from it; would any one queftion, whether it wanted any thing effential? It would be abfurd to afk, Whether a thing really exifting wanted any thing effential to it. Or could it be demanded, Whether this made an effential or specific difference or no; fince we have no other measure of effential or fpecific, but our abstract ideas? And to talk of fpecific differences in nature, without reference to general ideas and names, is to talk unintelligibly. For I would afk any one, What is fufficient to make an effential difference in nature, between any two particular beings, without any regard had to fome abftract idea, which is looked upon as the effence and standard of a species? All fuch patterns and ftandards being quite laid afide, particular beings, confidered barely in themfelves, will be found to have all their qualities equally effential; and every thing, in each individual, will be effential to it, or, which is more, nothing at all. For though it may be reasonable to afk, Whether obeying the magnet be effential to iron? yet, I think, it is very improper and infignificant to ask, Whether it be effential to the particular parcel of matter I cut my pen with, without confidering it under the name iron, or as being of a certain fpecies? And if, as has been faid, our abftract ideas, which have names annexed to them, are the boundaries of fpecies, nothing can be effential but what is contained in thofe ideas.

§. 6. It is true, I have often mentioned a real ef fence, diftinct in fubftances from those abstract ideas of them, which I call their nominal effence. By this real effence I mean the real conftitution of any thing, which is the foundation of all thofe properties that are combined in, and are conftantly found to co-exift with the nominal effence; that particular conftitution which every thing has within itfelf, without any relation to any thing without it. But effence, even in this fenfe, relates to a fort, and fuppofes a fpecies; for being that real conftitution, on which the properties depend, it neceffarily fuppofes a fort of things, properties belonging only to fpecies, and not to individuals; v. g. fuppofing the nominal effence of gold to be a body of fuch a peculiar

a peculiar colour and weight, with malleability and fufibility, the real effence is that conftitution of the parts of matter, on which thefe qualities and their union depend; and is alfo the foundation of its folubility in aqua regia and other properties accompanying that complex idea. Here are effences and properties, but all upon fuppofition of a fort, or general abstract idea, which is confidered as immutable: but there is no individual parcel of matter, to which any of these qualities are fo annexed, as to be effential to it, or infeparable from it. That which is effential belongs to it as a condition, whereby it is of this or that fort: but take away the confideration of its being ranked under the name of some abstract idea, and then there is nothing neceffary to it, nothing infeparable from it. Indeed, as to the real effences of fubftances, we only fuppofe their being, without precifely knowing what they are: but that which annexes them ftill to the fpecies, is the nominal effence, of which they are the fuppofed foundation and caufe.

The nominal effence bounds the fpecies.

§. 7. The next thing to be confidered, is, by which of thofe effences it is that fubftances are determined into forts, or fpecies; and that, it is evident, is by the nominal effence. For it is that alone that the name, which is the mark of the fort, fignifics. It is impoffible therefore that any thing fhould determine the forts of things, which we rank under general names, but that idea which that name is defigned as a mark for; which is that, as has been fhown, which we call nominal effence. Why do we fay, this is a horse, and that a mule; this is an animal, that an herb? How comes any particular thing to be of this or that fort, but because it has that nominal effence, or, which is all one, agrees to that abstract idea that name is annexed to? And I defire any one but to reflect on his own thoughts, when he hears or fpeaks any of thofe, or other names of substances, to know what fort of effences they stand

for.

§. 8. And that the fpecies of things to us are nothing but the ranking them under diftinct names, ac

cording

cording to the complex ideas in us, and not according to precife, diftinct, real effences in them; is plain from hence, that we find many of the individuals that are ranked into one fort, called by one common name, and fo received as being of one fpecies, have yet qualities depending on their real conftitutions, as far different one from another, as from others, from which they are accounted to differ fpecifically. This, as it is easy to be obferved by all who have to do with natural bodies; fo chemifts especially are often, by fad experience, convinced of it, when they, fometimes in vain, feek for the fame qualities in one parcel of fulphur, antimony or vitriol, which they have found in others. For though they are bodies of the fame fpecies, having the fame nominal effence, under the fame name; yet do they often, upon fevere ways of examination, betray qualities fo different one from another, as to frustrate the expectation and labour of very wary chemifts. But if things were diftinguished into fpecies, according to their real effences, it would be as impoffible to find different properties in any two individual fubftances of the fame fpecies, as it is to find different properties in two circles, or two equilateral triangles. That is properly the effence to us, which determines every particular to this or that claffis; or, which is the fame thing, to this or that general name: and what can that be elfe, but that abftract idea, to which that name is annexed? and fo has, in truth, a reference, not fo much to the being of particular things, as to their general denominations.

