ib. 18. Lord Castlereagh to the Count de la Châtre July 9. Lord Melville to Lord Castlereagh, with Enclosures: Mr. J. F. Oswald to Lord Melville, July 5 The Earl of Elgin to Mr. J. F. Oswald, July 4, with Memorandum on the Designs of Bonaparte against Sept. 10. Lieutenant-General Urquhart to Lord Castlereagh, sug- 1808. At the commencement of the war of the French Revolution, Charles Emanuel IV., King of Sardinia, having leagued himself, in 1792, with Austria against France, lost in consequence the provinces of Savoy and Nice, which were wrested from him by the latter. In 1797, though he united himself with France against Austria, the Directory, fomenting the discontents of his subjects, made them a pretext for war, and compelled him in 1798 to renounce possession of all his continental territories, which were incorporated with France; the king retaining Sardinia alone, to which he was obliged to retire with his family. The fortune of war having in 1799 placed those States in the VOL. V. B hands of Austria; the British Government entered into negociations with the court of Vienna for their restitution to their former sovereign. In less than a month from the date of the last of these letters, the decisive victory of Marengo abruptly terminated the negociation, by once more placing the continental provinces of the kingdom of Sardinia under the dominion of France. Extract of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Lord Minto. Downing Street, June, 1799. It is for this reason that it is judged here to be extremely desirable that (if it be not already done) no time should be lost in replacing the King of Sardinia in the possession of his dominions. Your lordship is apprized of the steps which have already been taken for this purpose; and, if any occasion should occur, you will co-operate in their success, as far as may be done with prudence and discretion at Vienna. Should the Austrians aim at the recovery of the Novarese, this is certainly within their own power, and could not be very strongly objected to by the King of Sardinia, if restored by their efforts to the rest of his dominions. But it would, in that case, be desirable that the hands in which the barrier of Italy is placed should in some other mode be strengthened; and any proper arrangement which should open to that power a more extensive communication with the sea-coast would operate favourably to the interests of this country in the Mediterranean. Extract of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Mr. Jackson. August 5, 1799. Having already explained to you in conversation the substance of his Majesty's opinion concerning the line to be followed, in regard to the views which the Court of Vienna is supposed to entertain respecting the Novarese territory, I have only to repeat to you that, however it would unquestionably be his Majesty's wish to discourage any pretensions of this kind, and though it is hoped that the influence of the Court of St. Petersburg and the example of the generous and disinterested exertions of the Emperor of Russia may operate powerfully, yet that it is foreseen that a situation of things may arise, in which it may be necessary that his Majesty should, in so far as he is concerned, acquiesce in the views of the Court of Vienna in this respect; and in this case, though, as an alternative which, upon every account, it would be desirable to avoid, his Majesty would wish that the King of Sardinia should be compensated by such a portion of the Genoese territory adjacent to his dominions as may be deemed an adequate equivalent for the surrender of the Novarese; there being no motive either of justice or of policy to prevent his Majesty from concurring in a measure for satisfying the pretensions of his ally out of the territories of a power which has for centuries been constantly under the influence of France, and with which his Majesty is at this time engaged in a war, the result of repeated provocations, injuries, and insults, offered to his Majesty. Extract of a Letter from Lord Minto to Lord Grenville. Most secret. Vienna, August 17, 1799. On the side of Italy, your lordship will find less moderation. I do not yet know the full extent of those views, but I now know that their extent is considerable. The suspicion I have already expressed in former despatches concerning the King of Sardinia's territories on the Continent is now verified. The Emperor proposes to retain Piedmont, and to take all that part of Savoy which is important in a military view. I have no doubt of his intention to keep the country of Nice also, if he gets possession of it, which will make the Var his boundary with France. But in case he should not acquire Nice, I presume he will take the Genoese frontier on the side of Venti miglia, and it is much to be wished that he may. But, in effect, the whole territory of the Genoese Republic seems to be an object of serious speculation. M. de Thugut said enough to satisfy me that it is not his wish to restore that Republic; that the Emperor would be very glad to add that great trading city and seaport to his dominions, if he were not seriously opposed by England and Russia in that design; and that he would not insist, however, on retaining Genoa, nor even on any other plan concerning it, if it were to be anxiously resisted by the allies. If the Emperor did not keep Genoa for himself, his next wish seemed to be that it should go into the scheme of indemnifications to other dispossessed sovereigns. The Legations will, I am persuaded, be retained by the Emperor, and Venice will certainly continue subject to him. I am not yet master of the designs on Tuscany. Baron Thugut seemed to reject with some degree of warmth the idea of the Emperor's appropriating his brother's territory to himself; yet he did not disavow explicitly the possibility of Tuscany being reserved to form part of some general and extensive plan of territorial arrangement. In truth, I felt the subject so delicate on the score of family connexion, that I rather shrunk from the inquiry. My information does not extend further south, and the Pope was not mentioned; but I shall not neglect any opportunity of pushing my discoveries in that direction. In these projected changes, Piedmont seems to be the principal feature; and, on that point, I should imagine that your lordship will find Austria so strongly bent as to hazard every thing for its accomplishment. I am so much impressed with this idea, that I should not think I expressed myself too strongly by saying that this Court would probably make it the pivot on which their whole system would hereafter turn; and that they would, in the choice of their allies, prefer that power, or those powers, which should concur or acquiesce in this view. It 1 1 Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs. |