and governed; yet the fubfiftence of the government depends not only upon the continuation of that original contract, but in this mutual and reciprocal covenant, engagement, or contract of every individual to abide by and enforce his own voluntary act and deed; for it is a firft principle of our constitutional policy, that every law of England is the free, unbiaffed, and deliberate act of every English

man.

It is but to fuch a political government as ours, that these, I may almost say, metaphyfical truths can be applied; they have no foundation in the first principle of the civil law, quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem. As the will of the prince is not under the controul of the people, they have no participation in the act impofed upon them; and its coercive obligation can be urged against the people upon no other ground, than that of a servile, timid, or compulfive acquiescence in the arbitrary dictates of. an uncontroulable power. The operative coercion and energy of a British act of parliament can never be fo clearly seen, as when viewed in antithefis to the defpotic mandates of an arbitrary monarch. If we could bring ourselves éven to conceive a contract or compact between a people and an abfolute defpotic fovereign, Hh3

yet

Our laws bind

ing upon each

individual, be

caufe every one

ailents to their paffing.

This reafon apbitrary go

plies not to ar

vernments.

yet as the whole legislative power rests folely in him, it neceffarily and effentially precludes the very poffibility of any mutual and reciprocal covenant, engagement, or contract of the individuals with each other; and this is the vivifying fap, that pervades every fibre of our conftitution.

Into what an extravagant error do not they fall, who attempt to justify by the spirit of the English conftitution the oppofition and resistance of individuals to the establishment of its government? For if there can exift upon earth a government of human inftitution, that emphatically and effentially condemns and precludes fuch anomalous efforts of the discontented members of a community to difturb or fubvert the establishment of the whole fociety, it is the conftitution of Great Britain. In arbitrary regal governments, where the will of the fovereign makes the law, the aggrieved fubject is immediately challenged by the oppreffive mandate of his fovereign to protect his own natural rights by perfonal refiftanee. There is no intervening lenitive between his judgment and his feelings; the mental condemnation of an unreasonable command is as quickly fucceeded by the impulse to resist it, as the report fucceeds the flash of a discharged muf

quet,

The doctrine of

and non-refiftance in arbitrary go

paffive obedience

can only exift

quet. Nothing fhort of the ftricteft paffive obedience and non-refiftance can enfure to an arbitrary fovereign the universal fubmiffion of his fubjects. In regal governments was this doctrine engendered, foftered, and reared; and when our kings wifhed or attempted to erect themselves into regal arbitrary fove- vernments. reigns, they attempted at the fame time to tranfplant it into this country; but the foil and climate of a political government, fuch as ours happily is, were little congenial with the nature of the plant. In the unnatural heat of exceffive prerogative under the Tudors and Stuarts it was forced into a puny exotic shoot, that drooped, withered, and decayed, when exposed to the natural foil and open free air of the English constitution.

Few or none of my readers are ignorant of the fatal effects, which have proceeded from the rancorous differences and difputes upon this doctrine, that formerly divided and disgraced our unhappy country. It has stained with blood and infamy the field, the judicature, the senate, and the church. Of this, as of moft other party differences in this country, it may moft truly be faid, "The heat of honeft men being once raised, and the cooler

* Yorke's Confid. on the Law of Forfeiture, p. 3.

The fatal effects establish thefe doctrines.

of attempting to

lity of paffive obedience and non-refiftance in our government.

paffions of artful men diffembled by a specious zeal for public good, the calm voice of reafon and the law finds no attention; and perfons of less understanding, incited by example, add greatly to the weight of that clamour, which for a time has ever been too

The impoffibi ftrong for argument." Thus if we confider but coolly and impartially what is and ever was the real doctrine of paffive obedience and non-refistance, we fhall find, that it could never by poffibility have been applicable to, or practicable in the English government; for in the political form of our government, no king could ever iffue commands, nor demand obeiffance in any thing, which exceeded or contradicted the law of the land. *« The confequences of fuch a frame of government are obvious. That the laws are the rule to both, the common measure of the power of the crown, and of the obedience of the fubject." The conftitution can know no obedience, where there is no power to com- . mand; but there is no power given by our conftitution to the king to command beyond the law; and therefore the constitution can never have had in contemplation fuch paffive

+ Mr. Lechmere's firft Speech in Dr. Sacheverel's Trial.

obedience

obedience of the subject in that, which is not law. The fame line, which circumfcribes and confines the power of the crown, marks the extent of the subjects obedience. The very use and admiffion of the term subject is a metaphyfical demonftration, that the doctrine is wholly inapplicable to the state of a limited monarchy, such as that of England confeffedly is. Subject and fovereign are correlatives; the one cannot exift without the other. In the English constitution the power of the fovereign or king is confined or limited to that of the law; beyond this limitation the very relation ceases; confequently, where there is no king nor fovereign, there the paffive obedience and non-refiftance of the fubject to him is out of the question, as is felf-evident.

To queftion whether in our constitution the paffive obedience and non-refiftance of the subject be to be maintained, is fubftantially to queftion whether the law can bind the community and its members to fubmiffion. And this is a question, that I have not yet found moved by the most devoted enthusiasts for regal power, with all its fanatic, arbitrary, indefeasible jure divino prerogatives. In arbitrary regal governments, the law must ever be uncertain, because the will of the prince, which conftitutes it, is naturally uncertain,

and

In a limited monarchy the

power of the obedience of the fubject co-extenfive.

king and the