of them alfo to the Roman fenators, who were not the chofen delegates or reprefentatives of the people, ftrengthens my fuggeftion; and the affertion of Mr. Gurdon, that learned inveftigator of the old parliamentary inftitutions, that the number of the house of commons was but one hundred and twenty-fix at the latter end of Hen. VIII.'s reign, feems to place the matter out of all doubt,

Whence the idea of property in boroughs

right or duty of fending reprefentatives to
parliament is no longer felt as a grievance or
hardship, but valued as an ineftimable right,
liberty, and benefit; and the appraisement of
its value is now settled by the paucity of the
voters, in whom the right of election for the
borough is vefted. Hence arofe the idea of
property in boroughs; for where the right
of election remained by the decay or de-
crease of population in the borough vested in
few individuals, it often happened, that these
few voters were tenants or dependents of
fome wealthy or powerful man of property
in the neighbourhood. The influence and
power of the opulent over their tenants and
dependents, or, as they formerly often were
their vaffals, feudatories, or bondsmen, were
in ancient times very different from what
they now are. At prefent I do not conceive
a poffible cafe, in which, if the right of voting
for a borough were vested but in one fingle
individual, how that individual fhould be con-
strained or obliged to give his vote for one
perfon in preference to another.
In pro-
portion to the certainty, with which a small
number of electors could return the mem-
ber they chofe, was this ideal borough-right
supposed to be vefted either in the electing
individuals of the borough, or in thofe, who

had

had an intereft in or influence over the electors.

In process of time, this certainty of returning their own man came to be looked upon as a fpecies of property, and as that idea gained ground, so did the legislature become tender of invading it, upon the true conftitutional principle of holding and preferving all private property facred and inviolable. There could not in reality be a groffer violation of the freedom of election, than to prevent the electors from chufing thofe, whom benevolence, affection, and gratitude should suggest or point out as the most agreeable perfons to represent them in parliament. Upon the prefumptive force of fuch motives are indivi

duals very frequently, though very improperly, faid to command the votes of a borough; for no phyfical nor moral, much lefs any legal or conftitutional restraint or obligation of voting for a particular person, can by poffibility exift; and our acts of parliament have gone almoft to the utmost extent of human jurifdiction, in order to obviate and prevent the effects .of any undue influence, bribery, and corruption upon the electors.

It is truly wonderful to confider the delicate, and at the fame time effectual remedy, which our admirable conftitution applies to

perfons improperly faid to

command the votes of a borough.