phers, is the harmony existing between Locke and Spinoza, that is to say, between empiricism and rationalism. Locke agrees with his contemporary at Amsterdam not only in his repudiation of species, but in his denial of the liberty of indifference, and in his view that ethics is as susceptible of demonstration as mathematics.

The name of the most illustrious scientist of the seventeenth century is connected with Locke's empiricism supplemented by mathematical speculation. I mean ISAAC NEWTON (1642-1727), the founder of celestial mechanics, whose Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy1 is, next to the Celestial Revolutions of Copernicus, the grandest monument of modern science. His calculus of fluxions, which anticipated, or at least was discovered independently of, Leibniz's integral and differential calculus, his analysis of light, and, above all, his theory of universal gravitation, according to which bodies are attracted to each other in direct proportion to their masses and in inverse ratio to the squares of their distances, have exercised an incalculable influence upon what he calls natural philosophy.

Locke's philosophy, with its principles of observation and analysis, also formed the nucleus of a distinguished school of English moralists. We might mention the names of: SHAFTESBURY,2 CLARKE, HUTCHESON, FERGUSON,5

3

1 Naturalis philosophia principia mathematica, London, 1687.

21671-1713. [Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, and Times, 1711; ed. by W. Hatch, 3 vols., London, 1869. See Stephen, Essays on Freethinking and Plainspeaking; G. v. Gizycki, Die Philosophie Shafiesbury's, Leipsic and Heidelberg, 1876; Th. Fowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, London, 1882; Ernest Albee, The Relation of Shaftesbury and Hutcheson to Utilitarianism (Phil. Rev., V., 1). — Tr.]

1675-1729. Works, 4 folio vols., London, 1738-1742.

1694-1747. [Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, London, 1725 ff.; Philosophia moralis institutio, Glasgow, 1745; A System of Moral Philosophy, id., 1755. See Fowler and Albee. -TR.] 1724-1816. [Institution of Moral Philosophy, London, 1769; tr into German by Garve, Leipsic, 1772. — TR.]

8

ADAM SMITH,1 and many others.2 The freethinkers, who flourished in Great Britain and on the Continent at the end of this period, and the philosophers proper whom we have still to consider, are likewise descendants of Locke. English philosophy is, to this day, almost as empirical and positivistic as in the times of Bacon and Locke. We may even claim, in general, that England, though rich in thinkers of the highest order, has never had but a single school of philosophy, or, rather, that it has never had any, for its philosophy is a perpetual protest against Scholasticism.

§ 58. Berkeley

After what has been said of the agreement existing between Locke and Spinoza, it will hardly surprise us to see a disciple of the English philosopher offering the hand of friendship to Leibniz and Malebranche, the champions of intellectualism and innate ideas across the sea. Although

1 1723-1790. [Theory of Moral Sentiments, London, 1759. Cf. Farrer, Adam Smith (English Philosophers Series), London, 1880.- TR.] Works, 5 vols., Edinburgh, 1812.

2 [Cumberland, De legibus naturæ, London, 1672; Engl. tr. by Jean Maxwell, id., 1727. Cf. Ernest Albee, The Ethical System of Richard Cumberland (Phil. Review, 1895). Joseph Butler, Sermons upon Human Nature, London, 1726. Cf. W. Collins, Butler (Phil. Classics), Edinburgh and London, 1889. Home, Essays on the Principles of Morality and Natural Religion, 1751. Paley, Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, London, 1785. J. Bentham, Principles of Morals and Legislation, 1789. See Gizycki, Die Ethik Hume's, Breslau, 1878; Mackintosh, On the Progress of Ethical Philosophy chiefly during the XVII. and XVIII. Centuries, ed. by W. Whewell, 4th ed., Edinburgh, 1872. — TR.]

[John Toland, Christianity not Mysterious, London, 1696. A. Collins, A Discourse of Freethinking, London, 1713. M. Tindal, Christianity as old as the Creation, London, 1730. Thomas Chubb, A Discourse concerning Reason with Regard to Religion, London, 1730. T. Morgan, The Moral Philosopher, London, 1737 ff. Lord Bolingbroke, Works ed. by D. Mollet, 5 vols., 1753-54. Cf. on the deists, V. Lechler, Geschichte des englischen Deismus, Stuttgart, 1841; Hunt, History of Religious Thought in England, London, 1871-73; and Leslie Stephen's work cited p. 12, note 11.— TR.],

Locke and his opponents differ on several essential points, they reach practically the same conclusions concerning the world of sense. Malebranche and Leibniz spiritualize matter; they explain it as a confused idea, and ultimately assume a principle endowed with desire and perception, that is, mind. Locke's criticism, on the other hand, does not wholly reject the material world; one half of it is retained. Extension, form, and motion exist outside of us; but neither colors, nor sounds, nor tastes, nor smells exist independently of our sensations. Moreover, Locke attacks the traditional notion of substance, or substratum, and defines real substance as a combination of qualities. Indeed, he goes so far as to say that the idea of corporeal substance or matter is as remote from our conceptions and apprehensions as that of spiritual substance or spirit!1 Hence, all that was needed to arrive at the negation of matter or absolute spiritualism was to efface the distinction which he had drawn between primary and secondary qualities, and to call all sensible qualities, without exception, secondary.

