then can the principle be maintained in regard to military service. No doubt the circumstances differ materially in some respects. For the mass of those engaged in it, military service does not, and never can, provide a career. To be efficient it must always remain a phase of youth. In this respect it resembles what is called education. In order to fight well a man must be hardy and strong and, above all, he must be young. Under our present system we purchase annually, for the Regular Army, in peace, the bones and muscles and youth of about 30,000 of our countrymen. We keep them a few years, in case war should come, and we throw them away, and take in a fresh supply. In war we purchase their blood. In addition we succeed in getting, by persuasion, the unpaid voluntary service of the Territorial Force. If the great piece of organisation conceived and brought into existence by Mr. Haldane, who, after all, is far the ablest and most successful War Minister this country has ever had, works as it is intended to work, we should require about 60,000 of these Territorial recruits every year. His scheme provides that after about four years' service Territorial soldiers should pass into a Territorial Reserve, and this building up of a reserve of trained men is the essence of the plan. It is the only method of what is called mobilising the force, that is, of enabling it to take the field in full strength, and the only method of making good losses from sickness or from battle in the event of war. For this plan to work well it is essential that about one-fifth of a total of 315,000 men should pass into the reserve every year. For this reason, about 60,000 recruits are annually required. In order, therefore, to provide a fighting machine of the size we nominally possess to-day, including Regurs and Territorials, that is to say, in order that on the summons of war about 600,000 men should stand armed all over the Empire, I mean men born and bred in Great Britain, and not Colonial or Indian troops, something under 100,000 fresh recruits are annually required.

That Mr. Haldane should have gone so near achieving such a result is a remarkable feat, and when it is remembered that he has brought into being the machinery, the framework, so to speak, and the motive power in the shape of what is called a "General Staff," to enable such a force to be used in war, he has done for England, in spite of his being a lawyer and a civilian, what no soldier, however eminent, has succeeded in doing before. The

country, by the voice of Parliament, sanctioned this piece of organisation, and Parliament and the Press lauded it very properly, and appeared to be satisfied that a force, so organised, and of the strength proposed, with a "reserve" behind it, which, in a few years, would mount up to a million of men trained to arms, would suffice for the needs of the Empire. If that is so, all that the ordinary citizen is concerned with is the question of plain fact -whether the men are forthcoming in the numbers required.

The training and efficiency of such a force are matters for experts, and with the training and efficiency of this force military experts appear from their public statements to be well satisfied. The ordinary citizen knows very little of the subject. But the question of numbers any one can understand. Mr. Haldane has always recognised, and everybody must agree with him, that the numerical test is the real test of the voluntary system; and it has been admitted over and over again that if the present scheme fails from want of men, no tinkering, no new scheme of Army Reform, no politician or soldier, however eloquent or distinguished is going to alter or amend it with success. Mr. Haldane's plan was always considered to be, and unquestionably is, the final test of the system of maintaining an adequate armed force by means of paid and unpaid volunteers.

The facts are before the world. There is no secret about them. All the returns of figures are available, and any one can draw an inference. I have said, and I say again, that, in my opinion, and it is a matter of opinion no doubt, we shall not get the annual supply of young men that we require to make the plan work in its completeness. There have been times when it was exceedingly difficult to get the 30,000 recruits wanted for the Regular Army. Sometimes those responsible were almost in despair. On the whole, however, the supply has been obtained. But at present there is no sign that the 60,000 required annually for the Territorial Force will be forthcoming. All the signs and portents are adverse. There is no steady increase, no advance, however slight. There is, latterly, in many cases retrogression.

I am not going to discuss the manifold causes and excuses which are suggested to account for this main and incontrovertible fact. Nor am I going to discuss remedies. According to some they resolve themselves eventually into hard cash. By adding so many

millions to the cost of the Territorial Force, some very competent judges believe that the supply of men could be obtained. It may be so. It may be that the youth and muscle and possibly the blood of so many of our fellow citizens can be bought for three and a half millions of pounds sterling, and that a greater quantity can be bought for five or six millions of pounds sterling. It looks plausible enough. But it is by no means certain. There may be deeper causes at work. It may be that the higher standard of skill and training required from the modern soldier, if he is to be of any use, the greater and unavoidable physical strain placed upon him in peace exercises, and the fiercer commercial competition between his employers, act adversely upon the instinct, for it cannot be given any other name, which induces the young civilian worker to practise the profession of arms. Or, again, it may be the sirocco of democracy withering in our people the spirit of sacrifice.

