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Not, during the said term, fell, stub, cut, destroy or spoil, or wilfully damage any timber trees, pollards, wood, or

Greenaway v. Adams, 12 Ves. 395). But both assignment and underletting are restrained by a condition “not to set, let, or assign;" (Roe d. Gregson v. Harrison, 2 T. R. 425); or by a condition “not to assign, or otherwise part with the premises, for the whole or any part of the term ;” (Doe d. Holland v. Worsley, 1 Camp. 20); or by a covenant “not to let, set, or demise the premises for all or any part of the term.(Greenaway v. Adams, 12 Ves. 395).

A restriction against underletting a house does not prevent the —and by what lessee from letting a room to a lodger for his exclusive use. (Doe d. acts the re

striction is broPitt v. Laming, 4 Camp. 77). But where the condition was not to

ken. “demise, lease, grant, or let the premises, or any part or parcel thereof,” and not to assign the indenture of lease, or the lessee's interest therein, or any part thereof; and the lessee agreed with another person to enter into partnership with him, and that he should have the use of certain parts of the premises exclusively, and of the rest jointly with the lessee, and let him into possession, it was held, that the covenant was broken. (Roe d. Dingley v. Sales, 1 Mau. & Sel. 297). A condition restraining underletting is not broken by advertising the farm to be let; (Gourlay v. The Duke of Somerset, 1 Ves. & Bea. 68); and as to what is evidence of an underletting, see Doe d. Hindly v, Rickarby, 5 Esp. 4; Doe v. Payne, 1 Stark. 86. Where, in a lease for three lives, there was a proviso for re-entry if the lessee or his executors should lease for more than seven years without license; and the third life being in possession, as executor under his father's will, leased for fourteen years without license, it was held, that there was no forfeiture; for as the lease could not extend beyond the life of the lessor, it might not endure for seven years. (Northcote v. Duke, 1 Eden, 319).

A general restriction on assignment does not apply to an assign- General rement by operation of law, as a sale by a sheriff under an execution. striction does

not include an (Doe d. Mitchinson v. Carter, 8 T. R. 57). And it is of no moment

(0) Ana 14 IS OI no moment assignment by that a warrant of attorney has been given to confess the judgment operation of on which the execution has been sued out, unless, as happened law. in that case, the warrant of attorney was given in fraud of the covenant, and for the purpose of effectuating the sale. (S. C. 8 T. R. 300). So a lease passes to the assignees in bankruptcy, although it contain a general restriction on assignment; (Goring v. Warner, 2 Eq. Ca. Abr. 100; S. C. 7 Vin. Abr. 85; Philpot v. Hoare, Amb. 480); and the restriction does not operate to prevent the assignees from selling, although the restriction expressly includes “ assigns." (Doe d. Goodbehere v. Bevan, 3 Mau. & Sel. 353). Whether the assign of the assignees is bound by the covenant, does not appear to have been decided; but in a case in which the restriction was


underwood, or any new quick fences, growing on the premises, under the penalty of paying to the said A. B. or

against assignment and underletting, but did not include “ assigns" of the lessee, and the lessee became bankrupt, and the lease, being sold by his assignees, was subsequently purchased of the purchaser by the lessee himself, who underlet to another person, it was held, that there was no forfeiture. (Doe d. Cheere v. Smith, 5 Taunt. 795). And as the deposit of a lease by way of equitable mortgage has been decided to be no breach of a condition not to assign or “otherwise part with the lease ” or premises, (Doe d. Pitt v. Hogg, 1 Car. & Pay. 160; S. C. 4 Dow. & Ry, 226; S. C. nom. Doe d. Pitt v. Laming, Ry. & Moo. 36), so it is now decided, that the assignees in bankruptcy may sell such a lease, not only for the benefit of the creditors at large, but also for the benefit of the equitable mortgagee. (Ex parte Baglehole, 1 Rose, 432; Ex parte Sherman, Buck, 462), overruling the dictum to the contrary in Weatherall v. Geering, 12 Ves. 504). An assignment by a lessee of all his property, real and personal, (including a lease with a condition against assignment), to trustees for the benefit of his creditors, but which assignment was avoided by a commission of bankrupt subsequently issued against the lessee, was held not to work a forfeiture. (Doe d. Loyd v. Powell,

5 B. & C. 308; 8 Dow. & Ry, 35). . Lease may be It is clear, that a lease may be made void or voidable upon bankmade determine ruptcy, (Roe d. Hunter v. Galliers, 2 T. R. 133; Hickinbotham y. able on bank

