The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of UnderstandingEpistemology has for a long time focused on the concept of knowledge and tried to answer questions such as whether knowledge is possible and how much of it there is. Often missing from this inquiry, however, is a discussion on the value of knowledge. In The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan Kvanvig argues that epistemology properly conceived cannot ignore the question of the value of knowledge. He also questions one of the most fundamental assumptions in epistemology, namely that knowledge is always more valuable than the value of its subparts. Taking Platos' Meno as a starting point of his discussion, Kvanvig tackles the different arguments about the value of knowledge and comes to the conclusion that knowledge is less valuable than generally assumed. Clearly written and well argued, this 2003 book will appeal to students and professionals in epistemology. |
Contents
1 The Value of Knowledge Is External to It | 1 |
2 The Value of True Belief | 28 |
3 The Value of Justification | 44 |
4 Reliabilism Normativity and the Special Promise of Virtue Epistemology | 76 |
5 The Gettier Problem and the Value of Knowledge | 108 |
6 Knowledge as Irreducibly Valuable | 140 |
Semantic and Pragmatic Approaches | 157 |
8 Knowledge and Understanding | 185 |
9 Conclusion | 204 |
| 207 | |
| 213 | |
Other editions - View all
The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan L. Kvanvig No preview available - 2007 |
The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding Jonathan L. Kvanvig No preview available - 2003 |
Common terms and phrases
adequate answer appeal approach argue ascription assertion assumption attitudinalism belief is valuable believing the truth chapter cognitive coherentism concept of knowledge conclusion condition context counterexamples counterfactuals credit for true curiosity defeater defend deserved credit difference epistemic Ernest Sosa evaluation evidence example explain the value explanation false feels cold Field’s finding the truth Gettier problem goal of inquiry Greco Ibid idea identify intellectual virtues internalist involved justified belief justified true belief Keith Lehrer kind knowledge in terms knowledge is valuable likelihood of truth nature of knowledge normative objective likelihood one’s Oxford person Philosophical pragmatic precisified Prioricity proposal question reason reliabilism reliabilist reliability requires Richard Swinburne Roderick Chisholm semantic simply skepticism Socrates Sosa subjective justification swamping problem Swinburne theory of justification theory of knowledge things Timothy Williamson understanding University Press valuable than true value of knowledge value of truth virtue epistemology Williamson