direction of Bagdad—when, besides this, attention is had to the affectation with which he has demanded and received the Persian embassy at Warsaw, and sent it back accompanied by many hundred French officers. To his views regarding Egypt, which undoubtedly are as steady and strong in his mind as ever they were; and to his conduct recently towards Turkey, about which Government must possess recent information, in support of the assertion in General Clarke's late declaration on the cause of the rupture in the negociations this winter when his whole conduct and the unchangeableness of his plans are considered, no doubt can remain of the necessity of a strong system of defence for the protection of India.

Connected with the present considerations is our situation, in reference to the weight we have a right and interest to claim on the Continent of Europe-and the use we possibly may be to any powers there, who may now or ultimately be able to offer resistance to France. On this subject, this war has proved to demonstration that our naval superiority cannot present the smallest co-operation, or furnish any check on the means France has it in her power to direct against a Continental State.

In this view of the dangers and necessities of our situation, there does not appear a moment's doubt of the indispensable urgency of our augmenting very considerably indeed our regular army. The great differences of opinion on the questions of the Volunteer system, armée en masse, &c., make them from that alone liable to instability. Still it seems agreed, on all hands, both that some such force is indispensable, and, on the other hand, that it cannot be relied on, except where acting along with regular troops. It can be distinctly offered as Bonaparte's opinion-that nothing can save England, secure her Colonies, or enable her to check him on the Continent, except a far more considerable regular army than our present establishment.

In regard to the more immediate pressure from the danger or the possibility of an invasion, nothing certainly can be more alarming than the total want of means or plan of defence in Scotland, which certainly cannot be unknown to Bonaparte, and where necessarily an attack could most easily be directed from the North.

Lieutenant-General Urquhart to Lord Castlereagh.

Catton, near Norwich, September 10, 1807. My Lord-Permit an old and respectable officer, and a firm friend of his King and country, and a friend to the present Administration, of which your lordship forms so conspicuous and brilliant a part, to suggest to your lordship, as Minister of the War Department, some plans for the benefit, glory, and honour of Britain, and which will more than recompense for the loss of Monte Video, Buenos Ayres, and the River Plata, and be the means of securing an honourable and safe peace.

I would propose to send immediate orders to the acting Governor and Commander-in-Chief at Gibraltar to take possession of the town, port, and garrison of Ceuta, opposite to Gibraltar, and to keep the same. Troops might be sent out immediately with sealed orders, not to be opened by the officers commanding till they were clear of the Channel, and then only to inform them that they were to proceed to Gibraltar, where they would receive further instructions and sealed orders on their arrival at Gibraltar to proceed to Ceuta, and an Admiral to proceed in a single ship of war to Gibraltar to await the arrival of the troops, and to command the expedition against Ceuta; and frigates, sloops of war, bombs, gun-brigs, cutters, to be sent out singly to Gibraltar, to join the Admiral, and two frigates to escort the transports with troops.

Ceuta, with Gibraltar, would give England complete command of the Gut of Gibraltar, open a lucrative trade for British manufactures with the Moors and all the Barbary States, and command a supply of provisions for Gibraltar at an easy and

cheap rate from Barbary; and, if England chose, she might make a treaty with the Emperor of Morocco for the purchase of Tangier, formerly belonging to England, at the entrance of the Straits of Gibraltar, which would give England another good port and harbour at the entrance of the Mediterranean, and open a trade with the Kingdom of Morocco, &c., and friendly treaties to be entered into between England and the Barbary States.

I propose sending sealed orders immediately in a fastsailing frigate, sloop of war, or armed cutter, to Jamaica, to both the Admiral on that station and the Governor of Jamaica, to send down a frigate or two and a regiment, to take possession of the Island of Rattan, in the Bay of Honduras. This island is made little use of by Spain, and not fortified or defended, and but few inhabitants on it; was uninhabited till the year 1742, when Major Crawford was sent down from Jamaica, took possession of it, and began a settlement, in order to protect the logwood-cutters in the Bay of Honduras, and to secure a trade with the Spaniards of Guatimala for cochineal, indigo, &c. This island is so well situated, though neglected by Spain, that it may be regarded as the key of the Bay of Honduras, and might command the trade of all the provinces round the Bay. It is a healthy island, well watered, and has a good harbour on the south side, called Port Royal, sufficiently capacious for 500 sail of ships to ride in, in the utmost safety, and has several other harbours, though smaller.

