parts. Where several commit a joint felony in the county of A., and there 8. Particular divide the goods, and afterwards separately carry each his respective requisites and share into the county of B., they cannot be indicted for a joint felony in the latter county. (R. v. Barnet, 2 Russ. 174). But if two jointly commit a larceny in one county, and one of them carry the stolen goods into a different county, the other still accompanying him, without their ever being separated, they are both indictable in either county; the possession of one being the possession of both in each of the counties, as long as they continue in company. (R. v. M'Donagh & Druid, Old Bailey, 1824; R. v. Courty, 2 Russ. 175). The taking into the second county, however, must be animo furandi, the mere possession there is not sufficient. A constable took the defendant with two stolen horses in Surrey, and afterwards, at his request, rode with him on the horses into Kent; the judges were unanimously of opinion that there was no evidence of stealing in Kent. (R. v. Simmonds, 1 Mood. C. C. 408). If, however, the original taking be one of which the common law cannot take cognizance, as if the goods be stolen at sea, the thief cannot be indicted for the larceny in any county into which he may carry the goods, but the larceny must be tried as other cases within the jurisdiction of the Admiralty. (3 Inst. 113; 1 Hawk. c. 35, s. 52). A prisoner having stolen goods on the island of Jersey, had them in his possession in the county of Dorset, in which he was indicted and convicted; but it was holden that the conviction was wrong, because the original taking was such whereof the common law could not take notice, and, the island of Jersey not being considered part of the united kingdom, the case was not within the stat. & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29, s. 76. (R. v. Prowes, R. & M. C. C. 349; see R. Madge, 9 C. & P. 29). So, where A. ripped lead from a church in Berks, and afterwards In an indictment for conspiracy, the venue may be laid in any county Conspiracy. In an indictment for sending a threatening letter, the venue may be Threatening letter. V. nt it. (See R. v. Watson, 1 Camp. 215; R. v. Williams, 2 Id. 506; Av. Sir F. Burdett, 3 B. & Ald. 717). So, if a libel, (R. v. Burdett, 4 1.& Ald. 95; R. v. Watson, 1 Camp. 215), or a letter containing a hallenge, be sent from the county of A. to the county of B., the venue may be laid in either county. So, if an act done in one county prove a misance in another, it seems that, in an indictment for it, the venue may e laid in either county, although it seems more correct to lay it in the ounty in which the act was done. Where a servant had received money for his master in the county Embezzlement. f A., and, upon returning to his master in the county of B., denied aving received it, the judges held, that his being indicted for the embezzlement in the county of B. was correct, for he could not be said to dave embezzled the money until he refused to account for it. (R. v. Taylor, 3 B. & P. 596). It is a general rule, that, where a statute creating a new felony directs that it may tried in the county where the offender is apprehended, without containing any negative words, the provision is only cumulative, and he may still be tried in the county where the offence was committed. (1 Hale, 694; 3 Inst. 87). 8. Particular parts. Offences to per or upon coaches, &c., or vessels, &c. Offences committed on Persons or Property in Coaches employed a requisites and Journeys, or in Vessels employed in Inland Narigation.]-The s Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 13, "For the more effectual prosecution of of committed during journeys from place to place," enacts, "that, s sons or property in any felony or misdemeanour shall be committed on any person, or in respect of any property in or upon any coach, waggon, cart, ether carriage whatever, employed in any journey, or shall be commis 2 any person, or on or in respect of any property on board any whatever, employed on any voyage or journey upon any nav river, canal, or inland navigation, such felony or misdemeanour may'ı dealt with, inquired of, tried, determined, and punished in any o through any part whereof such coach, waggon, cart, carriage, or v shall have passed in the course of the journey or voyage during such felony or misdemeanour shall have been committed, in the s manner as if it had been actually committed in such county; all cases where the side, centre, or other part of any highway, t side, bank, centre, or other part of any such river, canal, or navi shall constitute the boundary of any two counties, such felony er demeanour may be dealt with, inquired of, tried, determines punished in either of the said counties through, or adjoining: by the boundary of any part whereof such coach, waggon carriage, or vessel shall have passed in the course of the jour voyage during which such felony or misdemeanour shall har committed, in the same manner as if it had been actually commi such county." Offences in towns corporate. Offences in Wales. Offences in Towns Corporate, &c.]