3. Indictment in the profits nor a salary, but having authority to sell any part of the stock, and to buy goods for the shop, accounting to A., it was held, that B. was a bailee of the goods in the shop, and that they might be laid a his property. (Reg. v. Bird, 9 C. & P. 44). for. Where only bare charge. Joint ownership A married woman was sent by her husband to sell sheep, and rear the money; she did so, and was robbed of 5l., part of the price of the sheep; it was holden, that the money was properly described as t perty of her husband. (R. v. Roberts, 7 C. & P. 485). Although if the party, whose goods they are stated to be, had bee the property nor the possession, (and, for this purpose, the possess & f a feme covert or servant is, generally speaking, the possession of the band or master), the prisoner ought to be acquitted on that indictmen Therefore, if A. B. order a hat to be made for him, and the hatter main it, and it is stolen before it is delivered to the customer, it can laid as the hat of A. B. (R. v. Adams, R. & R. 225; ante, 1083, & further, ante, 1087). But where the money has never been in the pe session of the master, as where it was received by the servant for lis but he is robbed of it before his arrival at home, it should be a the property of the servant, not of the master. (Reg. v. Rudick, 10 & P. 237). In R. v. Gaby, (R. & R. 178), D. and C. were partners; Cl and survivorship. intestate, leaving a widow and children; from the time of his dear, de widow acted as partner with D., and attended the business of the d three weeks after C.'s death. Part of the goods were stolen; th described in the indictment as the goods of D. and the wi case reserved, the description was held right. Where a fan took a farm upon their joint account, and kept a flock of step, their joint property, and the father, upon the death of his son, and the farm for the joint benefit of himself and his son's childre. infants, it was holden, upon an indictment for stealing sheep, t the joint-stock some before and some after the son's death, property was well laid in the father and son's children. (R. v. ac, R. & R. 13). Bodies of person3. Joint-stock companies, &c. N the Where goods are vested in a body of persons not incorporand, they must not be described as the property of the body, but of the m duals who constitute it, or some of them, as in the case of p trustees, and joint-stock companies. (R. v. Sherrington, 1 Last R. v. Beucall, R. & M. 15). Where a Bible and hymn book, which been presented to a Methodist society, were stolen from the Ma chapel, and were described as the property of John Bennett and Bennett being one of the society, and also one of the trustes chapel, Parke, B., held it to be correct. (R. v. Boulton, 5 C5 P But when the goods of a corporation are stolen, they must be a the property of the corporation, in their corporate name, and ad names of the individuals who compose it. (R. v. Patrick, 2 › P. C. 1059, 1 Leach, 253. See ante, 885, 886). In an indictment for embezzlement, a collector of poor rates in the parish of St. Paul's, Covent Garden, was held to be described under the 10 Geo. IV. c. 68, as a servant to the c management of the affairs of that parish, though he was elected in the vestrymen of the parish. (Reg. v. Callahan, 8 C. & P. 154). So, an indictment for forgery, with intent to defraud a jas bank, may lay the intent to be to defraud A. B. (one of the sha ers) and others, and they are not bound to prosecute in the name public officer. (Reg. v. Beard, 8 C. & P. 143). But in an indictment for a forgery laid with intent to defrand apalic officer of a joint-stock bank, it is necessary to aver that he nated under the stat. 7 Geo. IV. c. 46. (Ib.) And where a member of a club was indicted for stealing some di di for. plate used at the club-house. The house-steward slept in the house, 3. Indictment and he stated, that he had the charge of all the plate, and was responsible for it; but it appeared that the plate was delivered every night to the under-butler, who was appointed by the club, and by him placed in a chest in the pantry. The indictment described the property as the goods of the house-steward, and alleged it to have been stolen in his dwelling-house :-Held, that, upon the evidence, it was wrong in both respects, inasmuch as his sleeping in the house was only as a servant of the club; and his alleged responsibility was not coupled with any custody of the property, either by himself or by his own servants. (Reg. v. Ashley, 1 C. & K. 198; per Recorder Law and Commissioner Bullock). He who steals goods belonging to a parish church may be indicted for Church. stealing the goods of the parishioners. (1 Hawk. c. 33, s. 29. See post, tit. "Sacrilege," Vol. V.) pro In an indictment for stealing lead or other effects from a church, there is no occasion to lay the property in any one; but it may be laid in the rector or vicar. (2 East's P. C. 651; post, tit. "Sacrilege," Vol. V.) And if the theft be effected in time of vacancy, the offender may be indicted for stealing the goods of the chapel, in the custody of those who have the care of them; or, if the place be a parish church, the perty may be laid in the parishioners at large. (1 Hale, 512; R. v. Walker, 3 Campb. 