Liberalism and Affirmative ObligationThe scope of affirmative obligation is a point of contention among liberals. Some see affirmative obligations required by social justice as incompatible with a strong commitment to individual freedom. The task before the moderate liberal is then to consider what a consistently liberal view of affirmative obligation would have to be in order to accommodate liberal commitments to freedom and justice and also account for long-standing institutions that are central to liberal democratic society. In this book, Patricia Smith argues that this can be achieved by reconstructing the liberal doctrine of positive and negative duty. She offers a careful consideration of these elements of liberal principles as they relate to affirmative obligation. Through an innovative analysis of the institutions of family and contract, Smith develops the idea of duties of membership as preferable to natural duties (to explain family obligation) and as needed to supplement contractual duties (to explain professional obligation). This idea is then applied to the problem of justifying political obligation. She argues that membership obligations, implied in cooperative endeavor, must supplement obligations of consent that are central to liberal theory. This is deftly illustrated through a state of nature theory that includes community membership, eliminating atomistic individualism while maintaining consonance with what Smith calls cooperative individualism. The resulting view of liberal individualism is consistent, complete, and capable of handling long-standing liberal institutions, while taking seriously the demands of affirmative obligations. Smiths clear articulation of a liberal view of affirmative obligation finds a middle ground on this polarized topic, with compelling and reasoned implications for liberal political philosophy. Her discussion will interest students and scholars of legal and political philosophy and political science. |
Contents
| 3 | |
Clarifying General Positive Duty | 25 |
Special Positive Duty and Natural Relations | 75 |
Special Positive Duty and Contractual Relations | 129 |
Political Obligation as Special Positive Duty | 171 |
Motivating Cooperative Individualism or Why a Liberal Individualist Should Accept Collective Solutions to Largescale Affirmative Obligations | 226 |
Notes | 231 |
Bibliography | 247 |
Index | 256 |
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Common terms and phrases
affirmative obligations agreement argued argument autonomy bad Samaritan basic chapter choice circumstances claim classical liberal clear communal membership community expectations compatible considered construed context contract law contractual obligation defined duties of charity duties of justice duty to rescue economic emergency enforcement example fact fair family obligation foundation freedom H. L. A. Hart harm human idea individualist institution interaction Joel Feinberg John Rawls justified least liberal commitment liberal theory liberal tradition libertarian living ment minimal moral community mutual reliance nature negative duties negative rights nomic noninterference parental obligation particular perfect duty person political obligation positive and negative practice presumption principle problem promises question reasonable reciprocity recognized relations rely requirements of justice rescuer responsibility restriction role significant simply social contract social contract theory society someone special positive duties standard suggest suppose tion tive trust undermine victim vidual violation
Popular passages
Page 3 - Whatsoever therefore is consequent to a time of war, where every man is enemy to every man ; the same is consequent to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal.
Page 123 - But in associations for exchange this sort of justice does hold men together — reciprocity in accordance with a proportion and not on the basis of precisely equal return.
Page 129 - The movement of the progressive societies has been uniform in one respect. Through all its course it has been distinguished by the gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of individual obligation in its place. The Individual is steadily substituted for the Family, as the unit of which civil laws take account.
Page 3 - In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor,...
Page 3 - In such condition, there is no place for Industry; because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no Culture of the Earth, no Navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments of moving, and removing such things as require much force ; no Knowledge of the face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore,...
Page 129 - Nor is it difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those forms of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family. It is Contract. Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals.
Page 46 - ... not everyone in circumstances like mine will give £5. So there will not be enough to provide the needed food, shelter, and medical care. Therefore by giving more than £5 I will prevent more suffering than I would if I gave just £5. It might be thought that this argument has an absurd consequence. Since the situation appears to be that very few people are likely to give substantial amounts, it follows that I and everyone else in similar circumstances ought to give as much as possible, that...
Page 171 - To insure the first set of rights a government must so order its functions as not to interfere with the individual. But even Jefferson realized that the exercise of the property rights might so interfere with the rights of the individual that the government, without whose assistance the property rights could not exist, must intervene, not to destroy individualism but to protect it.
Page 39 - The man, for example, whose eye was penetrated by the glancing shot of the careful pheasant hunter, stunned by the shot, fell face downward into a shallow pool by which he was standing. The hunter might easily save him, but lets him drown. In the first three illustrations, however revolting the conduct of the man who declined to interfere, he was in no way responsible for the perilous situation, he did not increase the peril, he took away nothing from the person in jeopardy, he simply failed to confer...