its own operations, proceeding from powers intrinficak and proper to itfelf; which when reflected on by itself, becoming alfo objects of its contemplation, are, as I have faid, the original of all knowledge. Thus the first capacity of human intellect is, that the mind is fitted to receive the impreffions made on it; either through the fenfes by outward objects; or by its own operations when it reflects on them. This is the first step a man makes towards the discovery of any thing, and the ground-work whercon to build all those notions which ever he fhall have naturally in this world, All thofe fublime thoughts which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rife and footing here: in all that good extent wherein the mind wanders, in thofe remote fpeculations, it may feem to be elevated with, it ftirs not one jot beyond thofe ideas which fenfe or reflection have offered for its contemplation. In the recep tion of fimple ideas the understanding is for the most part paffive. §. 25. In this part the understanding is merely paffive; and whether or no it will have these beginnings, and as it were materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. For the objects of our fenfes do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon our minds whether we will or no: and the operations of our minds will not let us be without, at leaft, fome obfcure notions of them. No man can be wholly ignorant of what he does when he thinks. These simple ideas, when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter, when they are imprinted, nor blot them out, and make new ones itself, than a mirror can refufe, alter, or obliterate the images. or ideas which the objects fet before it do therein produce. As the bodies that furround us do diverfly affect our organs, the mind is forced to receive the impreffions, and cannot avoid the perception of thofe ideas that are annexed to them, СНАР. CHAP. II. §. 1. TH Of Simple Ideas. HE better to understand the Uncompounded apour knowledge, one thing is carefully to pearances. be obferved concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that fome of them are fimple, and fome complex. Though the qualities that affect our fenfes are, in the things themselves, fo united and blended, that there is no feparation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the ideas they produce in the mind enter by the fenfes fimple and unmixed. For though the fight and touch often take in from the fame object, at the fame time, different ideas; as a man fees at once motion and colour; the hand feels softness and warmth in the fame piece of wax: yet the fimple ideas, thus united in the fame fubject, are as perfectly diftinct as thofe that come in by different fenfes: the coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of ice being as diftinct ideas in the mind, as the fmell and whitenefs of a lily; or as the taste of fugar, and fmell of a rofe. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man, than the clear and diftinct perception he has of thofe fimple ideas; which, being each in itfelf uncompounded, contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or conception in the mind, and is not diftinguishable into different ideas. §. 2. Thefe fimple ideas, the materials of all our knowledge, are fuggefted and furnifhed to the mind only by thofe two ways above-mentioned, viz. fenfation and reflection. (1) When the understanding is once The mind can neither make nor deftroy them. ftored with thefe (1) Against this, that the materials of all our knowledge are fuggefted and furnished to the mind only by fenfation and reflection, the bishop of Worcester makes ufe of the idea of fubftance in thefe words: "If the idea of fubftance be grounded upon plain and evident reafon, then we must allow thefe fimple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety; and fo can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understanding, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or frame one new fimple idea in the mind, not taken in by the ways aforementioned: nor can any force of the understanding destroy thofe that are there. The dominion of man, in this little world of his own understanding, being much-what the fame as it is in the great world of vifible things; wherein his power, however managed by art and kill, reaches no farther than to compound and divide the materials that are made allow an idea of fubftance, which comes not in by fenfation or reflection; and fo we may be certain of fomething which we have not by these ideas.” To which our author answers: Thefe words of your lordship's contain nothing as I fee in them againft me: for I never faid that the general idea of fubftance comes in by fenfation and reflection, or that it is a fimple idea of fenfation or reflection, though it be ultimately founded in them; for it is a complex idea, made up of the general idea of fomething, or being, with the relation of a fupport to accidents. For general ideas come not into the mind by fenfation or reflection, but are the creatures or inventions of the understanding, as I think I have shown t; and alfo how the mind makes them from ideas which it has got by fenfation and reflection; and as to the ideas of relation, how the mind forms them, and how they are derived from, and ultimately terminate in ideas of fenfation and reflection, I have likewife fhown. But that I may not be mistaken what I mean, when I fpeak of ideas of fenfation and reflection, as the materials of all our knowledge; give me leave, my lord, to fet down here a place or two, out of my book, to explain myfelf; as I thus fpeak of ideas of fenfation and reflection: That thefe, when we have taken a full furvey of them, and their • several modes, and the compofitions made out of them, we shall find to ⚫ contain all our whole stock of ideas, and we have nothing in our minds, ⚫ which did not come in one of these two ways t.' This thought, in another place, I express thus. These are the most confiderable of thofe fimple ideas which the mind has, and out of which is made all its other knowledge; all which it receives by the two forementioned ways of fenfation and reflection §.