seen-but by working them through, sometimes in easy effort and more time, sometimes in full strain and shorter time; and thus by my own movements I learnt the conceptions of space which I now include in the symbolic formula s=fr, or space is the product of so many units of acting force and of a function of the time through which it acts. And now, when I talk of the distance between me and Sirius, or of the force which is hurling me through space myriads of miles in an hour, I am affirming, though I am not clearly conceiving, the equivalent to a vast measurable multiple of my own expended will-force.

CHAPTER IV.

FUNDAMENTAL PROPOSITIONS IN ALL REASONING ABOUT FORCE.

(25.) I CANNOT See how the reasoning of (21) is to be denied, except by a denial either that the solving relation of which I spoke can have place, or that I can find this relation. Such denial, when stated logically, can, I think, only amount to a denial that what I call my will-force, my will in act, can have a proper relation to outward physical force. To deny that I am, or that I find myself, in relation, is to affirm that I am out of relation, that is, that I am what they call the absolute; which is plainly absurd. To a denial of a fact of consciousness, such as this relation of my will in act, which I say I know and find, there is no reply beyond an appeal to consciousness, which every thinker must make for himself. If anyone pretends that it is absurd to affirm a real measurable relation between my will-force and outward physical force, I can refer to the test of experience for for my voucher.

Supposing that you

are here; a being like myself, with a balance and weights, I beg you to put two pounds in one scale, and nothing in the other. The empty scale is in the air: I put my finger in it, and there is equilibrium. I can predict how long it shall last; I can predict which scale shall rise, and which shall fall, and by my will fulfil my predictions, maintaining the postures of the scales as long as I please. Is it then absurd to speak of measurable relation between my will-force and gravitation?

It is very good in you to inform me, that the force acting through my finger is one of the physical forces which Biologists and Physiologists quite understand, from their knowledge of the vital properties of protoplasm. Let them come here with their scientific knowledge, and predict for half a minute the behaviour of this force, under any conditions they may choose as most convenient for the display of their wisdom.

Put two pounds in each scale; there is equilibrium. I take one pound out of one scale, and put my finger there instead of it. There is still equilibrium. When my will force can thus take the place of your unit of pounds, and do its work, combining with the unit in the scale to produce the same relation of equality, as the two units produced together, will you still deny such measurable

relation between my force?

will-force and physical

(26.) A stone is in my hands: If I simply let it go, it will select for its movement the direction of the earth's centre, describing a right line. I can, before it goes, predict to you a curve which it shall describe before it reaches the earth, as well as the vertical plane in which that curve shall lie, and the distance from me at which it meets the horizon, both with tolerable accuracy; and by the command of my will-force, the stone shall fulfil my prediction. When my will can thus combine at my pleasure with a physical force, compelling that force to work with will, as it works with another so-called material force, to produce the result which I command, will you still persist in your denial of a proper relation between will-force and physical? Go, talk of your eternal conservations, invariabilities, and indestructibilities! I can confute you, and spoil them all, within a certain sphere, whenever I please. For this 'I can' I give you all the proof that reason can require, by prediction and fulfilment : fulfilment that no other prophet nor philosopher can foretell ; prediction that no other finite agent can accomplish.

(27.) I have had a long correspondence with a distinguished metaphysician about my beginning of philosophy, which ended by his claiming the victory

at this point, that I refused to define in terms exact enough for him what I mean by my will-force. He demanded my unit, and scale of measure; but I was unable to send him a pound of it for his examination. I can no more define it, than I can define 'I am.' 'I will,' with my will-force in conflict with difficulty inward or outward, is my starting-point, included in 'I am' when my will is in action at my beginning of thought. And so far from my being able to assign a scale on which it may be measured, this will-force is my only scale for the measurement of all other force of which I have accurate knowledge. I refuse to attempt further definition. I am bound either to describe and define it to an enquirer, or else to tell him, without ambiguity, how he may find my clear meaning for himself, as I find it. I refer him to the easy investigation which I have spoken of (19), into the fact of transition in consciousness, from purely passive sensation to active effort. I say, you are in your easiest garden chair, quite in repose in the sunshine, not moving a muscle. Ask yourself, What is the condition, necessary and sufficient, that I set myself to work? You know that nothing but main force can lift you from that chair, and set you and keep you working fifteen minutes at that roller. From what quarter is that force to come? Can it come into your consciousness otherwise than from