one jot more folid than water. For though the two flat fides of two pieces of marble will more easily approach each other, between which there is nothing but water or air, than if there be a diamond between them: yet it is not that the parts of the diamond are more folid than thofe of water, or refift more; but because, the parts of water being more easily feparable from each other, they will, by a fide motion, be more eafily removed, and give way to the approach of the two pieces of marble. But if they could be kept from making place by that fide-motion, they would eternally hinder the approach of thefe two pieces of marble as much as the diamond; and it would be as impoffible by any force to furmount their refiftance, as to furmount the refiftance of the parts of a diamond. The fofteft body in the world will as invincibly refift the coming together of any other two bodies, if it be not put out of the way, but remain between them, as the hardest that can be found or imagined. He that fhall fill a yielding foft body well with air or water, will quickly find its refiftance: and he that thinks that nothing but bodies that are hard can keep his hands from approaching one another, may be pleased to make a trial with the air inclofed in a foot-ball. The experiment, I have been told, was made at Florence, with a hollow globe of gold filled with water and exactly clofed, which farther hows the folidity of fo foft a body as water. For the golden globe thus filled being put into a prefs which was driven by the extreme force of fkrews, the, water made iffelf way through the pores of that very close metal; and, finding no room for a nearer approach of its particles within, got to the outfide, where it rofe like a dew, and fo fell in drops, before the fides of the globe could be made to yield to the violent compreffion of the engine that fqueezed it.

On folidity depend impulfe, refiftance, and protrufion.

§. 5. By this idea of folidity, is the extenfion of body diftinguished from the extenfion of fpace: the extenfion of body being nothing but the cohefion or continuity of folid, feparable, moveable parts; and the extenfion of space, the continuity of unfolid, inse

parable,

parable, and immoveable parts. Upon the folidity of bodies alfo depend their mutual impulfe, refiftance, and protrufion. Of pure fpace then, and folidity, there are feveral (amongft which I confefs myself one) who perfuade themselves they have clear and diftinct ideas; and that they can think on space, without any thing in it that refifts or is protruded by body. This is the idea of pure space, which they think they have as clear, as any idea they can have of the extenfion of body; the idea of the diftance between the oppofite parts of a concave fuperficies being equally as clear without as with the idea of any folid parts between: and on the other fide they perfuade themfelves, that they have, diftinct from that of pure fpace, the idea of fomething that fills fpace, that can be protruded by the impulfe of other bodies, or refift their motion. If there be others that have not thefe two ideas diftinct, but confound them, and make but one of them; I know not how men, who have the fame idea under different names, or different ideas under the fame name, can in that cafe talk with one another; any more than a mang who, not being blind or deaf, has diftinct ideas of the colour of fcarlet, and the found of a trumpet, could difcourfe concerning fcarlet colour with the blind man I mention in another place, who fancied that the idea of fcarlet was like the found of a trumpet.

§. 6. If any one afk me, what this fo- what it is, lidity is?' I fend him to his fenfes to inform him: let him put a flint or a foot-ball between his hands, and then endeavour to join them, and he will know. If he thinks this not a fufficient explication of folidity, what it is, and wherein it confifts; I promife to tell him what it is, and wherein it confifts, when he tells me what thinking is, or wherein it confifts; or explains to me what extenfion or motion' is, which perhaps feems much easier. The fimple ideas we have are fuch as experience teaches them us, but if,! beyond that, we endeavour by words to make them clearer in the mind; we shall fucceed no better, than if we went about to clear up the darknefs of a blind man's H 4 mind

mind by talking; and to difcourfe into him the ideas of light and colours. The reafon of this I fhall show in another place.

THE

CHA P. V.

Of Simple Ideas of divers Senfes.

HE ideas we get by more than one fenfe are of fpace, or extenfion, figure, reft, and motion; for thefe make perceivable impreffions, both on the eyes and touch and we can receive and convey into our minds the ideas of the extenfion, figure, motion, and reft of bodies, both by feeing and feeling. But having occafion to speak more at large of these in another place, I here only enumerate them.

