"Desires," according to Dr. Hutcheson (Essay on the Passions, sect. 1), “arise in our mind, from the frame of our nature, upon apprehension of good or evil in objects, actions, or events, to obtain for ourselves or others the agreeable sensation when the object or event is good; or to prevent the uneasy sensation when it is evil.” Of such Desires as manifest themselves as primitive tendencies, we can give no further account than to say, that they arise from the frame of our nature. Of the Desire of Society we can only say, man is a social being; while there are other living beings who delight in solitude. Our Primary Desires may, however, be characterised in the following way:—

1. They are such as spring from the frame of our nature; that is, from our very constitution as human beings.

2. They are, therefore, universal; they are found not in individuals, or families, or tribes, or nations only, but in the whole human

race.

3. They are also permanent; they manifest themselves throughout the whole term of human existence; they appear in the earliest years, they gather strength with maturing manhood, and do not altogether disappear even in old age.

The Desires which are Primary and natural to man are but few; those which grow up in a state of civilisation, and are subservient to the Primary and Natural Desires, are almost innumerable.

CHAPTER III.

PASSION AND AFFECTION.

“No peculiar place has been set apart by me," says Dr. Brown (Lect. 65), "for the Passions; the reason of which is, that our Passions are truly no separate class, but merely a name for our Desires, when very vivid and very permanent.”

Mr. Stewart says (Outlines, sect. 4), "This word Passion does not belong exclusively to any one class of our active principles; but is applicable to all of them, when they are suffered to pass the bounds moderation. In such cases, a sensible agitation or commotion of body is produced, and our reason is disturbed; we lose, in some

measure, the power of self-command, and are hurried to action by an almost irresistible impulse."

Dr. Reid distinguishes between Desire and Affection, by saying that " our Desires have things, not persons, for their object." "But," says he (Act. Pow., Essay iii. pt. ii. ch. 3), "there are various principles of action in man, which have persons for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature, our being well or ill affected to some person, or at least to some animated being. Such principles I shall call by the general name of Affections, whether they dispose us to do good or hurt to others." By the word Passion," he says (ch. 6), “he does not mean any principle of action different from Desires and Affections; but such a degree of vehemence as is apt to produce sensible effects upon the body, or to darken the understanding and weaken the power of self-command."

66

Dr. Hutcheson (Essay on the Passions, p. 1) describes the Affections and Passions as "these modifications or actions of the mind, consequent upon the apprehension of certain objects or events, in which the mind generally conceives good or evil" (p. 26). "When the word Passion denotes anything different from Affection, it includes a strong brutal impulse of the will, attended by some violent bodily motions, so as to prevent all deliberate reasoning."

In accordance with these explanations, the word Passion denotes a vivid and turbulent state of liking or disliking, attended by correspondent effects upon the bodily frame, and upon the powers of reason and self-command. Affection denotes a more calm and lasting state of liking or disliking, and has always a person or living being for its object. Taken in connection with these two terms, the word Emotion, according to Dr. Cogan, means the sensible effect upon the bodily frame by which a Passion or Affection may indicate its existence and character. Fear is a Passion. Gratitude is an Affection. The Emotion in Fear is paleness of countenance, or stiffening of the hair, &c.

In Passion and Affection there is implied Desire. If the object of a passion be agreeable, we desire to obtain it; if it be disagreeable, we desire to avoid it. If we are well-affected towards any person, we desire his society and seek his benefit; if we are ill-affected towards any one, we desire to avoid his company, and, perhaps, to do him hurt. Hence it is that all the Passions and Affections may be reduced to two, and may be regarded, in all their varieties, as so many forms of the primitive or mother principles of Love and

Hatred, Appetence and Aversion, or more generally still, of Inclination to, or from, an object.

Before any form or degree of Desire, Passion, or Affection, can be awakened, some object or event must be known; and between that object or event and our nature and condition as human beings, there must be some adaptation. The bare knowledge of a thing is no reason why we should either seek or shun it. Before we do so we must have an Emotion-that is, we must be moved in reference to it. It must affect our Sensitivity, in consequence of some adaptation between it and us. There must be some natural tendency carrying us towards it; making us uneasy in the want of it, and pleased with the attainment of it. But what is spontaneous in the first instance may afterwards be reflective; and, when a natural tendency has once been developed, then we may come, on the ground of experience, to estimate the pleasure and the pain, the good and the evil, which objects and events are fitted to give us. And, according to this estimate, one thing is sought and another is shunned, one Desire is checked and another is cherished, one Passion is yielded to, and another is resisted, one Affection is indulged, and another is restrained.

