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dominion. The first was, that of a parent over his young children: this that of an ancestor presiding over his adult descendants.

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Although the original progenitor was the centre of the union to his posterity, yet it is not probable that the association would be immediately or alto gether dissolved by his death. Connected by habits of intercourse and affection, and by some common rights, necessities and interests, they would consider themselves as allied to each other in a nearer degree than to the rest of the species. Almost all would be sensible of an inclination to continue in the socies ty in which they had been brought up; and experie encing, as they soon would do, many inconveniences from the absence of that authority which their com mon ancestor exercised, especially in deciding their disputes, and directing their operations in matters in which it was necessary to act in conjunction, they might be induced to supply his place by a formal choice of a successor, or rather might willingly, and almost imperceptibly transfer their obedience to some one of the family, who, by his age or services, or by the part he possessed in the direction of their affairs during the life-time of the parent, had already taught them to respect his advice, or to attend to his com mands; or lastly, the prospect of these inconveniences might prompt the first ancestor to appoint a successor, and his posterity, from the same motive, united with an habitual deference to the ancestor's authority, might receive the appointment with submission. Here then we have a tribe or clan incorpo rated under one chief. Such communities might be increased by considerable numbers, and fulfil the purposes of civil union without any other or more regular convention, constitution, or form of government, than what we have described. Every branch which was slipped off from the primitive stock, and removed to a distance from it, would in like manner take root, and grow into a separate clan. Two or three of these clans were frequently, we may suppose, united into one. Marriage, cone

quest, mutual defence, common distress, or more ac cidental coalitions, might produce this effect.

II. A second source of personal authority, and which might easily extend, or sometimes perhaps supercede, the patriarchal, is that, which results from military arrangement. In wars, either of aggression or defence, manifest necessity would prompt those who fought on the same side to array themselves under one leader. And although their leader was advanced to this eminence for the purpose only, and during the operations of a single expedition, yet his authority would not always, terminate with the reasons for which it was conferred. A warrior who had led-forth his tribe against their enemies with repeated success, would procure to himself, even in the deliberations of peace, a powerful and permanent influence. If this advantage were added to the author ity of the patriarchal chief, or favoured by any previous distinction of ancestry, it would be no difficultundertaking for the person who possessed it to obtain the almost absolute direction of the affairs of the community, especially if he was careful to associate to himself proper auxiliaries. and content to practise the obvious art of gratifying or removing those who opposed his pretensions.

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But, although we may be able to comprehend how by his personal abilities or fortune one man may obtain the rule over many, yet it seems more difficult to explain how empire became hereditary, or in what" manner sovereign power, which is never acquired without great merit or management, learns to descend in a succession, which has no dependence upon any qualities, either of understanding, or activity: The causes which have introduced hereditary dominion into so general a reception in the world, are principally the following-the influence of association, which communicates to the son a portion of the same respect which was wont to be paid to the virtues or sta tion of the father-the mutual jealousy of other competitors the greater envy, with which all behold the exaltation of an equal, than the continuance of an ac

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which are still found, wherever the state of society and manners is immature and uncultivated.

Nor need we be surprised at the early existence in the world of some vast empires, or at the rapidity. with which they advanced to their greatness, from comparatively small and obscure originals. Whilst the inhabitants of so many countries were broken. into numerous communities, unconnected, and often-. times contending with each other; before experi ence had taught these little states to see their own danger in their neighbour's ruin; or had instruct ed them in the necessity of resisting the aggrandizement. of an aspiring power, by alliances and timely prepa-. rations; in this condition of civil policy, a particulartribe, which by any means had got the start of the rest in strength, or discipline, and happened to fall under the conduct of an ambitious chief, by directing their first attempts to the part where success was most secure, and by assuming, as they went along, those whom they conquered, into a share of their future enterprizes, might soon gather a force which would infallibly overbear any opposition, that the scattered power and unprovided state of such enemies could make to the progress of their victories.

Lastly, our theory affords a presumption, that the earliest governments were monarchies, because the government of families, and of armies, from which, according to our account, civil government derived its institution, and probably its form, is universally monarchical.

CHAPTER II.

HOW SUBJECTION TO CIVIL GOVERN MENT IS MAINTAINED.

COULD we view our own species from a distance, or regard mankind with the same sort of observation, with which we read the natural history,

or remark the manners, of any other animal, there is nothing in the human character which would more: surprise us, than the almost universal subjugation of strength to weakness than to see many millions of robust men, in the complete use and exercise of their personal faculties, and without any defect of courage, waiting upon the will of a child, a woman, a driveller, or a lunatic. And although, when we suppose a vast empire in absolute subjection to one person, and that one depressed beneath the level of his species by infirmities, or vice, we suppose perhaps an extreme case, yet in all cases, even in the most popular forms of civil government, the physical strength resides in the governed. In what manner opinion thus prevails over strength, or how power, which naturally belongs to superior force, is maintained inopposition to it; in other words, by what motives the many are induced to submit to the few, becomes an inquiry which lies at the root of almost every political speculation. It removes, indeed, but does not resolve the difficulty, to say, that civil governments are now-a-days almost universally upheld by standing armies; for the question still returns, how are these armies themselves kept in subjection, or made to obey the commands, and carry on the designs, of the prince or state which employs them.

Now although we should look in vain for any single reason which will account for the general submission of mankind to civil government, yet it may not be difficult to assign for every class and character in the community, considerations powerful enough to dissuade each from any attempts to resist established authority. Every man has his motive, though not the same. In this, as in other instances, the conduct is similar,, but the principles which produce it extremely various.

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There are three distinctions of character into which the subjects of a state may be divided; into those who obey from prejudice; those who obey. from reason; and those who obey from self-interest.

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