8. Particular parts. In R. v. Went, (R. & R. 359), the prisoner was charged with stealrequisites and ing provisions in a workhouse: they were laid as the "goods, chattes, and property of the overseers of the poor, for the time being, of the paris of K. aforesaid," and the judges held that this was proper, and sciently imported, that, at the time of the theft, the goods were the p perty of the then overseers of the poor. Guardians of poor. Turnpike trust. Commissioners of sewers. Chelsea Hospital. Public service. But where a local act incorporates certain inhabitants of certain rishes by a certain title, although, according to the act, a number rectors are to be appointed, and the property of the corporation vested a them, still property stolen or embezzled must be laid in the corpent name, or in the directors for the time being, in their individual name. (R. v. Beacall, R. & M. C. C. 15). Guardians of Poor.]-By 5 & 6 Will. IV. c. 69, s. 7, the guardians the poor of every union formed by virtue of the 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 76, 17of every parish placed under the control of a board of guardians by vi of that act, are made a corporation, by the name of the "Guardians Poor of the Union [or, of the Parish of], in the County of and, as such corporation, are empowered to accept, take, and holl the benefit of the union or parish, any buildings, land, or hereditat goods, effects, or other property; and by that name to bring acti prefer indictments, &c.; and in every such action or indictment relat to any such property, it shall be sufficient to lay or state the property be that of the guardians of the union, or of the parish of The Poor Law Commissioners may be described in an indictment their style of office. (R. v. Crossley, 2 P. & D. 319). -- Turnpike Trustees, &c.]-With respect to the description owners of property belonging to a turnpike trust, it is enacte stat. 7 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 17, "that, in any indictment or inform any felony or misdemeanour committed on or with respect to a building, gate, machine, lamp, board, stone, post, fence, or dirt, erected or provided in pursuance of any act of Parliament for any turnpike road, or any of the conveniences or appurtenances unto respectively belonging, or any materials, tools, or implements vided for making, altering, or repairing any such road, it shall be s cient to state any such property to belong to the trustees or c sioners of such road, and it shall not be necessary to specify the any of such trustees or commissioners." We have already ma comments on this provision, ante, tits. "Highways, Turnpike.” Commissioners of Sewers.]-With respect to the description owners of property in or under the management of commiser sewers, by the statute 7 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 18, it is enacted, “that, indictment or information for any felony or misdemeanour con on or with respect to any sewer or other matter within or undr view, cognizance, or management of any commissioners of seven shall be sufficient to state any such property to belong to the sioners of sewers within or under whose view, cognizance, or MARE ment any such things shall be, and it shall not be necessary to g the names of any of such commissioners." Chelsea Hospital.]-With respect to the description of the own property belonging to Chelsea Hospital, by the 7 Geo. IV. c. I. - * in indictments for stealing or embezzling any property belonging hospital, the property is to be laid in "the Lords and others, C sioners of the Royal Hospital for Soldiers at Chelsea, in the Cor Middlesex;" and the same section contains a similar provision reset” ing frauds by personating, &c., and forgeries relative to this hospita Public Service.]-Monies or valuable securities embezzled by p in the public service may be described as the property of the Quee parts. Post-Office. Will. IV. c. 4, s. 4). Goods stolen in the house of a person who had 8. Particular been convicted of felony, and is undergoing his sentence, may be de- requisites and scribed as the property of the Queen, although there has been no office found. (Reg. v. Whitehead, 9 C. & P. 429). In indictments for stealing post-letters, &c., the property may be laid in the PostmasterGeneral. (7 Will. IV. & 1 Vict. c. 36, s. 40, post, " Post-Office," Vol. V.) Friendly Societies.]