Mr. Segar and Mr. O'Callaghan afterwards addressed the House for Mr. Macmanus. At the conclusion of their arguments * *THE LORD CHANCELLOR said: My Lords, I have had a 491 communication from the Judges, which I think right to state to your Lordships, in order that you may determine what course you will pursue under the circumstances. The Judges having heard all the arguments which have been adduced by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error in these two cases, are unanimously of opinion that the writs of error cannot be maintained, and that the judgment of the Court below on each of these cases ought to be affirmed. That is entirely in conformity with my own opinion, so that unless any difference of opinion should exist among your Lordships, it does not appear that we can, with any advantage, proceed further with the hearing of these cases. I am, of course, only stating my opinion as to the course which should be pursued, and your Lordships will determine whether you adopt that opinion or not. LORD LYNDHURST, LORD BROUGHAM, and LORD CAMPBELL sever ally expressed their concurrence with the Lord Chancellor. THE LORD CHANCELLOR. Then the course will be to request the learned Judges to state the grounds of their opinion. For this purpose I will put a question to them. His Lordship then proposed the following question to the Judges: "Whether the plaintiffs in error have sustained the errors assigned? ” The question was agreed to. The The Judges requested time to draw up their answer. request was granted, and the Judges withdrew from the House for nearly an hour. On their return, *LORD CHIEF JUSTICE WILDE delivered their opinion in *492 the following terms: My Lords, I am authorised by the learned Judges to report their unanimous opinion that the errors assigned have not been maintained by the arguments urged at your Lordships' bar. As to the first objection: The Judges are of opinion that the allegation upon the record, that the three Judges who executed the commission in relation to VOL. II. 23 [353] the trials of the several plaintiffs in error were nominated and appointed to execute that commission, is an affirmative allegation of their authority to perform that duty, and that it is in no respect rendered uncertain or ambiguous by the subsequent statement, that the commission by which they were so authorised, nominated, and appointed was directed to them and others. The second objection involves two points: 1st, Whether the plaintiffs in error, in respect of the 6th The Judges are of opinion that the plaintiffs in error were not entitled to have delivered to them the lists and copy referred to in the error assigned in that respect, and therefore it becomes unnecessary to consider whether the objection was properly * 493 urged by *plea. The right of the plaintiffs in error to be furnished with the copy of the indictment and the lists referred to has been endeavoured to be sustained by the counsel for the plaintiffs in error at the bar upon two grounds: 1st, Upon the ground that the Statute of the 36th Geo. III. cap. 7, extended to Ireland; 2dly, Or that if that statute did not originally extend to Ireland, it was afterwards so extended by the operation of the 57th Geo. III. c. 6, and by the 11th & 12th Vict. c. 12. The Judges are of opinion that neither of these grounds can be supported. The Statute of 36th Geo. III. passed before the union, and did not bind Ireland, and therefore if it has any application to Ireland, it must be by the effect of 57th Geo. III. or 11th & 12th Victoria. The first section of 36th Geo. III. cap. 7, enacted, that certain acts done during the life of his Majesty Geo. III. and until the end of the next session of Parliament after a demise of the crown, should be deemed treason; and the first section of the 57th Geo. III. c. 6, made those provisions perpetual, but did not extend the operation of the Statute of the 36th Geo. III. to Ireland. The 4th section of 57th Geo. III. cap. 6, has been principally relied upon, which expressly gives the benefit of the 7th & 8th William III. and the 7th Anne, cap. 21, to persons accused of any treason made or declared by that Act of the 57th Geo. III. and it is enough to say that the charge in the 6th count is not for any treason made or declared by that statute. With regard to the Statute of the 11th & 12th Vict. the only effect of that statute was to extend to Ireland certain of the provisions of the 36th Geo. III. * made perpetual by the * 494 57th Geo. III.; and the 4th sec. of the 57th Geo. III. which has been relied upon, is limited to treasons made or declared by that Act, and the treason which is the subject of the 6th count. was not one of them, and to which therefore it does not apply. As to the objection, that the counts charging the levying of the war in Ireland do not charge an offence which in point of law amounts to treason: This objection depends upon the construction of the Statute of Henry VII. passing by the name of Poyning's Law. By that statute we think that those acts which were treason in England by the Statute of Edw. III. were made treason in Ireland, if committed there, and we cannot deem it necessary to say more upon the subject than that the terms of the statute admit of no doubt. As to the objection to the Allocutus, we think it is the proper form. All