himself. Richard Duke of Gloucester murdered his two nephews, song to Edward the Fourth, to make himself king, and after was slain in Bosworth by Henry the Seventh; for blood requires blood, and let a bloody prince never look for a better end.

But many princes have been mightily abused by false reports, and wrong informations; David therefore prayed God to deliver him from wicked lips, and a lying tongue, Psal. exix. and in Eccles. vi. it is said, Separate thyself from thy enemies, and beware even of thy friends; for where a man doth trust the most there a man may be soonest de ceived, as was Francis Duke of Britain, who put his brother Giles to death upon the false report of those who went messengers between them, and after put them to death also; therefore a prince should duly examine every report whether it be true, or not, before he give credit thereunto, and especially if it concern life, for innocent blood doth cry to God for revenge, as appeareth in the Apoc. vi. saying, How long, Lord, holy and just, judgest thou not, and revengest not our blood upon them that dwell upon the earth?'

I have read that Appelles drew the picture of a king (which he sent to Ptolemæus) set in a chair of state, with great hands, great ears, and besides him Ignorance, Suspicion, a Tale-teller, and Flattery: These will labour to be about a prince, therefore a prince must labour to avoid them, It is therefore a happy thing for princes to have those about them that will not flatter, but tell the truth. Therefore the Emperor Gordian said, that prince was very unfortunate, who hath not about him those that may plainly tell him the truth; for a kingknoweth not what passeth, but by relation of those who converse with him. Theopompus being asked, How a prince might preserve his king dom? said, By giving his friends liberty to speak the truth, and keeping his subjects from oppression.

A prince should be very careful in making choice of his counsellors; for Plato saith, that many princes are undone, for want of faithful friends and servants to counsel them; therefore Alfred, King of England, sought out the wisest and most learned men to be of his council. The Emperor Constantius, to make proof of his friends, made shew to abandon Christian Religion, and to turn to Idolatry; he was instantly applauded by a great number, whom presently he banished the country, for a prince shall never want followers. I wish that our gracious sovereign would make this his precedent: But, to my former discourse. Counsellors, saith Julius Cæsar, in one of his orations to the senate, should not be led by malice, friendship, anger, nor mercy; and, if they concur in one lawful opinion, though the prince be opposite, yet it is fitting he should yield to them, for so did the Emperor Marcus Antoninus, saying: It must be as you will, for it is greater reason that I, being one, should follow your opinion, than you, being many, wise, and learned, should yield to mine.

If a prince take aid of a stranger stronger than himself, he may there by endanger his state; as, for example, the Heruls, Goths, and Lombards, who came into Italy for succour, became lords thereof; so did they of Franconia, with their King Pl. by Pharamond; the Galls, now France, and the Saxons did the like to England.

How to get and keep the love of his subjects.

A PRINCE, to the end he may be strong at home, and need no foreign forces, should always expect his own subjects, (especially men of worth and service) as well in peace as war, that he may win the love and hearts of his subjects, the meanest whereof may do him service, in some kind, at one time or other: For Seneca saith, The only inexpugnable force of a prince is the love of his subjects. Antoninus Pius would say, that he had rather preserve one of his subjects, than kill a thousand of his enemies. And Pythagoras affirmeth, that subjects are to the prince, as the wind to the fire; for the stronger the wind, the greater the fire; so the richer the subjects be, the stronger the prince; but, where Machiavel's principles take effect, there the subjects must be made poor, by continual subsidies, exactions, and impositions, that the people may always be kept under as slaves, and fear their prince; which course extinguisheth the love of the people towards the prince, and ingendereth hatred (the actions of the clergy, evil counsellors of the state, monopolies, and other Machiavilian practices of some great ones in authority, have almost procured the same effect in England). Philip Commines greatly blameth such princes, as seek not to compound and end discords and quarrels amongst their greatest subjects, but rather nourish the one part; wherein they do but set their own house on fire, as did the wife of Henry the Sixth, taking part with the Duke of Somerset, against the Earl of Warwick, which caused the war betwixt York and Lancaster. Augustus the emperor made a law concerning exactions, which he called Augusta, that no payment should be exacted of the people, but for the profit of the common-wealth. And, when Marcus Antoninus laid a double tax upon the people, they answered, That, if he would have two taxes in one year, he must give them two summers, two harvests, and two vintages, for the people cannot endure to be overcharged; if they be, great inconveniency may grow thereby, (our later times give apparent testimonies of the truth of this particular). A prince therefore shonld love and cherish his subjects, but not oppress them; for Tiberius Nero, when some persuaded him to take great tributes of the provinces, said, That a good shepherd should shear his sheep, but not devour them; and That state (saith Thales) is best ordered, which hath in it neither too wealthy, nor too poor citizens.

