"The will is that by which the mind chooses anything. The faculty of the will is that faculty or power by which it is capable of choosing ; an act of the will is the same as an act of choosing or choice.. Whatever names we call the act of the will by, choosing, refusing, approving, disapproving, liking, disliking, embracing, rejecting, determining, directing, commanding, forbidding, inclining, or being averse, a being pleased or displeased with ;-all may be reduced to this of choosing. For the soul to act voluntarily is evermore to act electively."

But although a voluntary action implies election or choice,1 that is, power to do or not to do, it does not follow that willing is always and precisely of the same meaning as choosing or preferring, or those other words here enumerated as equivalent to it. Approving and disapproving, primarily and properly denote acts of the Judgment or Reason; liking and disliking, inclination and aversion, pleasure and displeasure, are states of feeling. These may have an influence upon the will in reference to its determination. But none of these words, nor the words preferring and choosing, are always used in a sense precisely synonymous with willing. Such is the poverty of language or want of discrimination in the use of it, that the words preference and choice are employed to denote a command of the conscience, or a conclusion of the reason, a state of desire or affection, or a volition or act of will. But commands of the conscience may be disobeyed, conclusions of the reason may be rejected, and a man may will or determine to do what he knows to be wrong, or sees to be imprudent. In like manner, inclinations and desires, though strong, may be resisted and overcome. So that the words preferring and choosing can be considered as synonymous with willing only when employed to denote the determining or resolving to act in accordance with conviction and inclination, that is, not the grounds or reasons of preferring or choosing, but the mental act by which an agent fixes or sets himself to the doing of one thing and not of another. This is Willing or Volition-a manifestation of mind to be distinguished from the operations of Intellect, and from the impulses of the Sensitivity. (See Tappan, Doctrine of the Will, ch. 3, sect. 4 and 5.)

1" Choice there is not, unless the thing we take be so in our power that we might have refused and left it. the stubble, it chooseth not so to do, because If fire consumeth the nature thereof is such that it can do no other. To choose is to will one thing before

another."-HOOKER, Eccles. l'ol., book i.
2" To choose simply is not to will;
simply to resolve is not to will. To will
is to resolve upon choice."-ROBERTS, God
and His Works, p. 113.

But while a distinction should be made between preference and choice, when used to denote volition or the act of will, and when used as including the grounds or reasons on which the will acts, it is not meant to insinuate that the Will does or can act without grounds or reasons. In all determinations of the mind that are of any importance, the determination is come to in the presence, or with the consciousness and consideration, of grounds or reasons, on which the agent may determine to act or not to act.

CHAPTER IV.

OF MOTIVES.

"By motive," said Edwards (Inquiry, pt. i. sect. 2), "I mean the whole of that which moves, excites, or invites the mind to volition, whether that be one thing singly, or many things conjunctly. Many particular things may concur and unite their strength to induce the mind; and when it is so, all together are, as it were, one complex motive. Whatever is a motive, in this sense, must be something that is extant in the view or apprehension of the understanding, or perceiving faculty. Nothing can induce or invite the mind to will or act anything, any further than it is perceived, or is in some way or other in the mind's view; for what is wholly unperceived, and perfectly out of the mind's view, cannot affect the mind at all."

Hence it has been common to distinguish Motives as External or Objective, and as Internal or Subjective. Regarded Objectively, Motives are those external objects or circumstances which, when contemplated, give rise to views or feelings which prompt or influence the Will. Regarded Subjectively, Motives are those internal views or feelings which arise on the contemplation of external objects or circumstances. In common language, the term Motive is applied indifferently to the external object, and to the state of mind to which the apprehension or contemplation of it may give rise. The explanation of Edwards includes both. Dr. Reid said that he "understood a motive, when applied to a human being, to be that for the sake of which he acts, and, therefore, that what he never was conscious of can no more be a motive to determine his will than it can be an

argument to determine his judgment." (Correspondence prefixed to his Works, p. 87.) In his Act. Pow. (Essay iv. ch. 4) he said, "Everything that can be called a motive is addressed either to the animal or to the rational part of our nature." Here the word Motive is applied Objectively to those external things which, when contemplated, affect our Intelligence or our Sensitivity. But, in the very next sentence, he has said, "Motives of the former kind are common to us with the brutes." Here the word Motive is applied Subjectively to those internal principles of our nature, such as Appetite, Desire, Passion, &c., which are excited by the contemplation of external objects adapted and addressed to them.

