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human conduct, the rights and duties of social life would need only to be acknowledged and discharged, in so far as might be judged consistent with individual happiness and advantage. But man has not only a rational, but also a moral nature. He can judge not merely between what is Advantageous and Disadvantageous, but also between what is Right and Wrong. He sees not only what is best for him to do, in given circumstances, but also what is binding upon him, in all circumstances; not merely what is productive of benefit, but also what is promotive of the perfection of his nature.

"A man is prudent," says Dr. Reid, "when he consults his real interest; but he cannot be virtuous, if he has no regard to duty.”

CHAPTER II.

OF A SENSE OF DUTY, OR A REGARD TO WHAT IS RIGHT. It is now proposed to show that man has a moral nature, or, in other words, that he discerns a difference between Right and Wrong; and thus is capable of acting from a Sense of Duty—a principle distinct from, and superior to, a Sense of Prudence.

That we have a Sense of Duty is certain, from experiencing it in ourselves, and recognizing it in each other. (See Butler, Dissert. on Virtue, and Sermons on Hum. Nature; Reid, Act. Pow., Essay iii. pt. iii. ch. 5.)

I. On appealing to Consciousness, it will be found—

1. That we have ideas of Right and Wrong, and do some actions, and refrain from doing other actions, from a Sense of Duty.

2. That we experience feelings of satisfaction, or self-approbation, when we do what is Right, and feelings of dissatisfaction, or selfcondemnation, when we do what is Wrong.

3. That the feelings of Resentment, excited by an injury, and of Gratitude, awakened by a benefit, are analogous to our feelings of self-approbation or self-condemnation; and imply the discernment of Right and Wrong, in reference to actions done to us. (Shaftesbury, Moralists, pt. iii. sect. 2; Chalmers, Sketches of Mor. and Ment. Phil., ch. viii.; Reid, Act. Pow., Essay v. ch. 5.)

II. From observation of the conduct of others, it appears—

That the difference between actions as Right and Wrong is e from the earliest years. Children always passionately interest aselves on that side where kindness and humanity are found; detest the cruel, the covetous, the selfish, or the treacherous. itcheson, Inquiry concerning Moral Good and Evil, sect. iv.) 1 in all their sports and amusements, young persons make frent appeals to a sense of what is fair and honourable, or Right. . That the difference between Right and Wrong is implied in ⚫ ordinary intercourse and business of life. Men believe in tesony, trust to promises, and enter into contracts with one other, on the understanding that the duties of faithfulness and ith, and the evil and baseness of perfidy and deceit, are universally knowledged.

3. That, in all languages, words expressive of the difference beveen Right and Wrong have been found, and Essays and Treatises ritten, to illustrate this difference; while the events and characters : history have been described in corresponding terms of approbation r disapprobation. "Had nature made no such distinction, founded In the original frame and constitution of the mind, the words onourable and shameful, lovely and odious, noble and despicable, never had had place in any language; nor could politicians, had they invented these terms, ever have been able to render them intelligible, or make them convey any idea to the audience.” (Hume, Inquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, sect. 5.)

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4. That in the very existence of civil society there is a recognition of the difference between Right and Wrong. In the reverence which is paid to the social compact a compact which is implied rather than expressed—in the reluctance with which men rise against the established order of things, even when it is felt to be oppressive— and in the respect shown to artificially or legally created rights and interests-there is implied the belief, that underlying and upholding all these, there is a fundamental difference between what is Right and Wrong.

5. That the uniformity of human laws proves the moral nature of man. Under all the forms of law and government which have obtained in the world, it will be found that the great principles of natural justice have been acknowledged. "Lawgivers and statesmen,” says Sir James Mackintosh (Discourse on the Law of Nature and Nations)," but above all, moralists and political philosophers, may plainly discover, in all the useful and beautiful variety of

governments and institutions, and under all the fantastic multitude of usages and rites, which have prevailed among men, the same fundamental, comprehensive truths, the same master principles, which are the guardians of human society, recognized and revered, with few and slight exceptions, by every nation upon earth.” There have been peculiarities in the laws and institutions of different nations; but these peculiarities can be traced to something peculiar in the condition and circumstances of the nations; and in the midst of these peculiarities, the great natural rights of man have always been upheld. 'For," to use the language of Lord Bacon (Dign, and Adv. of Learning, Works, vol. i. p. 101), "there are in nature certain fountains of justice, whence all civil laws are derived but as streams; and, like as waters do take tinctures and tastes from the soils through which they run, so do civil laws vary according to the regions and governments where they are planted, though they proceed from the same fountains."

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6. That, even where law and government can scarcely be said to be established, the difference between Right and Wrong is recognized. A people without written law have the law of custom or usage to go by; and the difference between Right and Wrong may be found as clearly in that law as in those written upon tables of stone or brass.