264-5; 1 Hawk. c. 33, s. 45). But the goods in a dissenting chapel, vested in trustees, cannot be described as the goods of a servant who has merely the custody of the chapel and things in it, to clean and keep it in order, though he has the key of the chapel, and no other person but the minister has another key. (R. v. Hutchinson, R. & R. 412. And see 2 East's P. C. 652; Id. 633; R. v. Boulton, 5 C. & P. 537). It hath been adjudged, that he who takes off a shroud from a dead Stealing a shroud, corpse may be indicted as having stolen it from the executors of, or those who buried, the deceased, and not from the deceased himself. (2 East's P. C. 652). But though in corpses there can be no property, or a corpse. wherefore to steal a dead corpse is no felony, yet it is a misdemeanour. (2 East's P. C. 652; R. v. Lynn, 2 T. R. 733. See tit. "Bodies (Dead), Stealing of," Vol. I.) In an indictment for stealing property which had belonged to a de- Property of dead ceased person who appointed executors who would not prove the will, persons. it was held that the property must be laid in the ordinary, and not in a person who, after the commission of the offence but before the indictment, had taken out letters of administration with the will annexed, because the rights of an administrator only commence from the date of the letters, as distinguished from those of an executor, which commence, not from the granting of the probate, but from the death of the testator. (R. v. Smith, 7 C. & P. 147). A party may be guilty of larceny, though the owner of the goods is Where the owner unknown; and where that is the case, it may be stated in the indictment is unknown. that the things stolen were the goods "of a person to the jurors unknown." But, upon prosecutions of this kind, some proof must be given, sufficient to raise a reasonable presumption that the taking was felonious, or invito domino; and Lord Hale, C. J., said, that he never would convict any person for stealing the goods cujusdam ignoti, merely because the person would not give an account how he came by them, unless there were due proof made that a felony had been committed of those goods. (See 2 Russ. 169; 1 Hale, 512; 2 Hale, 290). An indictment, however, alleging the goods to be the property of a person unknown, will be bad, if the owner be known; and in such case the prisoner will be acquitted on the indictment so framed, though he may be tried upon a new one for stealing the goods of the owner, naming him. (R. v. Walker, 3 Campb. 264; 2 East's P. C. 651; Holt, C. N. P. 505). VOL. III. 4 E 4. Punishment for. Ownership under particular acts. The taking, &c. Punishment of larceny. Transportation or imprisonment. Hard labour or solitary confine ment. Felonies not punishable under the acts, if any relating thereto; otherwise, under The 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 64, removes many difficulties in stating the names of the owners of property in cases of corporations, partnerships companies, counties, inhabitants, parishes, townships, highways, to pike trusts, commissioners of sewers, the Chelsea Hospital, and frie societies. (See ante, tit. "Indictment,” p. 878 to 889). As to describing the ownership of records, see ante, 1134; and furnit in lodgings, ante, 1120. The Taking, &c.]-The indictment must allege that the prisoner and carried away the goods, and that it was done feloniously. (1 508; 2 Hale, 184). An indictment for housebreaking, after charging the breaking entering in the usual form, charged that the prisoner "forty-two per of the current gold coin of this realm, called sovereigns, of the va 421., in the same dwelling-house then and there being found, the there feloniously did steal and carry away," &c. It was held good, that the words "then and there," in the last allegation, were suffic without the words "in the same dwelling-house" being added to th (Reg. v. Andrews, 1 C. & M. 121). IV. Punishment for Larceny in general. We have already, while treating of larceny as extended by stat particular cases, considered the punishment imposed