In this advanced and mature stage of their development, our various states of feeling come to be connected with the conceptions which we form of objects and events, as good or evil, and as likely to give us pleasure or pain. Hence it is, that Dr. Hutcheson, while he refers our several natural Desires and Passions to so many several internal senses, or positive determinations of our nature, still describes them as arising in our mind upon the apprehension of Good or Evil in objects, actions, or events. Mr. Locke says (Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii. ch. 20), "Pleasure and Pain, and that which causes them, Good and Evil, are the hinges on which our Passions turn; and if we reflect on ourselves, and observe how these, under various considerations, operate in us; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations (if I may so call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our Passions."

Sir William Hamilton says (Metaphys. Lect. 44, 5, 6), “As the feelings are not primitive and independent states, but merely states

6 Quod latet ignotum est; ignoti nulla cupido.

Εκ του δραν γιγνεται το έραν.

Looking begets liking.

"I'll look to like, if looking liking move."-Shakespeare.

which accompany the exercise of our faculties, or the excitation of our capacities, they must take their differences from the differences of the powers which they attend. The feelings which accompany the exertion of the sensitive or corporeal powers, whether cognitive or appetent, may be called Sensations, whereas the feelings which accompany the energies of the higher powers of mind may be called Sentiments."

It may be well to take this common ground, and see how far it will carry us in an attempt to arrange and classify them. This is commonly called a Scheme or Classification of the Passions. But many of the states of mind so classified are but ill denoted by the term Passion; while all of them may be denoted by the term Feeling, without deviating from the common use of language.

CHAPTER IV.

SCHEME OF CLASSIFICATION.

ALL the various forms of Feeling denoted by the words Desire, Passion, and Affection, have, not for the cause, but as the occasion or condition of their development, the conception or contemplation of something as Good or as Evil—that is, as Pleasurable or Painful.

According as the action, object, or event is regarded as Good or as Evil, our states of Feeling may be arranged in two great classes. And as Good and Evil, in objects, actions, or events, may be contemplated in similar aspects, the Feelings in the one class will be the counterparts of those in the other; Joy will be opposed to Grief, Love to Hatred, Hope to Fear; and, in general, the Feelings awakened by the contemplation of Good will be pleasant and agreeable, while those awakened by the contemplation of Evil will be disagreeable and painful.

Good and Evil may be contemplated in reference to ourselves, and affect our Self-love. Or they may be contemplated in reference to others, and affect our Benevolence and Sympathy. This fact has been adopted as the ground of Classification by Dr. Cogan, who, in his Philosophical Essay on the Passions, has arranged them under Self-love and Benevolence. The distinction between Good and Evil, or the Pleasurable and the Painful, is more fundamental, and has

the advantage of arranging all the forms and degrees of Feeling in two equal and opposite classes.

The forms and degrees of Feeling will vary, according as the Good or Evil contemplated has come or is coming; as the consequence of something done by us or by others. But these circumstances, and the effect which they have in varying the form and degree of the correspondent Feelings, will be best seen in a tabular Scheme or View of all our Springs of Action; while special or disputed points may receive a separate consideration.

CHAPTER V.

OF RESENTMENT.

WHEN evil comes upon us by means of an unknown, or inanimate, or involuntary instrument, we submit to it; it may be with sorrow or with resignation. But when evil comes upon us by an intelligent being, like ourselves, acting voluntarily, we feel displeasure, and a desire to resist and retaliate. Such is Anger or Resentment.

Dr. Reid classes Resentment with Emulation, and calls them Malevolent Affections. But there may be Emulation without Envy, and Resentment 8 without Ill-will. It is only, therefore, to the excess or abuse of these passions that he applies the epithet Malevolent. The Desire to retaliate, which follows the first feeling of Anger, and may be regarded as forming an element of the Passion, is simply defensive, and is intended to prevent the repetition of evil.

Resentment has been distinguished into Sudden and Deliberate, according as it is excited by mere harm or evil, or by wrong or injury, damnum or injuria, done or intended. This distinction had been hinted at by Hobbes; but was first prominently brought forward by Bishop Butler (Sermons viii. and ix.), and has been adopted by subsequent philosophers.

7 Nemesius, On the Nature of Man, ch. 17, says, "Desire (or feeling) may be divided into four parts, according as it has respect to things good or evil, things present or things expected." The element of agency should also be taken into account.

8" When first introduced into the lan

guage (this was in the seventeenth century; vox nova in nostra lingua, Junius), to resent meant to have a sense or feeling of that which had been done to us, but whether a sense of gratitude for the good or enmity for the evil the word said nothing, and was employed in both meanings."