It is not for a prince to make war upon every small occasion, but to be sure the cause be good and just; which then will bring honour to his person, safety to his soul, and encouragement to all his soldiers: Yet, according to the saying of Octavius Cæsar, neither battle, nor war, is to be undertaken, unless there be evidently seen more hope of gain, than fear of damage; but, above all, a religious peace is to be embraced by a prince, and so to be offered to his enemy; for blessed is the peace-maker, for he shall inherit the kingdom of God: Which, that we may all do, let us endeavour to purchase a peace by our timely re pentance, and hearty prayers. When the Israelites had sinned, and God had resolved to destroy them, Moses rose up, and by his prayers

VOL. V.

became a mediator betwixt God and them, so that God's justice was converted to mercy. Is there not in all this spacious kingdom one religious Moses to stand betwixt God's justice and our sins, by his prayers to purchase a pardon, and remove this threatening mischief which hangs over our heads? O that God would put it into the hearts both of prince and people, to join with one heart and one voice, and cry unto the Lord, for who knows what an effect such an union may produce Who knows whether the Lord will repent him of his wrath, and turn this destruction from us?

THE

STATE AND DIGNITY

OF A

SECRETARY OF STATE'S PLACE,
WITH THE CARE AND PERIL THEREOF,
Written by the Right Honourable Robert, late Earl of Salisbury.

WITH

HIS EXCELLENT INSTRUCTIONS

TO THE

LATE EARL OF BEDFORD,

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF BARWICK.

A WORK WORTHY OF MEMORY.

London, printed in 1642. Quarto, containing seventeen pages.

A1

LL officers and counsellors of princes have a prescribed authority by patent, by custom, or by oath, the secretary only excepted; but, to the secretary, out of a confidence and singular affection, there is a liberty to negotiate at discretion at home and abroad, with friends and enemies, in all matters of speech and intelligence.

All servants of princes deal upon strong and wary authority and warrant in disbursements as Treasurers, in conference with enemies as Generals, in commissions in executing offices by patent and instructions, and so in whatever else; only a secretary hath no warrant or com

mission, no, not in matters of his own greatest particulars, but the virtue and word of his sovereign.

For such is the multiplicity of actions, and variable motions and intents of foreign princes, and their daily practices, and in so many parts and places, as secretaries can never have any commission, so long and universal as to secure them.

So as a secretary must either conceive the very thought of a king, which is only proper to God, or a king must exercise the painful office of a secretary, which is contrary to majesty, and liberty; or else, a prince must make choice of such a servant of such a prince, as the prince's assurance must be his confidence in the secretary, and the secretary's life his trust in the prince,

To deal now with the prince, tanquam infirmum futurum, cannot be a rule for a secretary; for all that he hath to trust to is quite the contrary, which is, that his prince will be semper idem.

All strange princes hate secretaries, all aspirers, and all conspirers, because they either kill those monsters in their cradles, or else trace them out, where no man can discern the print of their footing.

Furthermore, this is manifest, that all men of war do malign them, except they will be at their desires.