-By the 10 Geo. IV. c. 56, s. 21, ante, tit. Friendly societies. "Friendly Societies," the property of friendly societies established under that act may be stated to belong to the treasurer or trustee of such society in his proper name, without further description. A box, belonging to a benefit society, was stolen from a room in a public-house. Two of the stewards had keys of this box, and by the rules of the society the landlord ought to have had a key, but in fact had not; and it was holden, that the prisoner might be convicted on a count laying the property in the landlord alone. (R. v. Wymer, 4 C. & P. 391; see 4 & 5 Will. IV. c. 40). If the property be stolen by a trustee, it may be laid in the treasurer, and vice versa. (Reg. v. Cain, 1 C. & M. 309). (b) Consequences of Misnomer of Prosecutor or Third Persons. The consequences of a misnomer or mis-statement in the name of the prosecutor or third persons are more serious than those arising from the misnomer of the defendant. If, at the trial, it appear in evidence that the prosecutor is misnamed, the variance is fatal, and the defendant must be acquitted. So, if he be described as a certain person to the jurors unknown, and it appear in evidence that his name is known, the defendant will be acquitted. (See R. v. Walker, 3 Camp. 264; Holt, C. N. P. 595). In an indictment for receiving stolen goods, if the principal felon be unknown, he may be described as a certain person to the jurors aforesaid unknown; (R. v. Thomas, 2 East, P. C. 781); but, if it appear in evidence that the principal felon is known, the receiver will be acquitted. (R. v. Walker, 3 Camp. 264; ante, Vol. I. p. 27). A misnomer, however, will not be fatal, if the name inserted be immaterial, and may be rejected as mere surplusage. (R. v. Healey, R. & M. C. C. 1; 2 East, P. C. 593). Formerly, if a misnomer of a third person appeared on the face of the indictment, it was a ground for arresting the judgment. (See 1 East, P. C. 514; 1 Chit. C. L. 216). But now, by 7 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 20, post, 900, no judgment upon any indictment or information for any felony or misdemeanour, whether after verdict or outlawry, or by confession, default, or otherwise, shall be stayed or reversed for want of the averment of any matter unnecessary to be proved; nor for that any person or persons mentioned in the indictment or information is or are designated by a name of office, or other descriptive appellation, instead of his, her, or their proper name or names. 5. STATEMENT OF TIME, &c. Consequences of misnomer of persons. prosecutor or third 5. Statement of time, &c. It is a general rule, that the time and place of every material fact How to be stated. which is issuable and triable must be plainly and consistently alleged; and such a degree of precision does the law exact in this respect, that an uncertainty or incongruity in the description of time and place will vitiate the indictment on demurrer. (1 Stark. Crim. P. 54, and the authorities there cited; R. v. Hollond, 5 T. R. 620). Whenever a venue is necessary to be stated, so is time. (Ib.) Where an indictment charges a man with a bare omission, as not scouring such a ditch, it is said that it need not shew any time, because it affirmeth a present evil. (2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 79). But such time must be stated where the offence consisted in the omission of an act to be done at a certain time. No indictment can be good without precisely shewing a certain day on Day. which the material facts alleged in it happened. (2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 77). 8. Particular And if the offence be done in the night, before midnight, the indictment requisites and shall suppose it to be done in the day before; and if it happen ster Night. parts. Year of the Queen. Year set out by inference. Hour. Limited time. Divers days. Then and there. Day and year aforesaid. Consequences of defective statement of time. midnight, then it must say it was done the day after. (Lamb, b.4, c. d, It is most regular to set forth the year, by shewing the year th Queen; but the year of our Lord is unobjectionable. (2 Hale, Chit. C. L. 217). And if it say, on such a day last past, without ing in what year, that is good enough; for the certainty may be f out by the style of the sessions. (Lamb, 491). But this, pers doubtful, if objection were made at the trial. Indictment in the of one king shall serve in the time of another, and the offender shal arraigned upon it. (14 Vin. Abr. Indictment, (H 10), pl. 5). But it is not necessary to mention the hour in an indictment; (2 Hant c. 25, s. 76); and if it be stated, no exception is allowed to it. (C v. Pitt, 3 Burr. 1434; Clarke's case, 1 Bulst. 