in suci s (See ante, 1115, 1120 to 1148). All that remains here to be noticed are the following provisse By the 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29, s. 3, “Every person convicted pl larceny, or of any felony hereby made punishable like sim shall (except in the cases hereinafter otherwise provided for at the discretion of the Court, to be transported beyond the seas for the term of seven years, or to be imprisoned for any term not ex two years, and, if a male, to be once, twice, or thrice pubidy vately whipped, if the Court shall so think fit, in addition to such prisonment." And with regard to the place and mode of imprisonment fr dictable offences punishable under that statute, it enacts, br "That, where any person shall be convicted of any felony or nour punishable under this act, for which imprisonment may be sta it shall be lawful for the Court to sentence the offender to be imp or to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour, in the common house of correction, and also to direct that the offender shall be ha solitary confinement for the whole or any portion or portions'e imprisonment, or of such imprisonment with hard labour, Court in its discretion shall seem meet." (See further, as tes confinement, the 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 90, s. 5, post, 1155) 路 Besides the above two provisions, there are others contained & 8 Geo. IV. c. 28, of more general application as to pus That statute, having abolished the benefit of clergy in cases d 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 28. proceeds to establish various rules for the punishment of offences and the 8th section enacts, "That every person convicted of any punishable with death shall be punished in the manner prescribe the statute or statutes specially relating to such felony; and th person convicted of any felony for which no punishment hath be hereafter may be, specially provided, shall be deemed to be pa under this act, and shall be liable, at the discretion of the Court, transported beyond the seas for the term of seven years, or to be m soned for any term not exceeding two years, and, if a male, to be m twice, or thrice publicly or privately whipped, if the Court shall think fit, in addition to such imprisonment." As to the place and mode of punishment for all offences punishable under that act, sect. 9 of the same act provides, "That, where any person shall be convicted of any offence punishable under this act, for which imprisonment may be awarded, it shall be lawful for the Court to sentence the offender to be imprisoned, or to be imprisoned and kept to hard labour, in the common gaol or house of correction, and also to direct that the offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for the whole or any portion or portions of such imprisonment, or of such imprisonment with hard labour, as to the Court in its discretion shall seem meet." The extent of solitary confinement is now restricted to certain limits by the 7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 90, s. 5, which, after reciting, that, "by the laws now in force, it is lawful for the Court before whom any person shall be convicted of certain offences for which imprisonment or imprisonment with hard labour may be awarded, to direct that the offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for the whole or any portion or portions of such imprisonment, or of such imprisonment with hard labour, as to such Court in its discretion should seem meet," enacts, 'That, from and after the commencement of this act," (viz. 1st October 1837), "it shall not be lawful for any Court to direct that any offender shall be kept in solitary confinement for any longer periods than one month at a time, or than three months in the space of one year." The 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 28, s. 10, which is applicable to all felonies, enacts, "That, wherever sentence shall be passed for felony on a person already imprisoned under sentence for another crime, it shall be lawful for the Court to award imprisonment for the subsequent offence, to commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which such person shall have been previously sentenced; and where such person shall be already under sentence either of imprisonment or of transportation, the Court, if empowered to pass sentence of transportation, may award such sentence for the subsequent offence, to commence at the expiration of the imprisonment or transportation to which such person shall have been previously sentenced, although the aggregate term of imprisonment or transportation respectively may exceed the term