But, in order to a more precise use of the term Motive, let it be noted, that, in regard to it, there are three things clearly distinguishable, although it may not be common, nor easy, always to speak of them distinctively. These are, the external object, the internal principle, and the state or affection of mind resulting from the one being addressed to the other. For example,-Bread, or food of any kind, is the external object, which is adapted to an internal principle which is called Appetite, and Hunger, or the desire of food, is the internal feeling which is excited or allayed, as the circumstances may be, by the presentment of the external object to the internal principle. In popular language, the term Motive might be applied to any one of these three; and it might be said that the motive for such an action was bread, or appetite, or hunger. But, strictly speaking, the feeling of hunger was the motive; it was that, in the preceding state of mind, which disposed or inclined the agent to act in one way rather than in any other. The same may be said of motives of every kind. In every case there may be observed the external object, the internal principle, and the resultant state or affection of mind; and the term motive may be applied, separately and successively, to any one of them; but, speaking strictly, it should be applied to the terminating state or affection of mind which arises from a principle of human nature having been addressed by an object adapted to it; because it is this state or affection of mind which prompts to action. The motive of an agent, in some particular action, may be said to have been injury, or resentment, or angermeaning by the first of these words, the wrongous behaviour of another, by the second, the principle in human nature affected by such behaviour, and by the third, the resultant state of mind in the agent. When it is said that a man acted prudently, it may intimate

that his conduct was in accordance with the rules of propriety and prudence; or, that he adopted it, after careful consideration and forethought, or, from a sense of the benefit and advantage to be derived from it. In like manner, when it is said that a man acted conscientiously, it may mean that the particular action was regarded, not as a matter of interest, but of duty, or, that his moral faculty approved of it as Right, or, that he felt himself under a Sense of Obligation to do it. In all these cases, the term Motive is strictly applicable to the terminating state or affection of mind which immediately precedes the volition or determination to act.

To the question, therefore, whether Motive means something in the mind or out of it, it is replied, that, what moves the will is something in the preceding state of mind. That state of mind may have reference to something out of the mind. But what is out of the mind must be apprehended or contemplated-must be brought within the view of the mind, before it can in any way affect it. It is only in a secondary or remote sense, therefore, that external objects or circumstances can be called Motives, or be said to move the will. Motives are, strictly speaking, Subjective-as they are internal states or affections of mind in the agent.

And Motives may be called Subjective, not only in contradistinction to the external objects and circumstances which may be the occasion of them, but also in regard to the different effect which the same objects and circumstances may have, not only upon different individuals, but even upon the same individuals at different times.

A man of slow and narrow intellect is unable to perceive the value or importance of an object when presented to him, or the propriety and advantage of a course of conduct that may be pointed out to him, so clearly or so quickly as a man of large and vigorous intellect. The consequence will be, that, with the same Motives (objectively considered) presented to them, the one may remain indifferent and indolent in reference to the advantage held out, while the other will at once apprehend and pursue it. A man of cold and dull affections will contemplate a spectacle of pain or want, without feeling any desire or making any exertion to relieve it; while he whose sensibilities are more acute and lively will instantly be moved to the most active and generous efforts. An injury done to one man will rouse him at once to a phrenzy of indignation, which will prompt him to the most extravagant measures of retaliation or revenge; while, in another man, it will only give rise to a moderate

feeling of resentment. An action which will be contemplated with horror by a man of a tender conscience, will be done without compunction by him whose moral sense has not been sufficiently exercised to discern between good and evil. In short, anything external to the mind will be modified in its effect, according to the constitution and training of the different minds within the view of which it may be brought.

And not only may the same objects differently affect different minds, but also the same minds, at different times or under different circumstances. He who is suffering the pain of hunger may be tempted to steal, in order to satisfy his hunger; but he who has bread enough and to spare is under no such temptation. A sum of money which might be sufficient to bribe one man would be no trial to the honesty of another. Under the impulse of any violent passion, considerations of prudence and propriety have not the same weight as in calmer moments. The young are not so cautious, in circumstances of danger and difficulty, as those who have attained to greater age and experience. Objects appear to us in very different colours, in health and in sickness, in prosperity and in adversity, in society and in solitude, in prospect and in possession.

It would thus appear, that motives are in their nature Subjective, in their influence Individual, and in their issue Variable.

CHAPTER V.

OF THE CLASSIFICATION OF MOTIVES.

ACCORDING to Dr. Reid, the Animal and the Rational principles of our nature may, when addressed by their proper objects, produce those states or affections of mind which have an influence on our voluntary determinations. He therefore has said that Motives are of two kinds; which he designates Animal and Rational. Of the former kind are all those Motives which have their origin in Appetite, Affection, and Passion; and of the latter kind are those which take their rise from Reason and Conscience. This classification gives no place to those Motives which may be traced to Instinct and Habit. The reason of this is, that Dr. Reid classified Instinct and Habit as