203). Except in cases burglary, where it must be laid for the purpose of shewing that the fence was committed in the night-time. Although a particular time be limited for the prosecution, and it s appear on the face of the proceedings that the prosecution was menced within that period, no express averment to that effect is r site. (Lee v. Clarke, 2 East, 333, 362). If divers offences be laid to have been committed on divers days* tween such a day and such a day, it is utterly bad; (2 Harl.c 82); unless, perhaps, in offences which may have a continuan as a nuisance, &c. In indictments for assaults, there need not be either a rep the time, or a reference to it by the word adtunc, as the tim will be connected with all the subsequent facts. But in indi felony it is otherwise, and especially where the crime consists bination of facts: as in murder, which consists of the assault and and in robbery from the person, and in other cases. (2 Hale, to the words "still being," see R. v. Somerton, (7 B. & C. 467), ther, 1 Chit. C. L. 220-1). The words "day and year aforesaid," where two or more named, would, it seems, in general, mean the day and year last (See R. v. Wright, 1 Ad. & Ell. 434). Though the day or year be mistaken in the indictment, yet, fence were committed in the same county, though at another offender ought to be found guilty. (2 Hale, 179). It is best in indictments to set down the times as truly though it be not of absolute necessity to the defendant's convid Hale, 179). It is not necessary that the time should be laid according truth; for, if it be stated previous to the finding of the indicted the place be within the county, or the extent of the Court'sju a variance between the indictment and evidence in the time offence was committed will not be material. (Keb. 16; 2 In It is, however, necessary to state the day and year accordi fact; and in pleading deeds, bills of exchange, or matters of if the precise date of a fact be a necessary ingredient in the must be truly stated. (See R. v. Trehearne, 1 Mood. C. C. If no day be stated, or if the day stated be uncertain or imp if it make the indictment repugnant to itself, it is void on de But if the day laid be such as may be made certain, or be a day it will be good, though not laid expressly. (2 Hawk. e. 25,* v. Mathews, 5 T. R. 162). Formerly, a defective statement, or omission of the statemen parts. when material, was objectionable after verdict; but now, by the statute 8. Particular 7 Geo. IV. c. 64, s. 20, it is enacted, that no judgment shall be stayed or requisites and reversed, because the indictment or information does not state the time of the offence, where time is not the essence of the offence, or states it imperfectly, or states the offence to have been after the finding the indictment or exhibiting the information, or on an impossible day, or on a day that never happened. (See the enactment in full, post, 900). But these are as good objections on demurrer as they would have been in arrest of judgment before the passing of this act. An indictment tried on the Summer Circuit, 1 Geo. IV., stated that the prisoner, on the 20th of July, in the fourth year of the reign of King George the Fourth, stole a mare; and it was held, that the words "the fourth year of" might be rejected as surplusage. (R. v. Gill, R. & R. 431. And see R. v. Scott, Id. 415). 6. STATEMENT OF PLACE. No indictment can be good on demurrer, without expressly shewing some place where the offence was committed, which must appear to have been within the jurisdiction of the courts, and laid in a manner free from all repugnancy. (2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 83). The further requisites as to the statement of place, and the consequences of a defective statement or omission, will be found, ante, 871 to 878. 7. STATEMENT OF THE OFFENCE ITSELF. 6. Statement of place. 7. Statement of the offence itself. We have already, in considering the general requisites of an indictment, pointed out the mode in which the offence itself should be stated; and as to the general requisites in stating offences on statutes, see the General requisites. next section. The particular requisites to be observed, in stating each particular of- Particular requifence, will be found pointed out under the various titles of offences sites. throughout this work. 8. STATEMENT OF Statutes, and OFFENCES THEREON. 8. Statement of statutes, and of There is no necessity, in any indictment or information on a public fences thereon. statute, to recite the statute upon which it is founded, for the judges are bound, ex officio, to take notice of all public statutes. (Dyer, 155 a; 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 100; 1 Saund. 135, n. (3) ). But, if the indictment profess to recite the statute, and there be a material variance, and the indictment conclude "contrary to the form of the said statute," such variance will be fatal; and, therefore, it is in no case advisable to recite it; (Vanderplunken v. Griffith, Cro. Eliz. 236; 2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 101: King v. Marsack, 6 T. R. 776; 1 Chit. C. L. 276); though if, after such misrecital of a public act, the indictment conclude generally, as, contrary to the statute in such case made and provided," omitting any reference to the statute recited, the recital may be rejected as surplusage. (Ib). 