This is done by GEORGE BERKELEY, who thus enters upon a course against which Locke had advised in vain. Berkeley was born in Ireland, 1685, of English ancestors, became Bishop of Cloyne, 1734, and died at Oxford, 1753. The following are his most important works: Essay towards a New Theory of Vision,2 Treatise on the Principles of Human Knowledge, Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher.

1 Essay concerning Human Understanding, II., ch. XXIII., 5.

2 Dublin, 1709. This remarkable treatise clearly anticipates the modern principles of the physiology of sensation.

Dublin, 1710. [Krauth's ed., 1874.]

London, 1713. [Calcutta, 1893.] French, Amsterdam, 1750; German, Rostock, 1756.

London, 1732; French, The Hague, 1734; German, Lemgo, 1737. The works of G. Berkeley, London, 1784, 1820, 1843, 1871. This last edition, published in 4 vols., by A. Campbell Fraser, is the most com

Locke recognizes, with Descartes and Hobbes, that color is nothing apart from the sensation of the person seeing it, that sound exists only for the hearing, that taste and smell are mere sensations, and do not inhere in the things themselves. But in addition to such secondary qualities, which do not inhere in the objects but in the perceiving subject, he assumes primary qualities existing without the mind and belonging to an unthinking substance: extension, figure, and motion. And that is where he is wrong. Just as color, smell, and taste exist only for the person perceiving them, so extension, form, and motion exist only in a mind that perceives them. Take away the perceiving subject, and you take away the sensible world. Existence consists in perceiving or being perceived. That which is not perceived and does not perceive does not exist. The objects do not exist apart from the subjects perceiving them. According to the common view, these objects - houses, mountains, and rivers have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding, and our ideas of them are copies or resemblances of all these things without us. Now, says Berkeley,1 either those external objects or originals of our ideas are perceivable, or they are not perceivable. If they are, then they are ideas (for an idea

something perceived). In that case, there is no difference between objects assumed to be without us and our ideas of them; and "we have gained our point." "If you say they are not, I appeal to any one whether it be sense to assert a color is like something which is invisible; hard or soft, like something which is intangible; and so of the plete. [Selections from Berkeley, with introduction and notes, by A. Campbell Fraser, 4th ed. (revised), 1891. Cf. T. C. Simon, Universal Immaterialism, London, 1862; Controversy between Ueberweg and Simon, in Fichte's Z. f. Ph., vol. 55, 1869; vol. 57, 1870; vol. 59, 1871; A. C. Fraser, Berkeley (Philosophical Classics), Edinburgh and Lon. don, 1881.TR.]

1 Principles of Human Knowledge, § 8.

rest." Hence, there is no real difference between things and our ideas of them. The words sensible thing and idea are synonymous.

Our ideas, or the things which we perceive, are visibly inactive. It is impossible for an idea to do anything, or to be the cause of anything. Hence, spirit or thinking substance alone can be the cause of ideas (sensible things). A spirit is one simple, undivided, active being, as it perceives ideas, it is called the understanding, and as it produces or otherwise operates about them, it is called will. Now all ideas (perceived things) being essentially passive, and spirit eminently active, it follows that we cannot, strictly speaking, have an idea of spirit, will, or soul; at any rate, we cannot form as clear an idea of it as of a triangle, for example. Inasmuch as the idea is absolutely passive and spirit the very essence of activity, the idea of spirit is a contradiction in terms, and no more like spirit than night is like the day.1

In so far as mind perceives ideas it produces things; and these are not two distinct operations: to perceive signifies to produce, and the ideas are the things themselves. Nevertheless, the objects which I perceive have not a like dependence on my will. Nay, very many of them do not depend on it at all. "When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view." There is therefore thus Berkeley proves the existence of God some other will that

1 Berkeley repeatedly points out the impossibility of forming an adequate idea of spiritual things, such as spirit, soul, or will, and he explains this by the radical difference existing between spirit, the essentially active thing, and idea, the essentially passive thing (Principles of Human Knowledge, §§ 27, 89, 135). He likewise insists on the necessity of clearly distinguishing between spirit and idea, thus contradicting Spinoza, who regards them as synonyms (id., § 139).