Not the real effence,

which we

know not.

§. 9. Nor indeed can we rank and fort things, and confequently (which is the end of forting) denominate them by their real effences, because we know them not. Our faculties carry us no farther towards the knowledge and diftinction of fubftances, than a collection of those fenfible ideas which we obferve in them; which, however made with the greateft diligence and exactness we are capable of, yet is more remote from the true internal conftitution, from which thofe qualities flow, than, as I faid, a countryman's idea is from the inward contrivance

trivance of that famous clock at Strafburgh, whereof he only fees the outward figure and motions. There is not fo contemptible a plant or animal, that does not confound the most enlarged understanding. Though the familiar ufe of things about us take off our wonder; yet it cures not our ignorance. When we come to examine the stones we tread on, or the iron we daily handle, we prefently find we know not their make, and can give no reason of the different qualities we find in them. It is evident the internal conftitution, whereon their properties depend, is unknown to us. For to go no farther than the groffeft and most obvious we can imagine amongst them, what is that texture of parts, that real effence, that makes lead and antimony fufible; wood and ftones not? What makes lead and iron malleable, antimony and stones not? And yet how infinitely these come short of the fine contrivances, and unconceivable real effences of plants or animals, every one knows. The workmanship of the all-wife and powerful God, in the great fabric of the univerfe, and every part thereof, farther exceeds the capacity and comprehenfion of the most inquifitive and intelligent man, than the best contrivance of the moft ingenious man doth the conceptions of the most ignorant of rational creatures. Therefore we in vain pretend to range things into forts, and difpofe them into certain claffes, under names, by their real effences, that are fo far from our discovery or comprehenfion. A blind man may as foon fort things by their colours, and he that has loft his fmell, as well distinguish a lily and a rofe by their odours, as by those internal conftitutions which he knows not. He that thinks he can diftinguish theep and goats by their real effences, that are unknown to him, may be pleased to try his skill in thofe fpecies, called caffiowary and querechinchio; and by their internal real effences determine the boundaries of those species, without knowing the complex idea of fenfible qualities, that each of those names ftand for, in the countries where thofe animals are to be found.

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§. 102

Not fubftantial forms, know lefs.

which we

§. 10. Those therefore who have been taught, that the feveral fpecies of fubftances had their diftinct internal fubftantial forms; and that it was thofe forms which made the diftinction of fubftances into their true fpecies and genera; were led yet farther out of the way, by having their minds fet upon fruitless inquiries after fubftantial forms, wholly unintelligible, and where of we have scarce fo much as any obfcure or confufed conception in general.

That the nominal effence by we diftinguifh fpecies, farther

is that where

evident from fpirits.

And.

S... That our ranking and diftinguifhing natural fubftances into fpecies, confifts in the nominal effences the mind makes, and not in the real effences to be found in the things themfelyes, is farther evident from our ideas of fpirits. For the mind getting, only by reflecting on its own operations, thofe fimple ideas which it attributes to fpirits, it bath, or can have no other notion of fpirit, but by attributing all thofe operations, it finds in itself, to a fort of beings, without confideration of matter. even the most advanced notion we have of God is but attributing the fame fimple ideas which we have got from reflection on what we find in ourselves, and which, we conceive to have more perfection in them, than would be in their abfence; attributing, I fay, thofe fimple ideas to him in an unlimited degree. Thus having got, from reflecting on ourfelves, the idea of exiftence, knowledge, power, and pleasure, each of which we find it better to have than to want; and the more we have of each, the better: joining all these together, with infinity to each of them, we have the complex idea of an eternal, omnifcient, omnipotent, infinitely wife and happy Being. And though we are told, that there are different fpecies of angels; yet we know not how to frame diftinct fpecific ideas of them: not out of any conceit that the exiftence of more fpccies than one of fpirits is impoffible, but because having no more fimple ideas (nor being able to frame more) applicable to fuch beings, but only thofe few taken from ourselves, and from the actions of our own minds in VOL. I. thinking,

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