1. Affecting individuals. A publication, though defamatory, yet, if written bona fide, or in com fidence, or with a view of investigating a fact, in which the party maiing it is interested, is not a libel. (See Moore v. Ferrall, 4 B. & A 871; 1 N. & M. 559, S. C.). A man has a right to communicate to any other any information be is possessed of in a matter in which they have a mutual interest; an it is a perfectly legal and justifiable object for one to induce another to become a party to a suit, as to a subject-matter in which both have interest; and it is not because strong or angry language is used in ch a communication that it will be a libel; but the jury must go furthe and see, not merely whether expressions are angry, but whether they are malicious. (Shipley v. Todhunter, 7 C. & P. 680). A letter from a son-in-law to his mother-in-law, volunteering advice respecting her proposed marriage, and containing imputations upon the person whom she was about to marry, is a privileged communicate and not actionable, unless malice be shewn.(Todd v. Hawkins, 2 M. & R. 20; 8 C. & P. 888, S. C.) If A. is going to have dealings with B., and he makes inquiries of C. who gives A. information respecting B., this is a privileged commun tion, as every one is quite at liberty to state his opinions bond fide of the respectability of a party thus inquired about. (Story v. Challandı, 81. & P. 234). If B., a tradesman, be dismissed from serving A., one of his custan ers, A. stating as the reason of it, that B. charged for goods never de vered, and B., after this, writes a letter to A., vindicating himself, and imputing the dishonesty to a servant of A., this is a privileged m nication, if it be bona fide and without malice. (Coward v. W 7 C. & P. 531). If A. has sold goods to B., a tradesman, and before the delivery of them, C., without being asked or solicited in any way to do so, speaks words injurious to the credit of B. as a tradesman, this is not a privileged communication; but if he had been asked by A. as to the credits of B., it would have been so. (King v. Watts, 8 C. & P. 614) Where a petition was addressed by a creditor of an officer in the y to the secretary at war, bonâ fide, and with a view of obtaining, th his interference, the payment of a debt due, and containing a statement of facts, which, though derogatory to the officer's character, the cre believed to be true, it was held no libel. (Fairman v. Ives, 5 B. 642; 1 D. & R. 252, S. C.) A letter written confidentially to persons who employed A. solicitor, conveying charges injurious to his professional character the management of certain concerns which they intrusted to him, and in which B., the writer of the letter, was likewise interested, was balen not to be a libel. (M'Dougall v. Claridge, 1 Campb. 267), So, where A., being tenant of B., was desired by B. to inform he saw or heard any thing respecting the game, A. wrote a letter informing B. that his gamekeeper sold game:-It was held, that had been so informed, and believed the fact so to be, this was a privi communication, and no libel. (Cockayne v. Hodgkisson, 5 C.P In such a case, the defendant may give in evidence representations to him as to the conduct of the gamekeeper, but cannot go i of acts done by the gamekeeper. (Ib.) into erdemes Where a master gives a correct character of a servant upon an inq made to him relative to the character, it is a privileged communicat and no action lies for it. (Hargrave v. Le Breton, 4 Burr. 2425; P tison v. Jones, 3 Man. & R. 101; 8 B. & C. 574; Child v. Affies, 9 B. C. 403; 4 Man. & R. 338, S. C., 1 M. & P. 33, 692, 61.) But d be otherwise where the character was given maliciously. Th master, in giving the character of his late servant to a person intending to take her, charged her with theft; and in support of that charg stated, that she had borrowed money when she came into his service, and repaid it before she had received any wages. In reply to an inquiry made afterwards by a relation of the servant, he admitted that the time when he paid the wages was entered in a book, which he produced, but refused to state what the time was; and on the same party remonstrating, and observing that the servant, in consequence of her loss of character, might have gone on the town, he answered, "What is that to us?" It was held, that this conduct was evidence to go to the jury (though slight), that the communication to the intended master was made maliciously. (Kelly v. Partington, 4 B. & Adol. 700; 2 N. & M. 460, S. C.) Charges made by a rate-payer against the constable of a district, to a meeting of rate-payers met to investigate the constable's disposal of the money of the inhabitants, are privileged, and may be made by letter, if the rate-payer be prevented from attending. (Spencer v. Amerton, 1 M. & R. 470). The party alleging