demning to destruction the memory of the man who first made a distinction between expediency and moral right.

That this trait of reasoning upon principle, regardless of the consequences, is likely to be a feature in the character of the Quakers, we are warranted in pronouncing, when we discover no less than three circumstances in the constitution of the Quakers which may be causes in producing it*.

This trait seems, in the first place, to be the direct and legitimate offspring of the trait explained in the last chapter. For every time a Quaker is called upon to bear his testimony by suffering, whether in the case of a refusal to comply with the laws or with the customs and fashions of the land, he is called upon to refer to his own conscience, against his own temporal interest and against the opinion of the world. The moment he gives up principle for policy in the course of his reasoning upon such occa

*The Sierra Leone Company, which was founded for Jaudable purposes, might have been filled by Quakers; but when they understood that there was to be a fort and depôt of arms in the settlement, they declined becoming proprietors.

sions, then he does as many others do, that is, he submits to the less inconvenience; and then he ceases to be a Quaker. But while he continues to bear his testimony, it is a proof that he makes expediency give way to what he imagines to be right. The bearing, therefore, of testimony, where it is conscientiously done, is the parent, as it is also the bulwark and guardian, of reasoning upon principle. It throws out a memento whenever it is practised, and habituates the subject of it to reason in this manner.

But this trait is nourished and supported, again, by other causes; and, first, by the influence which the peculiar customs of the Quakers must occasionally have upon their minds. A Quaker cannot go out of doors but he is reminded of his own singularities, or of his difference in a variety of respects from his fellow-citizens. Now every custom in which he is singular, whether it be that of dress, or of language, or of address, or any other, is founded in his own mind on moral principle, and in direct opposition to popular opinion and applause. He is therefore perpetually reminded, in almost all his daily habits, of the two opposite systems

of

of reasoning, and is perpetually called upon, as it were, to refer to the principles which originally made the difference between him and another citizen of the world.

Neither has the discipline of the Quakers a less tendency to the production of the trait in question. For the business which is transacted in the monthly and quarterly and yearly meetings, is transacted under the deliberation of grave and serious men, who consider themselves as frequently under the divine influence, or as spiritually guided, on such occasions. In such assemblies it would be thought strange, if any sentiment were uttered which savoured of expediency in opposition to moral right. The youth, therefore, who are present, see no other determination of any question than by a religious standard. Hence these meetings operate as schools, in which they are habituated to reason upon principle, and to the exclusion of all worldly considerations which may sug gest themselves in the discussion of any point.

CHAP

CHAPTER VII.

A fifth trait is, that they have an extraordinary independence of mind-this prabable, because the result of the former trait-because likely to be produced by their discipline-by their peculiar customs and by their opinions on the supposed dignity of situations in life-because, again, they are not vulnerable by the seduction of Governments-or by the dominion of the Church-or by the power of fashion, and of the opinion of the. world.

THE next trait, conspicuous in the character of the Quakers, and which is nearly allied to the former, is that of Independence of Mind.

This trait is of long standing, having been coeval with the Society itself. It was observed by Cromwell, that "he could neither win the Quakers by money, nor by honours, nor by places, as he could other people.". A similar opinion is entertained of them at the present day. For of all people it is generally supposed that they are the least easily worked upon, or the least liable to be made tools or

instruments

instruments in the hands of others. Who, for example, could say on any electioneering occasion, whatever his riches might be, that he could command their votes ?

There will be no difficulty in believing this to be a real feature in the character of the Quakers; for, when men are accustomed to refer matters to their reason, and to reason upon principle, they will always have an independence of mind, from a belief that they are right. And wherever it is a maxim with them not to do evil that good may come, they will have a similar independence, from a consciousness that they have never put themselves into the power of the world. Hence this independence of mind must be a result of the trait explained in the former chapter.

But in looking into the constitution of the Quakers, we shall find it full of materials for the production of this noble trait.

Their discipline has an immediate tendency to produce it; for in no community does a man feel himself so independent as a man. A Quaker is called upon in his own Society to the discharge of important offices. He sits as a representative, a legislator, and a

judge.