-Where an offence is c within the county of a city or town corporate, (except is Westminster, or the borough of Southwark, (38 Geo. III. c. much of that statute as applied to the cities of Bristol, Ch Exeter having been repealed by stat. 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. see Reg. v. Holden, 8 C. & P. 606), the prosecutor may pre dictment to the jury of the next adjoining county, at the oyer and terminer, or gaol delivery, and have the offender trie (38 Geo. III. c. 52, s. 2); but in that case the venue must si. in the county of the city, &c. where the offence was committed R. v. Mellor, R. & R. 144). And it need not be averred that the in which the indictment is preferred is the next adjoining cou county of the town, &c.; but when the record is drawn up, pear in the caption or memorandum. (R. v. Goff, R. & R. 173. the bill have been found by a jury of the county of the city, court of oyer and terminer, or gaol delivery, holden for such the city, &c., may order it to be tried by a jury of the next ag county. (38 Geo. III. c. 52, s. 2). In both of which cases, th before which the offender is tried and convicted may order d ment to be executed, either in the same county, or in the cou city in which the offence was committed; (51 Geo. III. c. 100, s may order the expenses of prosecution and witnesses, (38 Geo. s. 3), and the expenses the county may have been put to by the of the prisoner there for trial, &c., (51 Geo. III. c. 100, s. 2), tr by the person who would have been ordered to pay the sam offender had been indicted and tried in such county of a city, 60 Geo. III. c. 14, s. 3; 7 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 25; 5 ̊& 6 Will. IV. s. 113; 5 & 6 Vict. c. 38; Jerv. Arch. C. L., 9th edit., 20). Offences in Wales.]-In indictments for felonies or other committed in Wales, the venue might formerly have been la next adjacent English county. (26 Hen. VIII. c. 6, s. 6, which a to felonies subsequently created; R. v. Wyndham, R. & R. 15:3 78; 34 & 35 Hen. VIII. c. 26, s. 84). But now these statute pealed by implication by stat. 11 Geo. IV. & 1 Will. IV. e.7 and in indictments for offences committed in Wales, the venue must, as 8. Particular in England, be laid in the county in which the offence is committed, requisites and unless otherwise provided for by statute. ap Offences in Scotland or Ireland.]-In general, offences committed in Scotland and Ireland are indictable only there, and if the party be prehended here, he must be sent thither for trial. (13 Geo. III. c. 31; 44 Geo. III. c. 92; 1 East's P. C. 772). If goods were stolen in Scotland or Ireland, and brought by the offender into England, he could not be indicted here. (2 East's P. C. 772. And see 3 Inst. 113; 13 Co. 53. But see 1 Stark. Cr. L. 2, n. (g) ). To remedy this, the 13 Geo. III. c. 31, ss. 4 and 5, and 44 Geo. III. c. 92, ss. 7 and 8, provide, that offenders escaping with stolen property from one part of the kingdom to another may be indicted in the county where the same is found; and that persons guilty of receiving only may be tried in the place where they receive, without reference to the place where the goods were originally taken. (1 East's P.C. 772). Offences Abroad.]-As to the venue on indictments for offences committed abroad, or on the high seas, see tit. "Admiralty," Vol. I. (b) Defective Venue, when cured. 66 By stat. 7 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 20, no judgment upon any indictment or information for any felony or misdemeanour, whether after verdict or outlawry, or by confession, default, or otherwise, shall be stayed or reversed for want of a proper or perfect venue, where the Court shall appear by the indictment or information to have had jurisdiction over the offence." (See Reg. v. Albert, 12 Law J., N. S., M. C., 117). Where an indictment, commencing "London, to wit," described the prisoner as late of London, and charged the defendant to have committed the offence in the parish of St. Mary-le-Bow, without stating that parish to be in London, it was held that this was not aided by the above statute, the jurisdiction of the court not being shewn. (R. v. Minter Hart, 7C.