for which either of those punishments could be otherwise awarded." In order to provide for the more exemplary punishment of offenders Punishment for a who commit felony after a previous conviction for felony, whether such subsequent felony. conviction shall have taken place before or after the commencement of that act, the statute provides, (sect. 11), "That, if any person shall be convicted of any felony not punishable with death, committed after a previous conviction for felony, such person shall, on such subsequent conviction, be liable, at the discretion of the Court, to be transported beyond the seas for life, or for any term not less than seven years, or to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding four years, and, if a male, to be once, twice, or thrice publicly or privately whipped, if the Court shall so think fit, in addition to such imprisonment." In order to warrant a sentence of transportation for life, on an indictment for a larceny, after a previous conviction for felony, the indictment need not conclude contra formam statuti. (Reg. v. Blea, 8 C. & P. 735). See ante, tit. "Judgment," p. 930; also the tits. Transportation," Vol. VI.; ante, "Hard Labour." V. Costs of Prosecution, &c. See this, ante, tits. "Costs," Vol. I.; "Evidence," Vol. II. P. 461. Costs. 6. Restitution of stolen goods. By the common law. VI. Restitution of stolen Goods. By the Common Law.]-By the common law, it should seem, the where a party's goods have been stolen, though, indeed, his owners in the goods be not thereby absolutely devested, yet, until he has d all that he can to bring the felon to justice, his remedy to recover igi the goods, either by a retaking, or action, or otherwise, is suspen Otherwise, offences would be made up and healed, and parties wi naturally seek their own immediate advantage, rather than the secure of the public. (See 1 Hale, 546; Noy, 82; 4 Bl. Com. 363). It is clear, therefore, the owner could have no civil redress against th felon himself before conviction, for it would be merging the felony the civil action; (see 4 Bl. Com. 863, 866; Crosby v. Leng, 12 Ear 409); and if he has no redress against the felon himself, he he against persons who derive their title through him. And in a recent case it was held, that, if goods have been stol there be reasonable ground for presuming that fact, the owner an maintain trover against the person who bought them of the supper thief, without he has done every thing in his power to bring the the to justice. (Gimson v. Woodfall, 2 C. & P. 41). If the owner take his goods again of the offender, to the intent to f vour him, or maintain him, this is unlawful, and punishable by ta imprisonment; but, if he take them again without any such intentia no offence. (1 Hale, 546). Provided the best endeavours be used to bring the offender to je that, when done, will suffice to entitle the owner to his reme back the goods; therefore, if, after the prosecution is commers, and before trial, the offender dies, or breaks prison, or if he stanE, S challenges more than the number he is allowed, without reason, or the like, the right of the party injured will not be sureted. (1 Hale, 540). After the conviction or proper prosecution of the offender, the prietor may take his goods wherever he can find them, so that it be e fected without any breach of the peace, because he satisfied p tice, and is entitled to a writ of restitution, whenever he thin demand it. (1 Hale, 546; 4 Bl. Com. 363). And if the felon be pardoned after conviction, or even if he be li acquitted, the owner may bring an action against him, in tres trover, to recover damages; for the civil right was not merged public injury, but only suspended till the prosecution was contas! (Crosby v. Leng, 12 East, 409). If the thing stolen have been converted into money, the o after having done all he can to bring the offender to justice, produce, instead of the specific chattel. (5 Co. 109; Keilr. And it seems now clear, though formerly disputed, that, if t stolen have been openly sold, and bonâ fide purchased in mars the owner may have them restored, even from an innocent (Keilw. 35, 48; 1 Hale, 542; 2 Hawk. c. 23, s. 54; Com. Dig." (A), "Market" (a)). And, though this may seem hard upor (a) Lord Hale argues strongly, that he shall have restitution, notwithstanding the sale in market overt of the goods stolen. 1. Because this act was made to encourage persons robbed to pursue malefactors, and therefore they have an assurance of restitution; and it would be small encouragement, if a thief, by a sale in a market overt, which is every day almost in every shop in London, should elude it. 2. Because |