Groves, 2 Car. & Pay. 492), or upon the lessee's becoming insolvent, ruptcy or in. solvency. or upon a judgment being entered up against him, or a fieri facias

or execution being sued out against him. (Davis v. Eyton, 7 Bing. 154). Provisions of this nature will be found in the proviso for re-entry, infra; for they are not matters for covenants, and it would perhaps be better if this covenant were omitted, and the condition as to assignment and underletting introduced expressly into the proviso for re-entry, instead of being included in that power among the other covenants, on the breach of which the proviso is to take

effect. When exe If the condition be that the lessée, his executors or administrators, cutors, admin. shall not assign, it is of course broken by an assignment by an exeistrators, and assigns of the

cutor or administrator. (More's case, Cro, Eliz, 26; Roe d. Gregson lessee are re v. Harrison, 2 T. R. 425; Lloyd v. Crispe, 5 Taunt. 249; Mason v. strained from

Corder, 7 Taunt. 9; 2 Marsh. 232). But if the condition apply only assigning.

to the lessee personally, the executor or administrator may assign. (Seers v. Hind, 1 Ves. Jun. 295). It is however proper, as a general rule, to name the executors and administrators in the condition, and also to include the “ assigns;" for although it was formerly held, that if a lease were made to a man and his assigns, alienation could not be restrained, (Hob. 170), yet the contrary is now clear. (Co.


his assigns £50 a load for every load of timber or wood, and £10 a tree for every young tree which shall be felled,

Litt. 204. a., 223. b.), and the word “assigns” is not repugnant to the condition, because the lessee may have assigns by license, and (if there be no provision determining the lease on bankruptcy or execution) assigns in law. (Weatherall v. Geering, 12 Ves. 504, 511; see too Paul v, Nurse, 8 B. & C. 486: S. C. 2 Man. & Ry. 525, where Bayley, J., observed, that it might admit of some doubt, whether an assign was within a covenant, that the lessee, his executors or administrators, would not assign), If an assignment were made without license, and the lessor waived the forfeiture, the condition restraining “ assigns” might apply. And in the case, too, in which there is a restriction on assignment, except to particular persons, the restriction should certainly extend to the assigns, so as to prevent any further assignment. For in Whichcot v. Fox, (Cro, Jae. 398), the condition being, that the lessee should not assign except to certain persons, it was held, that this was no restriction on one of those licensed assigns. But where the condition was, that neither the lessee, nor his executors or assigns, should assign except to particular persons, it was held, that one of these licensed assigns could not assign to another person. (Anon. Dy. 152 a; Thornhill v. King, Cro. Eliz. 757; see too Lloyd v. Crispe, 5 Taunt. 249).

In Berry v. Taunton, (Cro. Eliz. 331), and Dumper v. Syms, (Id. Whether a be. 815), it was held, that a bequest of the lease was a breach of the quest is a

breach of a condition not to assign, although the same principle certainly would con not now be applied to the decision of the case of Berry v. Taunton, for to assign, there the condition was not to demise. And in Fox v. Swann, (Sty, 483), it was held, that a condition restraining assignment was not broken by a bequest. In the absence of a bequest, of course the term vests in the executor as assets, but it seems, that an express bequest to him even as executor, would be a breach of the condition. (Cro. Eliz. 816; Barton v. Horton, 1 Roll. Abr. 428, pl. 1). It is presumed, that a term which would be forfeited by a bequest would be held not to pass under a general bequest.

It will be sufficient in this place to advert but briefly to a doctrine A license for connected with the subject, but which will be more fully discussed one assignment in another place. (See post, Vol. 5, Art. Defeasance). It is this, dispenses.

the condition that a condition dispensed with in part, is dispensed with altogether; altogether, and therefore, where there is a lease with a proviso for re-entry on assignment without license of the lessor, or with a covenant not to assign without a license of the lessor, and a proviso for re-entry on a breach of covenant, and an assignment is once made with license, the condition is altogether determined. (Dumper's case, 4 Co, Rep. 119; S. C. nom. Dremper v. Syms, Cro. Eliz. 815; Crusoe d. Blencowe v, Bugby, 3 Wils, 234; Lloyd v. Crispe, 5 Taunt. 249). So, too, an

ondition not

OF A FARM. cut, stubbed, destroyed or spoiled, or wilfully damaged as

aforesaid, and so in proportion for any greater or less

assignment with license of part of the land, determines the condition as to the residue, (4 Co. Rep. 120); or if the lease be to three persons, with a condition that they or any of them shall not alien without license, and one of them alien with license, the condition as to the other two is gone. (Crompton v. Leeds, 1 Roll. Abr. 472; S. C. cited nom. Lylds v. Crompton, Cro. Eliz. 816).

