Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency

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Oxford University Press, 2003 - Philosophy - 203 pages
Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
 

Contents

1 The Complexity of Moral Psychology
3
2 On Acting Rationally against Ones Best Judgment
33
3 Moral Worth
67
4 Varieties of Autonomy
117
5 Blame Autonomy and Problem Cases
149
Notes
181
References
191
Index
197
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About the author (2003)

Nomy Arpaly is at Rice University.

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