"Saturni gentem, haud vinculo nec legibus, æquam,
Sponte sua, veterisque Dei se more tenentem.'

66

Eneis, vii. v. 200.

If the accounts of travellers were carefully and candidly examined, it would be found that no nation has yet been discovered so inhuman as not to show some regard to kindness, and truth, and justice. Quæ autem natio non comitatem, non benignitatem, non gratum animum, et beneficii memorem, diligit? Quæ superbos, quæ maleficos, quæ crudeles, quæ ingratos, non aspernatur, non odit?" (Cicero, De Legg., lib. i. cap. 2.) On the great duties of kindness, and hospitality, and sympathy, of justice, and faithfulness, and truth, the wandering Arab and the civilized European are at one; because they are sharers of one common nature. This is admitted by Rousseau. (Emile, tom. iii. p. 106.)

It is objected, That there is no original nor essential difference between Right and Wrong, and no original nor distinct power in man nature to discern such a difference, because actions which

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are reckoned Right by some men are condemned by others; and things which are reckoned Wrong in one country are tolerated or applauded in another.

Mr. Locke has shown that men's judgments as to what is Right and Wrong have been very different at different times and in different places (Essay on Hum. Understand., book i. ch. 3). From this he argued that there can be no innate moral maxims, or practical principles of human conduct, engraven, as it were, on the human mind; otherwise there could not be such discrepancies in that conduct. But these discrepancies do not affect the fact, that there is an essential difference between Right and Wrong, which all men, as men, are capable of recognizing, and which, under some form or other, they do universally recognize. Indeed, Mr. Locke has not maintained this. On the contrary, he has expressly guarded himself against being charged with such views; and has taken a distinction "between an innate law, and a law of nature; between something imprinted on our minds in their very original, and something that we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowledge of by the use and application of our natural faculties." But the facts adduced by Mr. Locke against the doctrine of an innate law have been adduced by sceptical writers against the existence of a law of nature, known and read by all men, how different soever may have been the glosses put upon it. And it must be admitted that the cruel, wicked, and immoral practices which have prevailed in the world, do, when skilfully arrayed, present a plausible objection to the truth, that man has a moral nature, by which he is capable of discerning between Right and Wrong. But the prevalence of such practices merely proves, that the moral nature of man is not indestructible, and is liable to be corrupted and perverted in the progress of its development. And, when the many and various influences which are brought to bear on the formation of the human character, are taken into account, it is not wonderful that men should differ in their judgments of Right and Wrong in particular cases.

Climate, and other physical circumstances, may incline the inhabitants of one country to the practice of vices, from which those of another country are almost exempted. And thus actions which in

the one country are but lightly, if at all, censured, will, in another,

2 Plato concludes his fifth book De Legi- | pay due regard to the diversity of natural bus with remarking that all countries are character arising from the influence of clinot equally susceptible of the same sort of mate and soil. discipline; and that a wise legislator will

be loudly and strongly condemned. (See Hume, Essay xxi. pt. i.; also a Dialogue at the end of his Essay on the Principles of Morals; Foissac, Sur l'Influence des Climats sur l'Homme, 8vo., Paris, 1837; Montesquieu, Spirit of Laws; Charron, De la Sagesse, livre i. ch. 37.) The Customs and Manners of a country have also a silent, but powerful, influence, in blinding or biassing the moral judgments of the inhabitants.

Law and Government, in preserving public peace and promoting the public good, may, sometimes, be under the necessity of permitting, or perhaps sanctioning, measures which are not strictly just; and may thus affect public opinion and public principle.

Wrong views of the character of God and the condition of man have led the followers of false religions into the most absurd and immoral practices; and the power of true religion has not always been sufficient to restrain men from the excesses of bigotry and persecution.

It deserves also to be remarked, that actions which are Wrong, and admitted to be Wrong, in themselves, by those who do them, may be done to avoid some apprehended evil, or to obtain some expected good. By the laws of Solon and Lycurgus, deformed and sickly children were killed, to prevent the increase of a burdensome and useless population. The practice of exposing the aged, or of putting them to an unnatural death, originated in the intention to avoid, or shorten, the evils and infirmities of age. The Thug is supported in his trade of murder by the belief, that, by every victim which he slays, he is rendering more propitious the Goddess of Destruction, to whose service he is devoted. And even he who has persecuted, in the name of Christ, may have thought that, in doing so, he was doing both God and man service. These are instances, therefore, not of the absence, but of the aberration of the Moral Faculty.

All the parts of the human constitution are liable to variation and disorder. "Men's palates differ much," says Dr. Hutcheson, "but who denies a sense of tasting to be natural?" A spectacle which strikes one man with horror, does not move another man. A favour is received coldly by one man, while it throws another into transports of gratitude. But, surely, the capacity of being affected by good and by evil must be admitted to be natural to man. He is a rational being; but how often are his actions at variance with the dictates of reason. The absurd practices which

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