to contract her power, within the narrowest limits poffible, is therefore the most capital advantage we can obtain; and is worth purchafing by almost any conceffions. They infifted that the abfolute fecurity derived from this plan, in ́cluded in itself an indemnification: Firft; by faving us, more effectually than any other method could, from the neceffity of another war, and confequently by giving us an opportunity of increafing our trade, and lowering our debt. Secondly; by permitting our colonies on the continent to extend themfelves without danger or molestation. They fhewed the great increase of population in those colonies within a few years. They fhewed that their trade with the mother country had uniformly increased with this population. That being now freed from the moleftation of enemies, and the emulation of rivals, unlimited in their poffeffions, and fafe in their perfons, our American planters would, by the very courfe of their natural propagation in a very fhort time, furnish out a demand of our manufactures, as large as all the working hands of Great Britain could poffibly fupply. That there was therefore no reason to dread that want of trade, which their adversaries infinuated, fince North America alone would fupply the deficiencies of our trade in every other part of the world.. They expatiated on the great variety of climates, which that country contained, and the vaft refources which would thence arife to commerce. That the value of our 'conquefts thereby ought not to be eftimated by the prefent produce, but by their probable increafe. Neither ought the value of any country to be folely tried on its commercial advantages s that extent of territory and a number of subjects, are matters of as much confideration to a state attentive to the fources of real grandeur, as the mere advantages of traffic; that fuch ideas are rather fuitable to a limited and petty commonwealth, like Holland, than to a great, powerful and warlike nation. That on these principles, having made very large demands in North America, it was necessary to relax in other parts. That France would never be brought to any confiderable ceffion in the West Indies; but that her power and increase there could never become formidable, becaufe the exiftence of her fettlements depended upon ours in North America, fhe not being any longer left a place from whence they can be fupplied with provifions; that in lofing fomething of the fugar trade, we loft very little else than a luxury; as to the other produce of the Weft Indies, it might be in a great measure, and in part already was fupplied by our poffeffions on the continent, which daily increased not only in the quantity but in the kind of its produce. We do not pretend to pass any judgment on the merits of the feveral fides of this question, which is certainly a very difficult one. relate opinions, as well as facts, historically. We The only point, which remained to be adjusted in the Weft Indies, was the logwood trade. Spain confented not to disturb the English in their occupation of cutting logwood in the bay of Honduras, and to permit them to occupy fuch buildings as may be neceffary for them in this occupation. Great Britain, on her fide, ftipulated to deftroy the forti fications fications which had been erected on that bay*. By this article the English acquir ed a solid right in this long contested trade; but seemed, at the fame time, to lofe all the means of protecting it It is, however, difficult to point out a better method of adjusting a claim of fuch a peculiar nature. The right we claimed was not a right to the territory, nor directly to the produce; but only a privilege of cutting and taking away this wood by indulgence. To have infifted on the right of erecting fortifications, would have been making the ftrongest claim to an abfolute, direct and exclufive dominion over the territory itself; a point, to which I do not find that our most extenfive claims have ever been carried. In Africa, Goree was reftored to France, and Senegal remained to Great Britain +. This regulation feems to have divided the trade on this river, and the adjacent coaft, between the two nations. The English, as they are now circumflanced on that part, feem to be the moft advantageoufly fituated for the trade in time of peace; and the French for carrying away the whole of it in time of war. in the courfe of many years, if at all, be restored to their former ftate. In Bengal, (including, by an explanation annexed to the definitive treaty, the kingdom of Orixa,) they have engaged to erect no kind of fortification, nor to keep any number of foldiers whatsoever. Secondly, they have agreed to acknowledge the prefent reigning fubas of Bengal, Decan, and the Carnatick, as the lawful fovereigns of thefe countries. Thefe princes are the greateft on the peninfula of India: they are in our intereft, and most of them owe either the acquifition, or depend for the prefervation of their power on our arms; by which means our company is become, in effect, arbiter of the commerce and politics of that great and opulent coaft, extending from the Ganges to Cape Comorin; and in a great degree alfo of the other, from the fame cape to the mouth of the Indus. Thirdly, during the course of our fucceffes, the traders and the manufacturers have removed from the French to our fettlements, where they will have at least an equal market, and a fuperior protection; and it will be difficult, if not impoffible, to bring them back. With regard to the Eaft Indies, all the French factories and fettlements are restored to that nation in every part of India †. Although this muft be rgarded as a very great conceffion, it does not however afford all thofe advantages to France, which might be imagined at the first view. First, because the fortifications erected at fuch a vaft expence in all those settlements have been totally deftroyed; and it cannot be expected, in the prefent fituation of the French company, that they can, * Def. tr. art. xviii. Minorca and Belleifle were to be reftored to their former poffeffors . The fortifications and harbour of Dunkirk were to be demolished, agreeable to the ftipulations of former treaties.