Virtue is the highest good. so far in their enthusiasm: pleasure is an evil; that renounces all material an even reject mental cult Despising, as they did,. came to violate the principle at least, re For a life of refinem antiquity" substit: takes the place of autonomy, which by Socrates, pass Cynics, howeve in the well-kno ciple of Anti goes to extr The moral i the exagge: peared in and the S

3. F made 1

maste oson'

mer

in

t!

says a great writer,1 by s, the child of a family ring his younger days, crowd whose follies he

, elevate, and ennoble Codrus and of Solon, was

author of the aristocratic er, for whom form is everyiation, an obstacle, and a

will have nothing to do home is in the realms of the deal; the favorite teacher of the theosophists, and the mys. — auuevhat prosy cautiousness in ing to take any risks, he avoids D. The philosophy of Plato is aprudence, its love of adventure ...ation is not like the Philistine

market-place or in the workshop, sured by the narrow boundaries of se lord of the manor, who retires to ang seen the world, and turns his St horizon; disdaining the noise of

gles only in the best society, where elegant, the noblest, and the loftiest ever been spoken in the home of the

ient Greek philosopher whose writings ...ed, and the only one of whom we possess wa. Of the treatises attributed to him by

val modern editions of Plato's Complete Works: The ibrücken, 1781-87; Tauchnitz, Leipsic, 1813 ff.; London, 1826; F. Ast, Leipsic, 1819-32;

Baiter, Orelli, and Winckelmann, Zurich,

are surely spurious; others, like the Parst, the Cratylus, and the Philebus, are

n.

Criticism has also, but without just oned the authorship of the Apology and the writings whose genuineness is beyond doubt number, namely: (1) The Phaedrus, which e selfish rhetoric of the Sophists with the true e of the philosopher, whose chief object is the ige of the invisible world; (2) the Protagoras, or ocratic doctrine of virtue; (3) the Symposium, or coning the different manifestations of the eros, from sensual ve to the philosophical love of beauty, truth, and good. ness, as this was personified in Socrates; (4) the Gorgias, the true sage as opposed to the Sophist; (5) the Republic, or concerning the State which realizes the idea of justice; (6) the Timæus, or concerning the nature and origin of the

1839-42; Ch. Schneider (Greek and Latin), Paris, 1846-56 ff.; K. F. Hermann, Leipsic, 1851-53; [Schanz, Leipsic, 1875 ff. Ritter and Preller, pp. 233 ff.].

[The Dialogues of Plato. Translated into English, with Analyses and Introductions, by B. Jowett, 4 vols., Oxford, 1871; 3d ed. revised and corrected, 5 vols., New York and London, 1892; Platons Werke, German transl. by Schleiermacher, 3d ed., Berlin, 1855-62; also by H. Müller, 8 vols., Leipsic, 1850-66. — TR.]; Plato's Works, French transl. by V. Cousin, 8 vols., Paris, 1825-40.

For Plato and his writings, consult: [Ast, Platons Leben und Schriften, Leipsic, 1816; K. F. Hermann, Geschichte und System der platonischen Philosophie, Heidelberg, 1839]; Grote, Plato and the other Companions of Socrates, 3 vols., London, 1865 [new ed. 1885], also the same author's History of Greece; Schaarschmidt, Die Sammlung der platonischen Schriften, Bonn, 1866; Fouillée, La philosophie de Platon. Exposition, histoire, et critique de la théorie des idées, 2d ed., Paris, 1888–89; [Chaignet, La vie et les ecrits de Platon, Paris, 1871; Bénard, Platon. Sa philosophie, précédée d'un aperçu de sa vie et de ses écrits, Paris, 1892; Huit, La vie et l'œuvre de Platon, 2 vols., Paris, 1893; Pater, Plato and Platonism, New York and London, 1893; Van Oordt, Plato and his Times, Oxford and the Hague, 1895; B. Bosanquet, A Companion :0 Plato's Republic, New York, 1895].

world; (7) the Theaetetus, or concerning knowledge and Ideas; (8) the Phado, or concerning the immortality of the soul; (9) the Laws, a work which seems to be a partial retraction of the Republic. These treatises are dialogues.1 Socrates is the chief spokesman in the majority of them, and his speeches reflect the author's thought most faithfully. His use of the dialogue-form enables Plato to present us with his own philosophy as well as with the history of its origin, or the manner in which it arose among the Socratics. It is true, the dialogue-form may perhaps be objected to on the ground that it hinders us from obtaining a comprehensive view of the author's philosophy; indeed, the statement has been made that it is so difficult to systematize Plato's teachings because of his use of the dialogue. The reverse seems to be the case; in our opinion Plato employs this form precisely because he has no finished system like Plotinus, Spinoza, and Hegel. The dialogue might be regarded as an unsuitable method of exposition in case it concealed the philosopher's thoughts. But it hides nothing; form and content are here the same, and the dialogues of Plato present his philosophy in its psychological development.?