such letter to be libellous must prove the absence of the rate-payer to have been wilful. (Ib.) In an action for libel, it appeared that the plaintiff was church warden, and the defendant clergyman, of the same parish, and that, differences having arisen between them in that relation, the plaintiff requested that the defendant's future communications should be by letter to the plaintiff's clerk. The defendant afterwards applied by letter to the clerk for money which he conceived to be due to himself from the plaintiff. The clerk answered, that the plaintiff denied his liability, and in reply, the defendant addressed a letter to the clerk, saying, "This attempt to defraud me is as mean as dishonest:"-Held, that it was properly left to the jury, whether the above language was justified by the occasion, and that the communication was not in itself privileged so as to render proof of actual malice necessary to sustain the action. (Tuson v. Evans, 4 P. & D. 396; 12 Ad. & E. 733, S. C.) A letter written by a private individual to a public officer, complaining of the misconduct of a person under him, if bonâ fide made, and without malice, is not a libel, though the charges may not be true. (Blake v. Pilfold, 1 M. & R. 198. See Farrman v. Ives, supra). But though it may be the duty of all persons to give information to her Majesty's proper officers concerning abuses, yet if one writes of another in a letter to such officer that he is doing something to the prejudice of her Majesty's service, which is not true, this is sufficient evidence of a malicious intention; and where no excuse is set up by the defendant, the jury may well find him guilty, though there be no other publication, and no further proof of malice. (Robinson v. May, 2 Smith, 3). An officer in the navy has no right to make communications upon subjects with which he becomes acquainted in his professional capacity, except to the government; and, therefore, a letter written to Lloyd's Coffee-house, about the conduct of the captain of a transport ship, by a lieutenant, who was superintendant on board, is not a privileged communication. (Harwood v. Green, 3 C. & P. 141). Nor can evidence of its being the practice for persons so circumstanced to make communications to Lloyd's be received in an action for libel against such a person, either as furnishing a defence in conjunction with other circumstances, or in mitigation of the damages to be recovered. (Ib.) The delivery of a pamphlet by the governor of a distant province to his attorney-general, not for any public purpose, but in order that he might peruse it, is such a publication as will make him responsible if the pamphlet be a libel. (Wyatt v. Gore, Holt, 299). Where an advertisement was published by the defendant at the instigation of A., the plaintiff's wife, for the purpose of ascertaining whether the plaintiff had another wife living when he married A., it was held no libel. (Delany v. Jones, 4 Esp. 191). So, a handbill, offering a reward for the recovery of certain bills of exchange, and stating that A. B. is suspected of having embezzled them, is not a libel, if published solely VOL. III. 4 H 1. Affecting individuals. the 1. Affecting with a view to the protection of persons liable on the bills, or to the individuals. conviction of the offender. (Finden v. Westlake, M. & M. 401). But an advertisement in a public newspaper, strongly reflecting upon character of an individual who has been declared a bankrupt is libel lous, although published with the avowed intention of convening a meeting of creditors for the purpose of consulting upon the measures proper to be adopted for their own security, if the legal object might have been attained by means less injurious. "(Browne v. Croome, 2 Start. Rep. 297). The following publication was held to be no libel:-"Notice, any person giving information where any property may be found belonging to H. G., a prisoner in the King's Bench Prison, but residing within the rules thereof, and 3, 4, and 5, Portland-place, Borough-road, shall receive five per cent. upon the goods recovered, for their trouble, by gplying to Mr. Levy, Fetter-lane, Fleet-street." (Gompertz v. Le P. &D. 214). It was also there held, that the following innuendo, "there by meaning that the plaintiff had been and was guilty of concealing his property, with a fraudulent and unlawful intention," was an addition, and not explanatory only of any previous matter alleged in the notice. (16.) The following words, "The Reverend John Robinson and Mr. James Robinson, inhabitants of this town, not being persons that the proprietors and annual subscribers think it proper to associate with, are excluded this room," published by posting a paper on which they were written, purporting to be a regulation of a particular society, have been held no libel. (Robinson