CHAPTER III.

On the Relation of Thought to Language.

WHETHER it is possible to think without the aid of language, is a question which has been a constant source of dispute amongst logicians and psychologists. It is not necessary, however, here to enter on this discussion. As all logicians are agreed that we cannot communicate our thoughts without the aid of language, or of equivalent signs, and that practically we do always think by means of language, by a sort of internal converse, it will be safer to adopt the terminology of those authors who regard our thoughts as expressed in language rather than that of those who consider or attempt to consider them in themselves as apart from their expression in words. We shall therefore speak of Terms and Propositions, not of Concepts and Judgments.

Note.-Sir W. Hamilton and his followers, regarding Logic as primarily and essentially concerned with thought, and only secondarily and accidentally with language, attempt to mark the products of thought by words which do not imply their expression in language. Thus, instead

of Terms and Propositions, they use respectively the words Concepts and Judgments. The word Syllogism, owing to the ambiguity of the Greek word λóyos, stands either for the internal thought or the external expression of it. (See Hamilton's Lectures on Logic, Lecture I.)

CHAPTER IV.

Division of the Products of Thought.

IT has been stated that thought is the act or operation of comparison. Its simplest result is that which is expressed by the Term. Terms may be combined into Propositions, and Propositions, either singly or in conjunction with one or more other propositions, may lead to Inferences. We shall treat in order of the Term, of the Proposition, of Inferences. Before proceeding further, it may perhaps be useful to the student to give by anticipation instances of these products or results of thought. Man, good, manliness, goodness, the goodness of man, the virtue of manliness, are all instances of terms. 'This man is good,' 'All citizens of a state are under an obligation to obey its laws,' are instances of Propositions, and, according to logical phraseology, 'good' is said to be predicated of 'this man,' and 'under an obligation to obey its laws' is said to be predicated of 'all citizens of a state.' The term predicated is called the Predicate, and the term of which it is predicated is called the Subject, the word 'is' or 'are' (or, in the case of negative propositions, 'is not' or 'are not'), which connects the two, being called the Copula. Lastly, we may take as instances of Inferences the following:

from seeing and smelling it. All these perceptions I can recall to-morrow, even though the rose be absent, by the act or operation of imagination. Lastly, I may compare this particular rose with another which lies on the table, or with one which I saw yesterday, and I may express their similarity by calling them both moss-roses, or their difference by calling one a moss-rose and the other a Tudor rose. Again, moss-rose and Tudor rose, which names are both results of the act or operation of comparison, may themselves be compared, and their points of similarity expressed by the word 'rose.' So rose and dahlia may be compared, and their points of similarity expressed by the word 'flower.' Or I may compare the feeling with which I contemplate the rose with similar feelings which I have previously experienced, and call it 'pleasure;' or I may compare it with the feeling which I experience when I prick my finger with a thorn, and call one pleasure,' the other 'pain;' or I may compare pleasure and pain themselves, and call them both 'feelings.' The act of making comparisons, and of apprehending similarities and differences, is usually called Thought or Thinking, and the results at which it arrives Thought or Thoughts. The act or operation itself, as distinguished from other mental acts or operations, and the results which ensue from its correct or incorrect exercise, are alike legitimate subjects of investigation for the psychologist or mental philosopher. But the more detailed consideration of the latter, i.e. Thoughts or the results of Thinking, becomes the subject

of a science with a distinct name, Logic, which is thus a subordinate branch of the wider science, Psychology.

Note 1.-The term Perception is here used in its ordinary sense. The distinctions between External and Internal Perception, Perception Proper and Sensation. Proper, are foreign to the present subject. They are discussed at great length in the works of Sir William Hamilton and Dr. Mansel, as well as in those of the Scottish school of metaphysicians generally, but, as involving some of the most abstruse and disputed questions in Psychology, it is not necessary or desirable that the student should acquaint himself with them till he commences the special study of that science.

Note 2.—Imagination, as here defined, is what may be called Simple, or Reproductive, as distinguished from what may be called Complex, or Productive Imagination. The former simply represents to the mind absent objects of perception as they have already been perceived, the latter combines phenomena or portions of phenomena, whether absent or present, into a new whole. Thus the notions of a particular man or a particular horse, if the man and horse be absent, are products of simple or reproductive imagination; the notion of a centaur would be a product of complex or productive imagination. For further information on this distinction, see Sir W. Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. xxxiii. The