The rule is the same in equity as at law. (Brummell v. Macpher. son, 14 Ves. 175; Macher v. The Foundling Hospital, 1 Ves. & Bea. 188, 191).

But the principle only applies to the condition; if the restriction be by covenant extending to the assigns, the landlord's right of action on the covenant would remain after an assignment with

license. As to the kind If the license to assign be required to be by writing, a parol license of license re

is of course insufficient; (Roe d. Gregson v. Harrison, 2 T. R. 425); quired, and waiver of the

but a court of equity would relieve, if such parol license were given forfeiture. with the fraudulent intention of inducing the lessee to commit a

forfeiture. (Richardson v. Evans, 3 Madd. 218). But acceptance of rent by the lessor, after having knowledge of the breach of the condition, is a waiver of the forfeiture then incurred. (Whichcot v. Fox, Cro. Jac. 398 ; Goodright d. Walters v. Davids, Cowp. 803; Doe d. Boscawen v. Bliss, 4 Taunt. 735 ; see however Marsh v. Curteys, Cro. Eliz. 528), But of course, acceptance of rent after a breach of the condition does not bar the lessor's right of re-entry, unless he was aware of the breach at the time of such acceptance. (Harvey v. Oswald, Cro. Eliz. 553; S. C. nom, Harvey v. Oswel, Id. 553; Roe d. Gregson v. Harrison, ubi supra). Nor does a waiver of the forfeiture occasioned by a breach of a condition not to underlet, preclude the landlord from entering for another breach by a subsequent underletting. (Doe d. Boscawen v. Bliss, 4 Taunt. 735).

After the lessor has given a license, its efficacy is not impaired by his death, (Co. Litt. 52. b.), or by his parting with the reversion before the assignment be made. (Walker v. Ballamie, Cro.

Jac. 102). Construction of The power of assignment is not restrained by the mere omission condition for in the lease of the word “assigns,” (15 Ves. 264), but a condition re-entry on assignment

of re-entry or forfeiture is created by any words, however informal, without license. which indicate that such was the intention of the parties. (Simpson

v. Titterell, Cro. Eliz. 242; Whichcot v. Fox, Cro. Jac. 398; see too Thomas v. Ward, Cro. Eliz. 202 ; Archdeacon v. Jennor, Cro. Eliz, 604; Doe d. Henniker v. Watt, 8 B. & C. 308; S. C, 1 Man. & Ry. 694). Conditions, however, of this nature are construed with great strictness; for where a lease contained several covenants on the quantity of timber or wood, or greater number than one of A FARM. tree, (except such rough wood, bushes and thorns, for repairing the said messuage and buildings, gates, posts, pales, rails, stiles, hedges, and fences of the said demised premises, as may be first set out and allowed as aforesaid), and shall not, at any time during the continuance of the said term, lay any corn or other weighty or prejudicial thing in the said house, so as to damage any part thereof; AND SHALL NOT, during the said term, plough up or con- —and will not vert into tillage any part of the said meadow or pasture

ure plough pasture

land, nor use land, or plough, sow, use, or manage any of the said arable the lands con

trary to covelands, or dig or break up for brick earth, or any other nant; purpose whatsoever, any part of the demised premises, contrary to the covenants herein contained, without being subject to the further yearly rent or yearly rents hereinbefore reserved (i); AND SHALL NOT mow any of the -and will not natural grass, or meadow or pasture lands, for two years a

mow more than

cais a specified successively, nor more than one-third of the said pasture quantity of lands, and an equal moiety of the artificial grasses in

grass ; the eighth year of the said term; AND That it shall be -and that leslawful for the said A. B. and his assigns to lay and stack

hay, &c., on upon the said premises all such hay, wood, and coals, as he the premises

• for a certain or they shall think proper, after the day of — in time be the eighth year of the said term, without injury to the end of the

term ; tenant, and to fence in the same during the remainder of "** the said term : And that the several and respective ad- —and that the ditional or increased rents, hereinbefore reserved, shall be

ofera romana shuhe increased rents

shall be subject recovered on their becoming due as aforesaid, in the same to certain con

ditions; manner as the hereinbefore reserved rent of £- may be recovered, and no receipt for rent shall be a discharge for


part of the lessee, including a covenant not to assign without license, followed by a proviso for re-entry, on breach “ of all or any of the covenants hereinafter contained on the part of the lessee ;" and there were no subsequent covenants on the part of the lessee, the court decided that “hereinafter” could not be held to mean “hereinbefore,” although the meaning was evident. (Doe d. Spencer v. Godwin, 4 Mau. & Sel. 265).

(i) The utility and propriety of this covenant are doubtful. (See supra, p. 49, n. (d).


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