that the prisoner in that stage of the proceedings can properly be asked is, what he has to say why judgment should not be pronounced; and as to precedents which go further, we deem the matter beyond the question stated to be surplusage. The only remaining error assigned refers to the challenge to the jury. That error has not been urged at your Lordships' bar, and we think it was very properly abandoned, as the question is not open to any doubt, the language of the Statute of 9 Geo. IV. c. 54, § 9, being clear and unambiguous.1 "The Judges have not thought it necessary to trouble your Lordships with a more detailed statement of their reasons for the opinions they entertain, as the general * assign- 495 ments of error have been so fully and ably and satisfactorily discussed by the learned Judges of the Court of Queen's Bench in Ireland, and which arguments are before your Lordships. 1 See Gray v. The Queen, 11 Clark & Finnelly, 427. THE LORD CHANCELLOR. - Your Lordships having now heard the grounds of the opinion of the learned Judges, those learned Judges concurring unanimously in the judgment pronounced in the Court below, I do not apprehend that your Lordships will feel any difficulty in coming to the same conclusion as that at which those learned Judges have arrived. In my own mind, indeed, my Lords, I have never had any doubts, from the time when I first read these papers, as to the result of these writs of error. The reasons assigned by the learned Judges in Ireland, who certainly have most learnedly and most elaborately, and in a manner highly creditable to them, investigated the several grounds upon which the plaintiffs in error rely, leave no doubt as to the correctness of their decision. They properly considered the importance of the subject which they had under their consideration, and their judgments, when carefully perused, leave not any doubt upon the mind of any lawyer as to the soundness of their conclusion. We have now, however, had a confirmation of those reasons in the opinions of the learned Judges who have assisted us in considering the cases now before the House; and if your Lordships concur in the opinion which I have formed, you will affirm the judgments of the Court below. I therefore move your Lordships, on these grounds, that judgment be given for the Defendant in Error in each of the cases under consideration. *496 *LORD LYNDHURST. My Lords, I am of the same opinion as my noble and learned friend who has just addressed your Lordships. LORD BROUGHAM. - My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble and learned friend, that the judgment ought to be given for the Defendant in Error. I cannot express my entire concurrence, without adding my tribute of respectful commendation of the great learning and distinguished ability with which the learned Judges in Ireland have dealt with the whole of this important matter. I never, in the course of my experience, read a more able and satisfactory argument, in every respect, than that of Chief Justice Blackburne ; and the other learned Judges have all, in my opinion, distinguished themselves by their ability and their learning, and their careful and elaborate consideration of these cases. LORD CAMPBELL.- My Lords, I cannot abstain from expressing my approbation and admiration of the very able manner in which these questions have been treated by the Lord Chief Justice of Ireland, and the other learned Judges of the Court below. I have only further to add, that I entirely concur with my noble and learned friend on the woolsack in the opinion which he has expressed. Judgment for the defendant in error. ADAM BURNES, BURNES v. PENNELL. 1849. June 12, 13, 16. * 497 Appellant. WILLIAM PENNELL and others, Assignees and Creditors of the FORTH MARINE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondents. Fraudulent Representations. Joint Stock Company. Partner. Law Agent. Conspiracy. Indictment. Two actions were brought in Scotland, both arising out of the same cause. They were conjoined. The Lord Ordinary pronounced a judgment, which, in point of form, applied to one only, but which, in substance, affected both. His judgment was appealed against to the Court of Session, which made a decree, disposing, in form as well as substance, of both actions: Held, that a decree, so made, was correct. 1 By the deed of copartnership of a joint stock company, certain forms were to be observed by any transferee of shares, before he could become a member of the company. A. purchased shares, and executed some of the acts required to constitute him a member of the company; but left one of these acts unexecuted: Held, that the execution of these acts was a duty cast on the purchaser for the benefit of the company, and that his non-execution of one of them did not enable him, as respected the company, to retire from his contract. A Joint Stock Marine Insurance Company had declared dividends, which, as it afterwards appeared, were not warranted by the real condition of the company. The law-agent of the company, who was also a member of it, when applied to for information, mentioned these dividends as proofs of the flourishing state of the company. The person to whom he so mentioned them became afterwards a purchaser of shares: 1 See Bain v. Whitehaven Railway Company, 3 House of Lords Cases, 2, 7. |