&P. 123. See also R. v. Stowell, 12 Law J., N. S., M. C.,111). The entire omission of venue is not cured after verdict by this statute. (Reg. v. O'Connor, 13 Law J., N. S., M. C., 33). And though this act cures a wrong venue, it does not cure a venue into a wrong county. (R. v. Mitchell, 2 Q. B. 636). (c) Mode of stating Venue. parts. Offences in Scot land or Ireland. Offences abroad, &c. Defective venue, when cured. venue. The venue, that is, the county in which the indictment is preferred, Mode of stating is stated in the margin thus, Middlesex," or "Middlesex, to wit,' but the latter method is the most usual. In the body of the indictment, also, a special venue, as it is termed, should be laid, that is, the facts should in general be stated to have arisen in the county in which the indictment is preferred, so that it may appear that the offence was within the jurisdiction of the court; and, therefore, if a parish, vill, or other place where the offence, or part of it, occurred, be stated without naming the county in the margin, or expressly referring to it by the words "the county aforesaid," the indictment will be defective. (1 Saund. 208; 3 P. Wms. 496; 2 Hawk. c. 25, ss. 34, 128; 2 Hale, 166). And where two counties are mentioned, as Surrey, in the margin, and then a fact is described as having happened in Middlesex, and afterwards the offence is stated to have been committed at a place "in the county aforesaid," without shewing which county is intended, this will refer to the last antecedent county, Middlesex, and the indictment will be insufficient, for the rule in civil actions, that the venue in the margin will aid it, does not extend to criminal proceedings. (Reg. 8. Particular v. Rhodes, 2 Ld. Raym. 888; Anon., Id. 1304; 2 Hale, 180; Elnor's requisites and case, Cro. Eliz. 184; R. v. Kilderby, 1 Saund. 338, n. (1)). parts. So, where the indictment described the place as being " in the county aforesaid," where there were two different counties before mentioned it was holden bad, although one of the counties was mentioned in the defendant's addition merely. (R. v. Rolls, 1 Rol. Rep. 223). But in recent case, where it was alleged in an indictment that a dwelling-hous was "situate at the parish aforesaid," two parishes having been stated, it was holden that the parish last mentioned must be intended. (R. Richards, 1 M. & Rob. 177). Where an indictment for stealing in a dwelling-house stated that the defendant at C., in the county of D., one coat, &c., in the dwelling-house of A. B. then and there being, did steal, without saying "there situate," it was holden sufficient. (R. v. Napper, 1 Mood. C. C. 44). When, however, only one county is named, the words "county afore said" will have sufficient reference to the county in the margin. (3 P. Wms. 496; 2 Hale, 180; R. v. Kilderby, 1 Saund. 308, n. (1); 2 Hats c. 25, s. 34; 1 Chit. C. L. 194). But a count stating that the defendants, together with other evil d posed persons, &c., unlawfully did endeavour to excite her Majesty's subjects to disaffection, &c., no place being stated, held bad on motic in arrest of judgment, there being no words of reference to the venue in the margin, and the defect not being cured by the said statute. (Reg. v. Feargus O'Connor, 13 Law J., N. S., M. Č., 33). An indictment charged that defendant, at the township of W., highway there, leading from a highway leading from the village of W. towards C. to another highway, leading from the village of W wards L. by a wall there, extending into the said highway by erected, had encroached, &c.: it was held, that the indictment was not uncertain, and that "there" and "said" could be referred only to the highway first mentioned. (R. v. Wright, 1 Adol. & Ell. 434. And see R. v. Countesthorpe, 2 B & Adol. 487). And where, a parish being situate partly in two counties, an indict ment alleged an offence to have been committed in the parish of A. in the county of B., not saying in that part of the parish of A. which lies in the county of B., it was holden sufficient. (R. v. Perkins, 4 C. P.3). In indictments founded upon the statutes which authorize a mode or place of trial that did not exist at common law, all facts within the realm should be laid in the county where they actually happened. (See 1 Chit. C. L. 195, and cases there collected). Offences committed in the county of a city or town corporate, ani indicted in the county next adjoining, under the 38 Geo. III. c. 52, she all be laid to have been committed in the county of the town; R.. Mellor, R. & R. 144); but it need not be averred that the county where the indictment is brought is the next adjoining county. (R. v. Gej, R. & R. 179). Indictments for offences committed upon the high seas should allege the crimes to have been committed there, in order to shew the Admi ralty jurisdiction. (3 Inst. 112; Bac. Abr. Admiralty, (D); 1 Lear, 388). See the enactments of the 59 