Simple ideas are the ope-.. rations of the

mind about its other ideas.

CHA P. VI

Of Simple Ideas of Reflection.

§. 1.

TH

HE mind, receiving the ideas, mentioned in the foregoing chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and obferves its own actions about thofe ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are as capable to be the objects of its contemplation as any of those it received from foreign things.

The idea of

§. 2. The two great and principal actions perception, of the mind, which are moft frequently conand idea of fidered, and which are fo frequent, that willing, we have from reevery one that pleases may take notice of fection. them in himself, are these two: Perception or Thinking; and Volition, or Willing.

The

The power of thinking is called the understanding, and the power of volition is called the will; and these two powers or abilities in the mind are denominated faculties. Of fome of the modes of these fimple ideas of reflection, fuch as are Remembrance, Difcerning, Reafoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, &c., I fhall have occafion to speak hereafter.

§. I.

CHAP. VII.

Of Simple Ideas of both Senfation and Reflection.

THE

Pleasure and pain.

HERE be other fimple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of fenfation and reflection, viz. Pleasure or Delight, and its oppofite, Pain or Uneafinefs, Power, Existence, Unity.

§. 2. Delight or uneafinefs, one or other of them, join themselves to almost all our ideas, both of sensation and reflection: and there is fcarce any affection of our fenfes from without, any retired thought of our mind within, which is not able to produce in us pleasure or pain. By pleasure and pain I would be understood to fignify whatsoever delights or molefts us moft; whether it arifes from the thoughts of our minds, or any thing operating on our bodies. For whether we call it fatisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, &c. on the one fide; or uneafinefs, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, mifery, &c. on the other; they are ftill but different degrees of the fame thing, and belong to the ideas of pleasure and pain, delight or uneafinefs; which are the names I fhall moft commonly use for those two forts of ideas.

§. 3. The infinitely wife author of our being having given us the power over feveral parts of our bodies, to move or keep them at reft as we think fit; and also, by the motion of them, to move ourselves and other contiguous bodies, in which confift all the actions of our

body;

body; having alfo given a power to our minds in feveral inftances, to choose, amongst its ideas, which it will think on, and to purfue the inquiry of this or that fubject with confideration and attention, to excite us to thefe actions of thinking and motion that we are capable of; has been pleafed to join to feveral thoughts, and feveral fenfations, a perception of delight. If this were wholly feparated from all our outward fenfations and inward thoughts, we fhould have no reafon to prefer one thought or action to another; negligence to attention; or motion to reft. And fo we should neither ftir our bodies nor employ our minds, but let our thoughts (if I may fo call it) run a-drift, without any direction or defign; and fuffer the ideas of our minds, like unregarded fhadows, to make their appearances there, as it happened, without attending to them. In which flate man, however furnished with the faculties of understanding and will, would be a very idle unactive creature, and pafs his time only in a lazy, lethargick dream. It has therefore pleafed our wife Creator to annex to feveral objects, and the ideas which we receive from them, as alfo to feveral of our thoughts, a concomitant pleasure, and that in feveral objects, to feveral degrees; that thofe faculties which he had endowed us with might not remain wholly idle and unemployed by us.

§. 4. Pain has the fame efficacy and ufe to fet us on work that pleafure has, we being as ready to employ our faculties to avoid that, as to purfue this: only this. is worth our confideration, that pain is often produced by the fame objects and ideas that produce pleasure in us. This their near conjunction, which makes us often feel pain in the fenfations where we expected pleasure, gives us new occafion of admiring the wifdom and goodnefs of our Maker: who, defigning the prefervation of our being, has annexed pain to the application of many things to our bodies, to warn us of the harm that they will do, and as advices to withdraw from them. But he not defigning our preservation barely, but the prefervation of every part and organ in its perfection, hath, in many cafes, annexed pain to thofe very ideas which

delight