A real difficulty, however, arises from the frequent use of myths and allegories. Plato employs them, either in order to assist his readers in understanding abstract truths, or in order to mislead the fanatical democracy as to

1 Regarding the difficult question as to the chronological order of the dialogues of Plato, consult the Introductions of Schleiermacher, the German translator of Plato, and the investigations of Socher, Ast, K. F. Hermann, Bonitz, Zeller, Susemihl, Suckow, Munck, Ueberweg, [Schaarschmidt, Teichmüller, and Siebeck; also, Horn, Platonstudien, Vienna, 1893.-TR.].

• Concerning the genesis of Platonism, see Karl Joël, Zur Erkennt niss der geistigen Entwickelung und der schriftstellerischen Motive Plato's, Berlin, 1887 (reviewed by M. Reinach in the Revue critique, Aug. 22

his religious convictions, or, finally, in order to hide the contradictions of his thought and to escape philosophical criticism by seeking refuge in the licence of the poet. Most of the Platonic myths are mere allegories, which, as the author himself cautions us, must be taken for what they are worth. Some of them, however, seem to express the philosopher's real views. Hence the difficulty which we experience in the Timæus and the Phado, of distinguishing clearly between the pedagogical element and the teaching itself, between the accidental and the essential, between the poetical symbol and the real meaning. Though Plato himself gives us an allegorical exposition of the drama of creation in his Timæus, does it therefore follow that the idea of creation is absolutely foreign to his mind? When he speaks of a creator and follows popular fancy in picturing him as a human workman, does that mean that theism is not the essential element of his thought? The Phado, too, is full of mythological allegories, but who would have the boldness to declare, with Hegel, that Plato assumed pre-existence and immortality only for the world-soul and the divine voûs? We must, in choosing between the idea and the form,- a delicate and rather difficult task, -avoid two contrary conceptions, both of which our historical sense would compel us to reject. In the first place, we must not be deceived by Plato's symbolism; we must not lay too much stress on what is but a literary form, and mistake mere figures of speech for the hidden meaning of things. But we must also abandon the notion that Plato was too great a man to be influenced in his reason by the imagination. We have no right to make him a Christian or a modern philosopher. It is undoubtedly true that Catholic mysticism borrows extensively from Platonic theology, and it is equally certain that Plato's dialectics contain the rudi

Timaus, 28 C, 29 C-D.

world; (7) the Theaetetus, or concerning knowledge and Ideas; (8) the Phado, or concerning the immortality of the soul; (9) the Laws, a work which seems to be a partial retraction of the Republic. These treatises are dialogues.1 Socrates is the chief spokesman in the majority of them, and his speeches reflect the author's thought most faithfully. His use of the dialogue-form enables Plato to present us with his own philosophy as well as with the history of its origin, or the manner in which it arose among the Socratics. It is true, the dialogue-form may perhaps be objected to on the ground that it hinders us from obtaining a comprehensive view of the author's philosophy; indeed, the statement has been made that it is so difficult to systematize Plato's teachings because of his use of the dialogue. The reverse seems to be the case; in our opinion Plato employs this form precisely because he has no finished system like Plotinus, Spinoza, and Hegel. The dialogue might be regarded as an unsuitable method of exposition in case it concealed the philosopher's thoughts. But it hides nothing; form and content are here the same, and the dialogues of Plato present his philosophy in its psychological development.2

A real difficulty, however, arises from the frequent use of myths and allegories. Plato employs them, either in order to assist his readers in understanding abstract truths, or in order to mislead the fanatical democracy as to

1 Regarding the difficult question as to the chronological order of the dialogues of Plato, consult the Introductions of Schleiermacher, the German translator of Plato, and the investigations of Socher, Ast, K. F. Hermann, Bonitz, Zeller, Susemihl, Suckow, Munck, Ueberweg, [Schaarschmidt, Teichmüller, and Siebeck; also, Horn, Platonstudien, Vienna, 1893.TR.].

• Concerning the genesis of Platonism, see Karl Joël, Zur Erkennt niss der geistigen Entwickelung und der schriftstellerischen Motive Plato's, Berlin, 1887 (reviewed by M. Reinach in the Revue critique, Aug. 22