C. APOTHEOSIS OF WILL

§ 19. Stoicism 1

The founder of the Stoic school, ZENO2 of Citium in Cyprus, was the son of a family of merchants of Phoenician origin. Upon losing his fortune through shipwreck, he decided to indulge his taste for study. He was alternately the disciple of Crates, the Cynic, of Stilpo, the Megarian, and of the Academicians, Xenocrates and Polemo. Thereupon he taught philosophy in the ΣToà Tоikiλn at Athens. Convinced of the rightness of suicide, he put an end to his life about 260, leaving a great reputation and a large number of disciples behind. The school was continued by Cleanthes, a native of the Troad, the supposed author of the so-called hymn of Cleanthes, and after the voluntary

Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic schools. The inscription also gives as some information, at least indirectly, concerning matters hitherto little known, as for example, the organization of the school during the imperial period, its mode of appointing scholarchs, etc.

1 [Ritter and Preller, pp. 392 ff.; Tiedemann, System der stoischen Philosophie, 3 vols. Leipsic, 1776; Ravaisson, Essai sur le stoicisme, Paris, 1856; Leferrière, Mémoire concernant l'influence du stoicisme sur la doctrine des jurisconsultes romains, Paris, 1860; Hirzel, Untersuchungen zu Ciceros Philosophie, 3 vols., Leipsic, 1877-83 (Part II., pp. 1–566, for Stoics); Weygoldt, Die Philosophie der Stoa, Leipsic, 1883; Ogereau, Essai sur le système philosophique des Stoiciens, Paris, 1885; Bonhöfer, Epiktet und die Stoa, Stuttgart, 1890; and Die Ethik des Stoikers Epiktet, Stuttgart, 1894; Schmekel, Die Philosophie der mittleren Stoa, Berlin, 1892; Zahn, Der Stoiker Epiktet, 2d ed., Leipsic, 1895; Stein, Die Psychologie der Stoa, 2 vols., Berlin, 1886-88; F. Susemihl, Geschichte der Litteratur in der Alexandrinerzeit, 2 vols., Leipsic, 1891-92.-TR.]

Diog. L., VII. [Pearson, Fragments of Zeno and Cleanthes, Cam bridge, 1889].

death of the latter, by Chrysippus of Tarsus 1 (according to others, of Soli) in Cilicia (280-210), in whose numerous polemical writings against the Academy, the teachings of the school received their final form.2

In order to form a correct conception of Stoicism we must remember (1) that it is not merely a philosophy and a system of ethics, but a religion raised upon the ruins of popular polytheism; (2) that its founder and its most ardent disciples trace their origin either to Semitic Asia or to Roman Italy; (3) that it is not the work of a single individual, but a collection of doctrines from different sources which meet in one and the same channel like the tributaries of a river. Hence its conservatism in religion and its dogmatism in metaphysics. Hence also its practical turn, and, finally, the complex and wholly eclectic nature of its teachings.

Like Epicurus, Zeno and the Stoics pursue science for the sake of life; truth, in so far as it is good and useful (τὸ ἐπιτήδειον, τὸ ὠφέλιμον); the search for the first cause of being, in order to discover the final goal of life (To Téλos). Wisdom, i. e., theoretical and practical virtue, is the goal. Theoretical virtue consists in thinking correctly (ἀρετὴ λογική) and in having correct notions of the nature of things (aperǹ þvσikń); but practical virtue, which consists in right living and in acting according to reason, is the highest type of virtue, the goal aimed at by theoretical virtue, which is but a means. Whatever does not tend to make us better, and has no influence on our impulses and actions, is indifferent or bad. Logic, metaphysics, and the sciences have no raison d'être except in so far as they are of practical value. They introduce us to the study of ethics, and this gives them their importance in the teachings of the school.

1 Diog. L., VII., 179 ff; Cicero, passim.

* Cicero, De fin., IV., 19, 56; Diog. L., VII., 1; Ogereau, op. cit.