* And, Thus I have, in a fhort draught, given a view of our original ideas, ⚫ from whence all the rest are derived, and of which they are made up." * In his first letter to the B. 2. c. 25. & c. 28. §. 18. B. 2. c. 21. §. 73. bishop of Worcester. + B. 2. c. 1. §. 5. + B. 3. C. 3. $B. 2. c. 7. §. 10. made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making the leaft particle of new matter, or deftroying one atom of what is already in being. The fame inability will every one find in himself, who fhall go about to fashion in his understanding and fimple idea, not received in by his fenfes from external objects, or by reflection from the operations of his own mind about them. I would have any one try to fancy any taste, which had never affected his palate; or frame the idea of a fcent he had never fmelt: and when he can do this, I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colours, and a deaf man true diftinct notions of founds. This, and the like, faid in other places, is what I have thought concerning ideas of fenfation and reflection, as the foundation and materials of all our ideas, and confequently of all our knowledge: I have fet down thefe particulars out of my book, that the reader having a full view of my opinion herein, may the better fee what in it is liable to your lordfhip's reprehenfion. For that your lordship is not very well fatisfied with it, appears not only by the words under confideration, but by these alfo: "But we are 'Itill told, that our understanding can have no other ideas, but either from fenfation or reflection." Your lordship's argument, in the paffage we are upon, stands thus: If the general idea of fubftance be grounded upon plain and evident reafon, then we muft allow an idea of substance, which comes not in by fenfation or reflection. This is a confequence which, with fubmiffion, I think will not hold, viz. That reafon and ideas are inconfiftent; for if that fuppofition be not true, then the general idea of fubftance may be grounded on plain and evident reafon; and yet it will not follow from thence, that it is not ultimately grounded on and derived from ideas which come in by fenfation or reflection, and fo cannot be said to come in by fenfation or reflection. To explain myfelf, and clear my meaning in this matter. All the ideas of all the fenfible qualities of a cherry come into my mind by fenfation; the ideas of perceiving, thinking, reafoning, knowing, &c. come into my mind by reflection. The ideas of thefe qualities and actions, or powers, are perceived by the mind, to be by themselves inconfiftent with exiftence; or, as your lordfhip well expreifes it, we find that we can bave no true conception of any modes or accidents, but we must conceive a fubftratum, or fubject, wherein they are, i. e. That they cannot exist or fubfift of themfelves. Hence the mind perceives their neceffary con nexion with inherence or being fupported; which being a relative idea, fuperadded to the red colour in a cherry, or to thinking in a man, the mind frames the correlative idea of a fupport. For I never denied, that the mind could frame to itfelf ideas of relation, but have showed the quite contrary in my chapters about relation. But becaufe a relation cannot be founded in nothing, or be the relation of nothing, and the thing here §. 3. This is the reafon why, though we cannot believe it impoffible to God to make a creature with other organs, and more ways to convey into the understanding the notice of corporeal things than those five, as they are ufually counted, which he has given to man: yet I think, it is not poffible for any one to imagine any other qualities in bodies, how foever conftituted, whereby they can be taken notice of, befides founds, taftes, fmells, vifible and tangible qualities. And had mankind been made but with four fenfes, the qualities then, which are the object of the fifth fenfe, had been as far from our notice, imagination, and conception, as now any belonging to a fixth, feventh, or eighth sense, can here related as a fupporter, or a fupport, is not reprefented to the mind, by any clear and diftinct idea; therefore the obfcure and indiftinct, vague idea of thing, or fomething, is all that is left to be the pofitive idea, which has the relation of a fupport, or fubftratum, to modes or accidents; and that general, indetermined idea of fomething is, by the abstraction of the mind, derived alfo from the fimple ideas of fenfation and reflection: and thus the mind, from the pofitive, fimple ideas got by fenfation and reflection, comes to the general, relative idea of fubftance, which, without thefe pofitive, fimple ideas, it would never have. This your lordship (without giving by detail all the particular steps of the mind in this bufinefs) has well expreffed in this more familiar way: "We find we can have no true conception of any modes or accidents, but we must conceive a substratum, or subject, wherein they are; fince it is a repugnancy to our conceptions of things, that modes or accidents fhould fubfift by themselves.' Hence your lordship calls it the rational idea of fubftance: and fays, "I grant that by fenfation and reflection we come to know the powers and properties of things; but our reafon is fatisfied that there must be fome thing beyond thefe, because it is impoffible that they fhould fubfift by themfelves;" fo that if this be that which your lordship means by the rational idea of fubftance, I fee nothing there is in it against what I have faid, shat it is founded on fimple ideas of fenfation or reflection, and that it is a very obfcure idea. Your lordship's conclufion from your foregoing words is," and fo we may be certain of fome things which we have not by thofe ideas;" which is a propofition, whofe precife meaning, your lordship will forgive me, if I profefs, as it ftands there, I do not understand. For it is uncertain to me, whether your lordship means, we may certainly know the exiftence of fomething, which we have not by thofe ideas; or certainly know the diftinct properties of fomething, which we have not by those ideas: or certainly know the truth of fome propofition, which we have not by thofe ideas: for to be certain of fomething may fignify either of thefe. But in which foever of thefe it be meant, I do not fee how I am concerned in it. |