The Spaniards dispossessed us of it in the year 1782, by a very small force from Honduras, as we had no force at Rattan. It is only eight leagues from the Mosquito Shore, whose native Indians have always been friendly to the English, and 200 leagues west by south from Jamaica; is 30 miles long, 13 broad, and contains upwards of 250,000 acres, which would raise every production which the West India islands and that part of America cultivate. The land might be sold by Government to proprietors, in lots of from 50 to 100 or 200 acres

each. An annual quit-rent of 18. per acre might be reserved. to be paid to the Crown. The produce of the sale of the land in Rattan would bring in a sum of £250,000 sterling at least, which might be laid out in the purchase of stock in the British funds, for the purpose of defraying the expense of the colony, under the direction of the Treasury; and the quit-rents would produce the yearly sum of twelve or thirteen thousand pounds; and by making Rattan a free port and encouraging the trade of that island and Curaçoa, I am not too sanguine in stating, that both these islands might bring in a revenue of half a million to England.

It is probably the intention of Government to secure for our ally, Portugal, as much as we can from French and Spanish seizure and plunder, by taking possession of Madeira and the Azores, or Western Islands, for Portugal; and it would be good policy in Britain to agree with Portugal for the purchase of three of the Azores or Western Islands, viz., the islands of Fayal, Pico, and St. Michael. It would be of great importance to England to keep those three islands in the Atlantic Ocean. They could easily be spared to us by Portugal, and might be kept at a small expense, and be a proper station for a squadron of frigates, sloops of war, and armed cutters, both in war and peace, under the command of a senior Captain of the navy, as Commodore, with a distinguishing pendant, but no Captain under him, and be a protection to our outward-bound East and West India and American trade, as well as a security for Madeira and the remainder of the Azore, or Western Islands, for Portugal. England has long wanted some islands in the Atlantic Ocean near Madeira, for our outward and homeward-bound East and West India and American trade to touch at: Fayal, Pico, and St. Michael, might produce wine equal to Madeira; indeed, a great deal of what is called Fayal wine goes to Madeira, and is mixed with it; and the Fayal wine answers for the American and West India markets, and might do also for the East India trade.

As it is the intention of France and Spain to seize the fleet of Portugal, this should, if possible, be prevented by England sending a squadron to the Tagus, and securing the Portuguese fleet for Portugal; and a squadron might also be sent to the Brazils, to secure and keep that country for Portugal.

I would propose to send a squadron and troops from Sicily, to take possession of the Greek islands of Scio, Mitylene, Samos, and Milo, and to offer to the Porte a compensation in money for these islands, and also for the retaining and keeping possession of Alexandria in Egypt, and being put into possession of Rosetta; to offer the Porte the assistance of our ships of war in protecting their other territories, and improving their marine; the rest of Egypt, with the exception of a small district round the two towns above-mentioned, to be subject to the Porte: Rosetta, Alexandria, and their districts, sold to England, to be independent of the Porte, and declared free ports under the government of England, and subject to her mild and equitable laws. These places would be of great use in the security of our East India possessions, and bring the whole produce of Egypt into our hands: their acquisition would be of immense advantage to our manufactures, and produce a large revenue to the Crown; while they might be kept up and defended by partly British and partly country troops, in British pay, at no very great expense, considering the benefit that would be derived from it.

Scio, Mitylene, and Samos, would completely command the Gulf of Smyrna and the trade of that place and Constantinople : they are fine, well-inhabited islands, the population all Greeks. Milo has one of the finest harbours in that part of the Mediterranean; and the inhabitants, Greeks, are among the best sailors of the Archipelago.

The island of Heligoland, though of no value of itself, yet as a safe haven for small craft, even in winter, and as a key to the rivers Ems, Weser, Jade, Elbe, and Eyder, and as an asylum for our cruisers in those seas, ought to be kept and