v. Jermyn, 1 Price, 11). So, communications made to a member of a dissenting congregation, respecting an individual about to be appointed a minister of that congre gation, if made bona fide and without malice, are privileged communica tions, and not libellous. (Blackburne v. Blackburne, 4 Bingh, 395; 1 M. & P. 33, 63; 3 C. & P. 146, S. C.) On the other hand, communications made by one member of a charitable association to another, reflecting on the conduct of the medical st tendant of the establishment, are not privileged. (Martin v. Stre, 1 N. & P. 29; 5 Ad. & Ell. 535, S. C.) Nor is a circular letter sent y the secretary to the members of a society for the protection of trade against sharpers and swindlers, furnishing information respecting certain bill transactions, is not a privileged communication. (Getting v. Foss, 3 C. & P. 160). But it seems, that, if such letter state particular facts it will not be a libel, though some of the persons receiving it believed that it was sent to intimate that the parties mentioned in it were c mon sharpers and swindlers. At all events, it is a question for the jury, whether the society really and bonâ fide intended to give the particular information which the letter contains. (Ib.) It is otherwise, howeve”, if the letter contain a general statement, such as that the party mentioned in it is considered as an improper person to be balloted for sa member of the society. (Ib.) mercantile house, contain very strong expressions concerning third pers M. & Rob. 151). An imputation of felony made in the presence of a third person, s stranger to the parties, and not an officer of justice, is not necessarily an individuals. authorized communication. (Podmore v. Lawrence, 3 Per. & D. 209.) 1. Affecting In the same case, it was considered, that the circumstances and occasion of speaking them should be submitted to the consideration of the jury, to whom it belongs to determine whether the defendant acted without malice and bonâ fide. There is no such privileged relation existing between Parliamentary candidates and the electors, as will justify any of the latter in publishing statements injurious to the character of the former. (Duncombe v. Daniell, 8 Car. & P. 222). In all these cases it is a question of fact, to be left to the jury, whether or not a defendant was actuated by express malice in writing a communication, which he alleges to be privileged as a confidential communication; (Kine v. Sewell, 3 M. & W. 297; Cooper v. Lawson, 1 P. & D. 15; 8 A. & Ell. 746, S. C.; Podmore v. Lawrence, 3 P. & D. 209; Blackburn v. Blackburn, 4 Bingh. 395; 1 M. & P. 33, 63; 3 C. & P. 146, S. C.; Robinson v. May, 2 Smith, 3; Smith v. Matthews, 1 M. & Rob. 151); and communications of this kind should be viewed liberally by juries; and unless they see clearly that there was a malicious intention of defaming the party, they ought to find for the defendant. (Todd v. Chambers, 2 M. & R. 20; 8 C. & P. 888, S. C.) Matter, though defamatory, if contained in any proceedings used in a Proceedings in regular course of justice, is not a libel. (Lake v. King, 1 Lev. 240; 1 courts of Justice. Saund. 132, S. C.; 1 Hawk. c. 73, s. 8. See Fairman v. Ives, 1 D. & R. 252, ante, 724). Parliament. Therefore, no action or indictment will lie for printing a report of the In Houses of House of Commons, though it reflects on the character of an individual; (R. v. Wright, 8 T. R. 293); and this however injurious such publication might be to his character. (Curry v. Walter, 1 B. & P. 525; 1 Esp. 457). And it seems nothing can be charged as libellous, which is contained in a petition to either House of Parliament, however it may affect individuals. (Lake v. King, 1 Lev. 240; 1 Saund. 132, S. C.) And the delivering of printed copies of the petition to all the members, and the necessary exposure of the manuscript to the compositors and other workmen concerned in printing it, are not indictable offences. (Lake v. King, 1 Lev. 240; 1 Saund. 133, S. C.) And the reason of this is manifest, because the Courts of justice and the great council of the state are the constitutional tribunals to which grievances should be preferred; and to bring alleged wrongs under their notice is to support, and not to break the peace, since their discussion puts an end to the dispute. But it is contended by Hawkins, that, where it appears from the whole circumstances of the case, that the prosecution is commenced for the mere purpose of libelling, and without any intention to proceed in it, such an abuse and mockery of public justice should not become a shelter for the guilt which, in reality, they increased. (1 Hawk. c. 73, s. 6; 3 Chit. C. L. 870). Therefore, although it is lawful to publish a speech delivered by a party in his character of a member of Parliament, (see 4 Hen. VIII. c. 8; 1 Will. & Mary, st. 