Conformably with its voluntaristic and anti-dualistic tendencies, Stoicism rejects Plato's separate Idea, even more emphatically than Aristotle. Ideas or universals have no objective existence; they exist neither outside of things, as Plato teaches, nor in things, as Aristotle holds; they are mere abstractions of thought (evvonμara), to which nothing corresponds in reality. Moreover, the soul has no innate ideas; it is an empty tablet, and all its concepts come to it from without (0úpalev). The sensible impression (Túπwσs) is, according to Cleanthes, like an impression made upon a material object, like the mark of a seal upon wax. Chrysippus defines it as a modification of the soul (érepoíwois). Sensation (ato@nois) is the common source of all our ideas (pavraolai). The latter are divided into four categories, according as they express: substantiality (ὑποκείμενα), quality (ποιά), mode of being (πῶς ἔχοντα), or relation (pós тí πws ěxovтa). An idea is true when it is an exact reproduction of its object. The criterion of the truth of an idea is its clearness, its self-evidence (pavraoíaι KAтаληTTIKAί). There are, according to Zeno, four degrees of knowledge: presentation, (pavтaoía), assent (σvyкaтáOeois), comprehension (Karáλnis), and understanding (èπioτńμn). In order to illustrate the highest degree of knowledge, which the philosopher alone attains, Zeno, it is said, used to place his left hand upon his clenched right. Following the example of Aristotle, the Stoics regarded grammar and rhetoric as integral parts of logic. They are worthy successors of the great logician in this field; indeed, the majority of our technical terms in grammar and syntax are of Stoic origin.1

1 For the Stoic logic, see Diog. L., VII., 41 ff.; Cic., Acad. pr., II., 47, and post, I., 11; Sextus Emp., Adv. math., VIII.; Stobaeus, Ecl. I.; Simplicius, In Categ., f. 16b; [Prantl, Geschichte der Logik: Heinze, Zur Erkenntnisslehre der Stoiker, Leipsic, 1880; Stein, Die Erkenntnisstheorie der Stoiker, vol. II. of work mentioned above.

TR.].

The Stoic metaphysic is, like their theory of knowledge, even more realistic than the system of Aristotle. It is concrete spiritualism pure and simple. Mind and body are two aspects of one and the same reality. In the real being, mind is the active element (TÒ TOLOûv); matter, the passive element (тò πáσxov). There is no such thing as pure spirit. Whatever Aristotle may think of him, God has a body, and the world constitutes this body. The universe is a living being (Sov), of which God is the soul (ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου), the governing intelligence (νοῦς, λόγος τοῦ παντός), the sovereign law (εἱμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη), the motive principle, the animating warmth (πveûμa tupoeidés, πῦρ τεχνικόν, πῦρ νοερόν, πνεῦμα διῆκον δι ̓ ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου).

The Stoic theology is a kind of compromise between pantheism and theism. God is identical with the universe, but this universe is a real being, a living God who has a knowledge of things (vous), who governs our destinies. (πρόνοια), who loves us (φιλάνθρωπος), and desires our good (κηδεμονικός, ὠφέλιμος, εὐποιητικὸς ἀνθρώποις), without, however, participating in human passions. The Stoics ascribe providential love to the Infinite Being; hence their teaching differs essentially from that of the Peripatetics and Epicureans (οὐκ ἀθάνατον μόνον και μακάριον, ἀλλὰ καὶ piλávoρwπov). Their pantheism, which does not exclude the notion of Providence, is essentially religious. They have a pious respect for the religious forms of paganism; they grant the existence of gods who are inferior to Jupiter, and who are revealed either in the stars or in the forces of nature; but they declare these gods to be mortal, and ascribe immortality to the Supreme Being alone.1

1 The Stoics of the different periods differ widely as to religion. The ancient Stoics are unenlightened enough to combat the heliocentric system in the name of religion, while the Roman Stoics are much more liberal, but not less accommodating. They look upon myths as allegories, the hidden meaning of which must be unravelled. Jupiter is the soul, but the intelligent soul, of the world.

Conformably with its voluntaris dencies, Stoicism rejects Plato's. emphatically than Aristotle. Ide: objective existence; they exist n as Plato teaches, nor in things, : are mere abstractions of though nothing corresponds in reality. no innate ideas; it is an empty ta come to it from without (θύραθεν sion (Túπwσls) is, according to Clea made upon a material object, like wax. Chrysippus defines it as a 1 (ἑτεροίωσις). Sensation (αἴσθησις) of all our ideas (pavтaoíai). The four categories, according as they (Vπокeíμeva), quality (πolá), mode or relation (πρός τί πως ἔχοντα). is an exact reproduction of its objec truth of an idea is its clearness, its s KaтαληπтIKαί). There are, accordin of knowledge: presentation, (pavтC θεσις), comprehension (κατάληψις (èπLOτńμn). In order to illustrate knowledge, which the philosopher it is said, used to place his left ha right. Following the example of regarded grammar and rhetoric as They are worthy successors of the field; indeed, the majority of our te mar and syntax are of Stoic origin.1

1 For the Stoic logic, see Diog. L., VII.. 47, and post, I., 11; Sextus Emp., Adv. m I.; Simplicius, In Categ., f. 16b; [Pra Heinze, Zur Erkenntnisslehre der Stoiker, Erkenntnisstheorie der Stoiker, vol. II. of

TR.].

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