There are many of us who have laboured hard to bring success to Mr. Haldane's imaginative and practical organisation of the Territorial Forces of our country. There are many of us who will relax no effort in the future to recruit and administer these forces; but it would be cowardice and an act of treachery both to the responsible Minister of the Crown and to the nation, ill-informed and lethargic as it is, if those engaged in this task were to shrink from speaking what they believe to be true, or from expressing candid opinions, however unpalatable they may be. No one can contend that this is a case when the truth, if truth it be, is best unspoken. Of course, the pessimistic view may prove to be an error of judgment, but in that case what harm is done, for it is childish to maintain that so insignificant a thing as the expression of an erroneous opinion could check the growth of the Territorial Force, if the youth of the country were seriously bent upon serving in its ranks. If that were so the basis upon which the Home Army rests would be frail indeed. On the other hand, the view that we have reached the limit of the nation's yield for the Territorial Force may be the true view, and if So, what graver decision lies before the electorate than to choose between leaving the forces of the country below the minimum admitted by every one to be necessary and imposing by law upon our children the duty to bear arms in its defence.

ESHER.

SPEAKING on the question of National Defence, Mr. Haldane described this country as an "Island Fortress." If Mr. Haldane's description be a correct one, it would be well to consider our position from that point of view. It will be perhaps admitted without contention that it is a vital condition for the security of a fortress that the garrison within it should be victualled. No matter how strong the defences may be, or how brave the defenders, the lack of food-supplies must inevitably be followed by surrender. The history of the sieges of fortresses places this fact beyond dispute.

What then is the position with regard to food of the forty-four millions of dwellers in our "Island Fortress"? They are dependent on an over-sea supply for all the main necessaries of life-a supply that must be continuous and uninterrupted, as there is little or no stock in hand.

The general public do not realise the extent to which at the present time they are dependent for their food upon outside

sources.

The value of our imports last year (1909) of animal food alone (including every description, live and dead) was £36,729,000 from foreign countries, and £10,894,000 from the Colonies, making together the enormous sum of nearly £48,000,000 in a single year.

In the same year we imported smaller articles of food, such as eggs, butter, cheese, vegetables, fruits, milk, &c. (excluding those that cannot well be produced at home) to the value of more than £41,298,000 from foreign countries, and £11,558,000 from the Colonies, a total of nearly £53,000,000.

As far as regards soil and climate, the British Isles are as suitable as other European countries-more suitable than most

for the production of these smaller articles of food; and under proper conditions they could be so produced.

Turning to bread-stuffs, we find that in 1909 the value of imports into Great Britain of wheat, wheatmeal, and flour was, from foreign countries, £30,567,000, and from the Colonies and India, £21,075,000, making a total of £51,642,000.

The grand total of the kinds of food enumerated above imported in one year amounts to £152,642,000.

This does not include other articles, such as barley, oats, maize, beans, and offals of all kinds, of which the quantities imported every year are enormous.

More important than all, however, is the question of bread; our stock of bread-stuffs being rarely more than enough for a few weeks' consumption. This is a state of things that should create alarm in the minds of all classes of the community, but successive Governments pay little or no attention to it. We are bidden to sleep in peace." It is true that the Unionist Government in 1903 appointed a Royal Commission to consider the "Supply of Food and Raw Material in Time of War." The report of the Commission is vague and inconclusive and contains no practical remedy. Since then the question has been in abeyance. The presumption is that we are to rely on the Navy to protect our food-supplies. As yet no statesman has given reasons to warrant such a presumption, while competent seamen have declared that no Navy, however large, could perform the task.

Sir Nowell Salmon said a few years ago, when he was Admiral of the Fleet:

We may hope to a certain extent, but not at the beginning of a war, the trade-routes may be kept free; at the commencement of a war they would be very much interfered with.

The late Admiral Close, speaking at a meeting of "The Royal United Service Institution " in 1903, used more emphatic language.

We spend [he said] £31,000,000 a year on the Navy. You might as well chuck that money into the sea for all the good it will do; for what is the use of our going to sea and winning battles of Trafalgar, if we leave a starving population behind? It is no use your boasting that we have a powerful Navy, and therefore, having command of the sea, our food-supply is safe. You cannot get a naval officer to say so. We never had command of the sea, so far as the protection of our merchant ships is concerned. If there was a period

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