seems to me as if a determined opposition on the part of Great Britain and Russia to the acquisition of Piedmont might probably throw Austria once more into a connexion with the French Republic, and become a motive, as it would furnish a pretext, for a separate peace on that condition. M. de Thugut, in arguing this point, represents, in the first place, the importance to Europe at large, and the necessity, for the safety of the Emperor's Italian dominions, that this barrier against France should be placed in secure hands. He then shows the inadequacy of such a power as the Duke of Savoy to that charge, and he supports that argument by the experience of recent events. With regard to England, he contends that we have a separate interest in this arrangement; observing that, while the Emperor held the Low Countries, and a weak prince was in possession of the Alps, he was exposed to perpetual danger and offensive war from France, without the means of offence on his part-that the Low Countries were themselves open to incursion every moment, and the frontier of France in that quarter was, on the contrary, the strongest in Europe, and required several campaigns of sieges, as well as of superiority in the field to suffer any impression from the Emperor's arms-that Lombardy was in a somewhat similar situation by the weakness of the power to which the barrier of the Alps was entrusted -that those circumstances made Austria the natural ally of France, and established on the part of the former almost a necessary and dependent relation with the latter; but that the case would be entirely altered and nearly inverted, when the Emperor should have nothing to fear in the Low Countries, and when he should not only be secure in Italy by the possession of the Alps; but, standing on strong ground himself, should be placed on a weak frontier of France that the general interest which he would share in restraining the power of France within due bounds would furnish a principle of natural connexion with England, which would be improved by the want of naval support, if the acquisitions made by Austria should give rise to naval or commercial views in that government. Such are the arguments urged by the Austrian minister, and submitted to his Majesty's consideration. When I seemed struck by the extensive scheme of aggrandizement which he had opened to me, and, among other things, observed the consequence it would naturally produce in Prussia by furnishing to that Court a motive for falling upon the smaller States of Germany, in order to keep pace with the growth of Austria, or by inducing it even to attempt checking the progress of Austria by active alliance with the French Republic, he seemed at first disposed to defy Prussia, and to rely on the superior power of the Emperor for restraining that rival; but, when I represented the doubt which must exist concerning the part which Russia would take in a contest between Austria and Prussia on such grounds, he seemed disposed to compromise the matter with Prussia, and to admit of her taking something also, provided, however, it were not much. He contended that Prussia was unreasonable in stating any acquisitions proposed to be made by the Emperor as an aggrandizement, relatively, at least, and as compared with the power of Prussia; and he said he had heard of Prussia's proposing the status quo ante bellum as the basis of peace-that Prussia could not be in earnest in that proposal, for that power had already acquired since this war a greater accession of territory and population than the whole amount of the Emperor's ultimate views, without having contributed anything, however, to the common cause. He alluded to the acquisitions made by Prussia in Poland, which he stated at 5,000,000 souls-that hitherto the Emperor had lost on balance, rating the Low Countries at a population of 3,500,000; and that, after the acquisition of Piedmont, he should not gain above 200,000 or 300,000. He reckons the population of the Venetian States acquired by the Emperor and all he obtained in Istria and Dalmatia at 1,800,000. The point to which it is my duty, after a discussion, much too long I fear, on such a variety of matter, to recall your lordship's attention, is the proposal made by M. de Thugut for a mutual and confidential communication on the ultimate object of the war. If his Majesty should refuse altogether that condition, the object of which is to withhold the communications to be made by Austria from the Emperor of Russia, a proposal might be made to receive these communications separately, and to communicate them afterwards from England to Russia. There might probably be an advantage in his Majesty's forming a mature judgment on these points, and becoming a channel of communication to Russia; by which means the first impressions might be conveyed to the mind of that prince from a quarter which he respects, instead of sending them crude from hence to Petersburg. Most secret. Extract of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Lord Minto. Downing Street, September 4, 1799. I have said enough in my former despatch to enable your lordship to prove to M. de Thugut that his Majesty is very far from entertaining any views hostile to the interests of Austria. Very much of the reasoning urged to your lordship by M. de Thugut in support of his plan of peace in Italy, as far as that plan is understood, appears to his Majesty's servants to be perfectly well founded, in reference not only to the sepa rate interests of this country, but also to the permanent tranquillity of Europe. Nor is the aggrandizement of the House of Austria in itself a point to which this country has been accustomed to look with dissatisfaction or alarm. Extract of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Lord Minto. Another point of indispensable necessity is, that if, in consequence of any concert with his Majesty, Austria shall at a peace retain Venice and Genoa, and possibly acquire Leghorn, a treaty of commerce and navigation should immediately be entered into between his Majesty and that Court, which shall ensure to his Majesty's subjects equal advantages of commerce with those to be enjoyed by any other nation there; shall protect our merchants and manufactures from the imposition of exorbitant or prohibitory duties; and shall recognise and establish the law of neutral navigation, on the footing of the Danish and American treaties, to the exclusion of what are commonly called the principles of that armed neutrality which took place during the American war. Extracts of a Letter from Lord Grenville to Lord Minto. Downing Street, February 14, 1800. Having received, since I began this letter, despatches from Mr. Jackson, containing a detailed account of the present military and financial resources of Piedmont, it will be necessary for me, in order not to delay this messenger, to defer to another opportunity the discussion of what relates to this point. But, from the general tenor of Mr. Jackson's despatches, I am induced to hope that the subsidy, which his Majesty has it in his contemplation to grant to the King of Sardinia on his restoration, will be sufficient, when taken in aid of his own means, to afford a material co-operation to the Austrians in the course of the next campaign. The Austrian plan last mentioned by your lordship with respect to that country is, as your lordship judged, much more consonant to his Majesty's wishes than that which had before been in contemplation. It would, however, be desirable that the Court of Vienna should relax from its demand of Alexandria, and this may perhaps be obtained, whenever a minister of the King of Sardinia is admitted to discuss these points at Vienna. But your lordship is already apprized that the King's consent to this plan is given only in the supposition of the sig nature of a treaty of commerce and navigation, of which I shall speak more particularly in the course of this despatch. There would remain behind the promise, on his Majesty's part, not to enter into any negociation with any other Court during the continuance of this concert, which shall be inconsistent with that spirit of strict and intimate union which it is his Majesty's object to establish; a like promise not to raise any obstacles in the way of such arrangement of Italy as shall be settled on the grounds already stated to your lordship; and a mutual engagement as to the future arrangement of the Netherlands, in whatever form that point shall now be settled between the two Courts. Extracts of a Letter from Lord Minto to Lord Grenville. Vienna, April 10, 1800. His Majesty's express assent to the Emperor's retaining the three Legations is also insisted on as an essential point. Being now apprized that the Emperor attaches more importance to this acquisition than almost to any other, I have observed that the silence of his Majesty on this point, leaving me without the power of objecting or protesting, may be considered as a virtual acquiescence. Baron Thugut does not consider the mere acquiescence of his Majesty in the arrangements proposed for Italy as sufficient, and he desires an article binding his Majesty to make common cause with the Emperor, if he should be attacked in odium of this treaty. I am most at a loss to acquaint your lordship with Baron Thugut's present notions and intentions concerning Piedmont, as he opened in the last conference ideas perfectly new, and, indeed, so new as to be very imperfectly digested. He has for some time past reverted with greater warmth |