Geo. III. c. 96, ss. 1, 2, and 59 free. III. c. 27. Before the passing of the new jury act, 6 Geo. IV. c. 50, it was, in general, essential to lay every issuable and triable fact to have happened at some particular parish, vill, hamlet, or place within the county to which a venire may be awarded; and it would not suffice merely to state the county. (R. v. Hollond, 5 T. R. 620; 2 Hale, 180; Anon., 3 Camp. 77; 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 83; Bac. Abr. Indictment, (G 4). So, if the of fence were laid in London generally, it was before the passing of that act too general, because of its largeness: and there must have been some parish stated, with some addition; (as St. Mary, Wood-street); though the ward need not have been stated, because a ward is in London as a hundred is in a county, and the hundred need not have been stated. 8. Particular (2 Hawk. c. 23, s. 92; Strike v. Banes, Sid. 325; Mackalley's case, 9 requisites and Rep. 66 b). But now the jury in criminal cases are returned from the body of the county, and not, as formerly, from any particular visne; (6 Geo. IV. c. 50, s. 20); and, therefore, it would seem now sufficient to state only the county, or the city, borough, or other part of the county, to which the jurisdiction of the court is limited, in all cases which are not of a local nature. (See Jervis's Archbold's Crim. Law, 38; R. v. Lawrence, 3 Corp. 78; R. v. Dowling, R. & M. N. P. C. 433; R. v. Perkins, 4 C. & P. 363). Where a mere omission or nonfeasance is alleged, as in an indictment for not attending church, no vill need be stated in the body of the indictment, though it would be otherwise if the duty were local. (R. v. Corry, 5 East, 376-8; 1 Hawk. c. 10, s. 5). Where the nature of the offence consists in the repetition of several acts, it must be supposed to have happened in several places, and there is no necessity to state any place. (Parcel's case, Cro. Eliz. 195; 1 Hawk. c. 81, s. 11; R. v. Urlyn, 2 Saund. 308, n. (1) ). And no venue need be laid to immaterial facts. In some cases, where the offence is of a peculiar local description, more particularity in the statement of the venue is necessary: thus, an indictment under the 57 Geo. III. c. 90, (now the 9 Geo. IV. c. 69, title "Game," Vol. III.), for being armed at night in a close to kill game, must shew the particular close by name, or name its owner, or otherwise particularize it. (R. v. Ridley, R. & R. 515, three of the judges diss.) And in such a case, although it is not necessary to state both the name of the close and the name of the owner also, yet, if the indictnent state both, and there be a variance in either one of the statenents, it will be fatal. (R. v. Owen and another, R. & M. C. C. 118. And see R. v. Pye, 2 East's P. C. 785; R. v. Healey, R. & M. C. C. 1). If the statute upon which an indictment is framed give the penalty to of the parish in which the offence was committed, the parish must be truly stated. the poor If a parish be partly situate in the county of W. and partly in the county of S., it is sufficient to state the offence to have been comnitted "at the parish of H., in the county of W." (R. v. Perkins, 4 C. P. 363). In general, where any positive fact is averred, it should be stated to e done "then and there," after the county and the vill have been clearly expressed in the body of the indictment; (1 Sess. Cas. 178; Com. Dig. Indictment, (G1)); and the allegation of time and place, "then and here," should be repeated to every material fact which is issuable and riable. (Ib., Id. 8; R. v. Hollond, 5 T. R. 620; Bouche's case, Cro. Eliz. 200-5). And, therefore, if an indictment state that the defendant at the venue "made an assault, and with his sword feloniously struck,' &c., without saying "then and there feloniously struck," it will be in sufficient. Where an indictment charged a prisoner with having burglariously broken and entered a dwelling-house, " with intent one A. D., in the said dwelling-house then being, violently and against her will then and there feloniously to ravish and carnally know;" it was doubtful whether that allegation was sufficient, without the addition of the words "in the said dwelling-house," after the words "then and there." (Reg. v. Watkins, 1 Car. & M. 264; Dyer, 69 a; 2 Hale, 180; and see a variety of other instances, 1 Chit. C. L. 198). Where an indictment for manslaughter charged that A. gave to deceased divers mortal blows at P., in the county of M., and that the deceased languished and died at D., in the county of K.; and that the prisoner was then and there aiding in the commission of the felony; it was held, that the word "there" sufficiently referred to P., in the County of M. (Rex v. Hargrave, 5 C. & P. 170). parts. |