* This is the general outline of the late treaty. Those who chufe a more minute information, will recur to the treaty itself, which is printed among the State Papers. The paiticulars given here will ferve to point out the fpirit and the general effect of that tranfaction, which has been + Def. tr. art. ix. Def. tr. art xi. Def. tr. art. xiii. been the fubject of fo much heat and controverfy; and which nothing but adulation will affert to be free from defect, nor any thing but faction can deny to be productive of many very great and effential advantages to this kingdom. This treaty, while it remained in agitation, formed a great crifis, not only in the affairs of the nation, but in the fortune of the new miniftry. Towards the latter end of the fummer, Mr. T. was called in, and engaged in their fupport. Though he continued in his old place of paymafter, he undertook to conduct the affairs of government in the house of commons. Mr. Gr. whofe employment would naturally have engaged him in that task, refigned the feals of fecretary of state, and was appointed firft lord of the admiralty. The great experience aad known parliamentary abilities of Mr. F. feemed to give new life to the affairs of the adminiftration. A more vigorous and determined conduct was from that time adopted. Many of thofe, who were not perfectly attached to the new fyftem, were immediately removed from their employments; and measures were taken to clear every department of every friend of the D. of N. The fpirit of these proceedings feemed to augment that of the oppofition. It was apprehended, that the preliminaries would undergo a rigorous fcrutiny, and might poffibly incur a heavy cenfure from parliament. The terms of peace were criticised without mercy. They were declared to be inglorious, inadequate, and unfecure; unequal to the great fucceffes of the war, and below the juft expectations of the nation; that our commerce was neglected, and our allies abandoned. Public expectation wag, however, intirely difappointed. The preliminaries were approved, without any qualification, by both houses; by the lords without a divifion; by the com-Dec. 9. mons with a very difproportioned majority. Many caufes concurred to produce this moderate difpofition. First, a very great number, which included almoft all the Tories, were engaged in the support of the adminiftration. The then chiefs of the oppofition were not well agreed among themselves. Mr. P. who was confidered as a party in himself, had not joined with the D. of N. nor feemed difposed to act with any particular body. The fame general plan of peace, which many now in the oppofition had formerly approved, had been adopted in thefe preliminaries, and evidently improved. It is true, it had been objected, that our additional fucceffes, fince that time, gave us ground to expect better terms; but it was answered, that our national burthens, and the extent of the war, had increased in, at least, an equal proportion; and that peace was become necessary to the nation. These arguments, whatever weight they might have in themfelves, were ftrong against thofe, upon whom they were rather retorted, than for the first time levelled, being altogether agreeable to the fyftem which many now in oppofition had always purfued, and to the fentiments many of them had publicly avowed, and perhaps ftill fecretly retained. On the whole, it was evident, that, when the question came on, the difcontented party was found not very well united, and abfolutely unprovided of any regular fcheme scheme of oppofition. However, though baffled on this occafion, it has fince begun to revive and to unite; and though peace is happily reftored with foreign powers, our domeftic quiet is ftill far from being fecurely established. With regard to the powers in Germany, the peace between England and France, and the fuperiority of the king of Pruffia at the clofe of the campaign, infpired at length, and unwillingly, a difpofition to peace. Conferences were opened at Hubertsburgh, and a treaty concluded between his Pruffian majefty and the emprefs queen. As affairs in this treaty were speedily adjusted, fo they may be very concifely related. The fubftance of it was no more than that a mutual reftitution and oblivion fhould take place, and each party fit down at the end of the war in the fame fituation in which they began it. There has been talk of a fecret atticle, which promised some kind of indemnification for the king of Poland; but of this there is nothing of certainty. The king of Pruffia, after having for fix years contended against the efforts of almoft all the great powers of Europe, by whofe enmity he could be affected, having flood proof against the moft terrible blows of fortune, enjoys at length the full reward of his uncommon magnanimity. He retains his dominions in their utmost extent; and having delivered his country, by his incomparable talents for war, he now enjoys leifure to recover it by his no lefs admirable talents for government. Scarcely was the war concluded, when he began to difplay his attention to domeftic policy, and his care for the happiness of his people. He immediately diftributed lands to his disbanded foldiery; and gave them the horfes of his artillery to aid them in their cultivation. Europe is now pacified; and the begins to refpire, after a more general and a more bloody war than any the world experienced fince that which was concluded by the peace of Weftphalia. As far as it is fafe to judge concerning a fyftem which is fubject to fo great and unforefeen variations, and fometimes from very flight caufes, this peace promifes a confiderable duration. The king of Pruffia will hardly again commit his affairs, fo miraculously retrieved, to the chances of war. He fees how dearly he has a fecond time purchased his onqueft of Silefia, and he will hardly aim at new acquifitions. The emprefs, fince the failed to reduce Silefia, or even to recover the fmalleft particle of her loffes, with fuch an exertion of her own ftrength, and with fuch an alliance as never was feen united before, and with which the can never flatter herself again, must be convinced how vain it is to attempt any change in the prefent fyftem of Germany. Whilft Ruffia remains circumftanced as the feems to be at prefent, there is a very good profpect for the tranquillity of the North. France has turned her thoughts to a much wanted economy, and the re-establishment of her marine. She has reduced her land forces by above one half. England, without leffening the ordinary establishment of her navy, has augmented her military, in confequence of the extent of her conquefts. Both nations feem fenfible of the neceffity of being prepared, and yet quiet. The Bourbon courts are united, but weakened. The mutual jealoufy of the nations, which have been lately at war, continues; but |