Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry Into Moral Agency
Nomy Arpaly rejects the model of rationality used by most ethicists and action theorists. Both observation and psychology indicate that people act rationally without deliberation, and act irrationally with deliberation. By questioning the notion that our own minds are comprehensible to us--and therefore questioning much of the current work of action theorists and ethicists--Arpaly attempts to develop a more realistic conception of moral agency.
Other editions - View all
act for moral act rationally acting against one's acting for reasons addiction agent agent-autonomy akrasia akratic anti-Semite argue auton autonomous actions become a hermit behavior beliefs and desires Beth blame blameworthy cause cern chapter character claim coherent conflict conscious course of action decision discussion ego-dystonic ego-syntonic emotional Ethics example excuse fact false feel Frankfurt Harry Frankfurt Huckleberry Finn human imagine impulse control disorder intuitions irra irrational irrationality Jews kleptomania Korsgaard lack less marry Todd Mele mental moral concern moral desirability moral luck moral psychology moral reasons moral responsibility moral worth morally praiseworthy morally relevant motives Nefarious normative autonomy Oliver Single one's best judgment perform person philanthropist Philosophical praise reflect responsiveness to moral right thing Sam's seems self-control sense simply Smith someone sort Tamara theory tion tional tonomous true unautonomous unconscious Velleman virtue Virtue Ethics wish wrong