66 But the parts of a private act upon which an indictment is framed must be set out specially, the same as other facts, and a variance, if properly shewn to the Court, will be fatal. (2 Hawk. c. 25, s. 103). A statute passed in a session of Parliament begun in the second and continued in the third year of a king's reign must not be pleaded as passed in the second and third years of the reign; although such act be recited in a later statute, as "passed in the second and third years," &c. (See R. v. Biers, 1 A. & E. 327). Where a statute forbids the commission or omission of certain acts under certain circumstances, or with a particular intent, an indictment for an offence against the statute must, with certainty and precision, charge the defendant to have committed or omitted the acts, under the circumstances and with the intent mentioned in the statute; and if any 8. Particular one of these ingredients in the offence be omitted, the defendant my requisites and demur, move in arrest of judgment, or bring a writ of error. The d parts. fect will not be aided by verdict; (see Lee v. Clarke, 2 East, 333); =? will the conclusion contra formam statuti cure it. (2 Hale, 170. Ax see R. v. Jukes, 8 T. R. 536; Com. Dig. Information, (D3)). Thus, where a statute made it a felony "wilfully and malisas to do an act, an indictment was held bad, which omitted to cha offence as "wilfully" done, though it was stated to be done fully and maliciously." (R. v. Davis, 1 Leach, 556). So the o of the word "unlawfully," in charging an offence where that wor been used in the statute, has been held to vitiate an indictment. (2. Turner, 1 Mood. C. C. 239; Reg. v. Ryan, 2 Mood. C. C. 15). So, where an indictment charged in one count that the defendant break to get out, and in another that he did break and get out, it holden insufficient, because the words of the statute are "break (R. v. Compton, 7 C. & P. 139). In like manner it was decided. as the repealed stat. 15 Geo. II. c. 34, specified lambs as well as she defendant could not be convicted for stealing sheep upon an indic for stealing lambs. (R. v. Loom, 1 Mood. C. C. 160). And a s construction has been put upon the stat. 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 2 (R. v. Puddifoot, 1 Mood. C. C. 247; see also R. v. Coke, 2 East, P. 617; 1 Leach, 123; R. v. Douglas, 1 Camp. 212). But where a specific act is forbidden by a statute, the intenti not be material. Thus, a party is liable to be indicted under the & Vict. c. 97, s. 15, if he designedly places on a railway substances a tendency to produce obstruction to the carriages, though he " have done the act expressly with that object. (Reg. v. Holra & Rob. 339). But it is not necessary to use the identical word to be foun act; it is sufficient, if the word substituted be synonymous generic, so as to contain that used in the act. Thus, "advises be substituted for "knowingly," (R. v. Fuller, 1 B. & P.1801 ously" for wilfully. And in Reg. v. M'Culley, (2 Mood. C. C.Moh indictment under statute 7 & 8 Geo. IV. c. 29, s. 25, for killing a ser with intent to steal the carcase, was held to be supported by pad killing a ram or ewe, the words of the statute being “ram, ewe or lamb;" a majority of the judges considering "sheep" a ge including the former words. In some cases a mere statement of the offence, though in th words of the statute, will not be sufficient. As where the stat generic terms, in which case it is necessary to state the species mes to the truth of the case; as, for instance, where a statute makeTe liciously killing of cattle a felony, it is not sufficient in an ind on the statute to charge the defendant with killing “cattle” p but the species of cattle, as horse, mare, gelding, cow, heifer. must be stated. (R. v. Chalkeley, R. & R. 258). And where the subject of the indictment cannot be brought the meaning of the statute without the aid of extrinsic evid necessary, besides charging the offence in the words of the sta aver such facts and circumstances as may be necessary to matter within the meaning of it; as, for instance, where, by det of a public office, the bare signature of a party upon a navy as a receipt, an indictment for forging such a receipt, setting navy bill and indorsement, and charging the defendant with forged "a certain receipt for money, to wit, the sum of 25, and contained in the said paper called a navy bill, which forged t was as follows, that is to say,- William Thornton, Willan he was holden bad, because it did not shew by proper averments the signatures imported a receipt. (R. v. Hunter, 2 Leach, 624; P. C. 928; see R. v. Barton, 1 Mood. C. C. 141). In like was holden that an indictment for forging the word "settled" |