Their fellow-counsellors envy them, because they have most easy and free access to princes; and, wheresoever a prince hath cause to delay or deny to search or punish, none so soon bear so much burthen. Kings are advised to observe these things in a secretary :

First, That he be created by himself, and of his own raising.
Secondly, That he match not in a factious family.

And, lastly, That he hath reasonable capacity, and convenient ability.

On the other side, the place of secretary is dreadful, if he serve not a constant prince; for he that liveth by trust, ought to serve truly; so he that lives at mercy, ought to be careful in the choice of his master, that he be just et de bona natura.

If princes be not confident on those, whom they have made choice of, they shall ill trust the work of a strange hand; and, if the rule hath failed in some of those that have sinned in ingratitude to those princes, it is in those of the highest order, Ero similis altissimo.

But, for those of private quality, who have no other consistence, nor can ever look for equal blessedness, there the jealously of a prince hath never beheld suspect, but mere comtempt.

As long as any matter, of what weight soever, is handled only between the Prince and the Secretary, those counsels are compared to the mutual affections of two lovers, undiscovered to their friends.

When it cometh to be disputed in council, it is like the conference of parents, and solemnization of marriage; the first matter, the second order; and, indeed, the one the act, the other the publication.

If there be then a secretary, whose state can witness that he coveteth not for profit; and if his careful life and death shall record it, that Jaye is his object; if he deal less with other men's suits, whereby secre

taries gain, than ever any did; if he prefer his majesty, and despise his

own.

If such an one should find that his hope could not warrant him, no, not against the slanders of those wicked ones, whom he must use only, then, surely, that secretary must resolve, that the first day of his en try is the first day of his misery; for, if he be not worthy of trust, he is less worthy of life; and a suspicion of a secretary is both a tryal and condemnation, and a judgment.

SIR,

Mr. Secretary's answer to the Earl of Bedford.

I AM sorry, that I find in myself, that I am neither able to satisfy your lordship's request, nor my own desires; and yet yourself, perchance, will better accept my doings, than I shall, myself, allow them. Your lordship would have me, by your letters, give you advice, for your affairs and service there. It cometh of your too much good opinion of me, that your lordship thinks me able thereunto, which, surely, I am not: And, though my desire be to do this, as you would; yet cannot I satisfy myself, as I would; and, if I should spend any words to declare my own inability, your lordship would not like them; and, to enterprise to do that which I know not, I am not therein like myself: Yet, notwithstanding, I had rather please your lordship with my folly, than altogether myself with silence. If I write foolishly, or unseasonably, the lack is mine; but the occasion of my fault is your lordship's. I heard so good report of your doing, the best is, I can give you, to go forward, and countenance your own example; and the next advice thereunto is, that, when you see one day coming, to amend the day past; my meaning is, to have you, in all your actions, do, as all other natural things do, and most plainly. Things growing, which daily, from time to time, do increase; whose example, if a man would follow, he should, as his body groweth in age, so see his wit with knowledge, bis conditions with virtues, should amend; and, as we do live, we grow towards death, by moments of time; so should we grow towards heaven, by multiplying of virtues, and good gifts. You see, I am at the first step in divinity; and so might I seem, to many others of your estate, to be of small discretion, to fall in preaching to him, that must be occupied in musters, with looking to fortifications, and suchlike worldly affairs. Bnt, my Lord, I know to whom I write; to him, who considereth between things worldly, and heavenly; to him, that knoweth the fear of God is the beginning of wisdom; and, therewith, I end.

Now, to your external care; where, certainly, God is served, and pleased with them, that accomplish the same to their powers; and, if wisdom lack, they may ask it of him, who hath the treasure of wisdom and goodness. Your lordship hath there a great charge of government; I know, you think yourself unmeet thereunto, especially, in knowledge; and, surely, to know that amendeth your ability; for more hurt comes of men's securities, and presumption of wisdom, than in mistrust, It is