2, c. 2), yet this privilege extends only to his speaking in the House; for, if he afterwards publish his speech, he is amenable for it, in the same manner as any other person. (R. v. Creevy, 1 M. & Sel. 273; R. v. Lord Abingdon, 1 Esp. 226). It is no defence in law to an action for publishing a libel, that the defamatory matter is part of a document which was, by order of the House of Commons, laid before the House, and thereupon became part of the proceedings of the House, and which was afterwards, by order of the House, printed and published by defendant; and that the House of Commons heretofore resolved, declared, and adjudged, "that the power of publishing such of its reports, votes, and proceedings, as it shall deem necessary or conducive to the public interest, is an essential incident to the constitutional functions of Parliament, more especially to the Commons House of Parliament as the representative portion of it." (Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1.; 2 Per. & D. 1, S. C.)___ On demurrer 1. Affecting to a plea suggesting such a defence, a court of law is competent to deterIndividuals. mine whether or not the House of Commons has such privilege as wil support the plea. (lb.) Proceedings of court martial, Courts of justice. In the proceedings themselves. Proceedings before justices, coroners, &c. If a court martial, after stating in their sentence the acquittal of a officer against whom a charge has been made, subjoin thereto a declar tion of their opinion that the charge is malicious and groundless, and that the conduct of the prosecutor in falsely calumniating the accused is highly injurious to the service, it is no libel, though the president of the court martial deliver such sentence and declaration to the jud advocate. (Jekyll v. Sir J. Moore, 6 Esp. Rep. 63; 2 New Rep. Hi. S. C.) A fair and strict report of proceedings in a court of justice is no libe (See Lewis v. Walter, 4 B. & Ald. 605.) As to what is a fair rep it is to be observed, that the publication of the history of a trial consist ing of the facts of the case, and of the law of the case as applied to the facts, is lawful. Counsel in the discharge of their duty, and in mate relative to the issue, may make observations injurious to individu (Hodgson v. Scarlett, 1 B. & Ald. 232); but the publication of s slanderous matter is not justifiable, unless it be shewn that it was lished for the purpose of giving the public information, which it fit and proper for them to receive, and that it was warranted by evidence. (Flint v. Pike, 6 Dowl. & R. 528; 4 B. & C. 478, &. C., Sa in the publication of evidence given on a trial, the evidence itse not the result of evidence, should be given. (Lewis v. Walter, 4 B.4 Ald. 606. See Roberts v. Brown, 10 Bingh. 523.) And a publication of proceedings in a court of justice, containi famatory matter, would be a libel, if the account be highly false; (Waterfield v. The Bishop of Chichester, 2 Mod. 118. Nokes, 7 East, 493); or be commented upon with injurious (Lewis v. Clement, 3 B. & Ald. 702; S. C. in error, 7 Moore, 20; 15. &B. 297; 1 Price, P. C. 181; Stile v. Nokes, 7 East, 493; R. v. Fe 1 B. & Ald. 379; R. v. Fisher, 2 Campb. 570; R. v. Lee, 5 Esp or where it does not set forth all the material evidence; (S Mills, 6 Bingh. 213; 3 M. & P. 520, S. C.); or where the pu is not for the mere purpose of publishing the account, but express & libelling the party, or for the vehicle of blasphemy, indecency, like. R. v. Carlile, 3 B. & Ald. 167; R. v. Creevy, 1 M. & Lake v. King, 1 Saund. 131, 133). The fairness of the rep question for the jury. (Cooper v. Lawson, 1 P. & D. 15; 84.4 746, S. C.) The publication must also be strictly confined to the proces Court, and cannot be justified if it contain disparaging ober by any other than a judge of the Court. (Delegal v. Highl N. C. 950.) A. (the plaintiff) obtained a rule nisi for a criminal inf against B. (the defendant) for sending him a challenge, and A davits contained matters of high censure against B. The a B., in shewing cause against this rule, was recriminatory, and Ra under other circumstances, have been libellous. In an acti against B. for the libel contained in B.'s affidavit, it was held was justified in setting forth any such matters respecting A. duct as he might think would disincline the Court to enter application for A.'s rule. (Doyle v. O'Doherty, 1 Car. & M. 4 A publication of defamatory matter, which took place on proceedings, as at a public office, or coroner's inquest, or the indictable. (Duncan v. Thwaites, 5 D. & R. 447; 3 B. & C. 56 v. Lee, 5 Esp. 123; R. v. Fisher, 2 Camp. 563; R. v. Fleet, 1379; Lewis v. Walter, 4 B. & Ald. 218; East v. Chapmas, Ha) 46; 2 C. & P. 570, S. C.; Charlton v. Walton, 6 C. & P. 385.) If a party who has summoned another before a magistrate, die |