Fiction and MetaphysicsThis challenging study places fiction squarely at the center of the discussion of metaphysics. Philosophers have traditionally treated fiction as involving a set of narrow problems in logic or the philosophy of language. By contrast Amie Thomasson argues that fiction has far-reaching implications for central problems of metaphysics. The book develops an "artifactual" theory of fiction, whereby fictional characters are abstract artifacts as ordinary as laws or symphonies or works of literature. In taking seriously the work of literary scholars and in citing a wide range of literary examples, this book will interest not only philosophers concerned with metaphysics and the philosophy of language, but also those in literary theory interested in these foundational issues. |
Contents
Foreword | 3 |
The nature and varieties of existential dependence | 24 |
Fictional characters as abstract artifacts | 35 |
Reference to fictional characters | 43 |
Identity conditions for fictional characters | 55 |
Foreword | 73 |
Fiction and language | 93 |
Ontology and categorization | 115 |
Perils of false parsimony | 137 |
Ontology for a varied world | 146 |
Notes | 154 |
| 166 | |
Other editions - View all
Common terms and phrases
abstract artifacts abstract entities abstract objects analyze appear argue artifactual theory ascribed basic category system causal Chapter Chichikov claims content theory copy created creative acts cultural cultural artifacts dependence relations dependent abstracta dependent entities dependent on mental dependent on real discussion encode example existence false parsimony Faust features of intentionality fictional discourse fictional entities fictional names Fregean genuine Guildenstern Hamlet Husserl intentional acts intentional object kind King Lear Kripke language Lear thoughts literature Meinongian theories merely metaphysical Naming and Necessity Nonetheless Nonexistent Objects ontology Pamela paraphrase Parsons particular possible worlds postulate fictional characters postulate fictional objects practices predications principle problems properties real entities reference to fictional relevant requires rigidly constantly dependent seems sentences Sherlock Holmes sorts of entities spatiotemporal entities spatiotemporal location story system of categories theory of fiction theory of intentionality things tional characters treating fictional characters view of fictional Zalta



