on the contrary, the longer we preserve them, like those sorts of wine that will bear age, the more relishing and valuable they become." They, therefore, who have gained a true friend should cherish him as the apple of their eye. It is a mark of a weak and fickle mind to be seeking out continually for new attachments. The inconstancy which we thus manifest towards others is sure to be visited upon ourselves; and he who neglects or abandons his friend, is sure to be neglected and abandoned himself. It is not maintained, however, but that in our progress through life new and fresh Friendships may be formed; but this may be done without manifesting any inconstancy or unkindness to our old and well-tried friends, so long as they continue to manifest the virtues which first attracted our affection.

SECTION III.-Close of Friendship.

Occasions, however, may and will occur on which it is not only expedient but necessary that Friendship should be broken or dissolved.

1. A change of circumstances in one or other of the parties frequently leads to an interruption or a dissolution of Friendship. At first they were equal in many respects, and their intercourse frequent and familiar. But one has been elevated or the other depressed, and distance and alienation ensue. A good man, however, will guard against allowing a mere change of outward condition to estrange or to separate him from one whose Friendship he valued more than all the gifts of fortune. And he who has been less fortunate should beware of being jealous of his former friend, or of accusing him of pride and want of kindness and consideration.

2. Another occasion on which Friendship is liable to be interrupted or dissolved is, when one of the parties has neglected or violated its obligations. To defend the character and promote the interest of a friend are plain and imperative duties. But when either of these is neglected, or not discharged with activity, this is regarded and resented as a want of true Friendship. In such cases, however, self-love is apt to mislead, and to make us hasty in our expectations and exorbitant in our demands upon the kindness of our friends. It is only when there has been a plain and culpable neglect of our honour or our interest that we have reason to be offended. We

should be slow and unwilling to take any such ground of offence; and even when constrained to do so, it should be done without anger or bitterness. We may quietly and with regret withdraw our confidence and affections from one who is not willing to return them; but all violent upbraidings and bitter thoughts should as far as possible be avoided.

3. A worse case may be put. He whom we called our friend may not only have neglected to defend our character, or to promote our interest, but may have injured both. Or, without aiming at our hurt or ruin, he may have shown himself to be destitute of the good qualities which we thought him to possess, or, by yielding to the corruptions and temptations of the world, may have become unworthy of our respect and esteem. All our endeavours to correct or reclaim him have been fruitless, and we may be driven at last to the dire necessity of withdrawing ourselves from him. But even in such a case, we should separate more in sorrow than in anger. "The most advisable and prudent conduct, in situations of this kind," says Cicero, "is to suffer the intimacy to wear out by silent and insensible degrees; or, to use a strong expression, which I remember to have fallen from Cato, on a similar occasion, the bands of friendship should be gradually untied, rather than suddenly cut asunder,—always supposing, however, that the offence is not of so atrocious a nature as to render an absolute and immediate alienation indispensably requisite for one's own honour."

4. But although Friendship should survive the many shocks and accidents to which, amidst the chances and encounters of this mortal life, it may be exposed, it must at length be dissolved by the death of one of the parties. But the death of one friend calls for duties from the survivor. A request made by one dying has always been regarded as peculiarly solemn and sacred. And any such request, when acceded to, should be carefully fulfilled by the survivor. Nor is our duty to be confined merely to what has been specially devolved upon us. "The name of our friends, their glory, their family," says the Marquise de Lambert, in a passage quoted by Dr. Brown, "have still claims on our affection, which it would be guilt not to feel. They should live still in our heart, by the emotions which subsist there; in our memory, by our frequent remembrance of them; in our voice, by our eulogiums; in our conduct, by our imitation of their virtues."

PART II.

JUSTICE.

JUSTICE, as distinguished from Benevolence, has been defined to be constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi—the steady and lasting determination or disposition to render to every one his right. The Latin word jus, which corresponds to the substantive noun, right, has been defined by civilians -Facultas aliquid agendi, vel possidendi, vel ab alio consequendi-that is, according to Dr. Reid (Act. Pow., Essay v. ch. 3), " A lawful claim to do anything, to possess anything, or to demand some prestation from some other person;" or, as Dr. Whewell has designated them-the "right of personal security, the right of property, and the right of contract." To these he has added, in his classification of rights, the "right of government and the right of marriage." The rights of government, as arising from the relation between magistrates and people, may be called Political Justice. The rights of marriage as arising from the relation between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant, may be called Economical Justice. The rights of person, property, and contract, as arising from the relation in which all men stand as men and as members of society, constitute what may be called Ethical Justice.

Ethical Justice consists in giving to every one his right in respect of person, property, and contract. It may be regarded negatively and positively.

CHAPTER I.

ETHICAL JUSTICE VIEWED NEGATIVELY.

WITH respect to the rights of the person, this prohibits all acts of cruelty and oppression. One of the earliest enumerations of wrongs against the person is to be found in Exodus, ch. xxi. The basis of

all laws against these wrongs is the commandment Thou shalt not kill. Wrongous imprisonment and injury done to the health are also included in wrongs against the person.

The commandment, Thou shalt not steal, is the basis of all laws against wrongs to the possession or property of others. These wrongs may be done to property, real and personal, or to character and reputation.

The right to liberty of person, possession of property, and enjoyment of reputation, are called natural, because every man as man has a right to them, against all men. They are natural, and they are absolute rights.

The rights of Contract are adventitious and conditional. They are not naturally nor inherently vested in a man, but come upon him in consequence of an agreement; and hence they are called adventitious. They are not rights which one man holds against all men; but only against the parties with whom he may have contracted. Even against these the rights of contract are not absolute, but conditional—that is, the one party can only demand his right, on condition of rendering the right which he gave to the other party. The declining or refusing to do so is an injury against the rights of that other party, and therefore a violation of Justice negatively considered. But the fulfilment of contracts depends so much upon the conditions under which they have been entered into, that it may be better to consider this duty under the head of Positive Justice; because the rights which the parties may have acquired are not obvious and natural, like the rights of life, liberty, property, and reputation, but have previously to be ascertained by the enactments of positive law, as well as by the precepts of natural Justice.

But, "In the series of absolute duties, or such as oblige all men antecedently to any human institution, this seems to challenge the first and noblest place," says Puffendorff (Law of Nature and of Nations, book iii. ch. 1, sect. 1),“ That no man hurt another; and that in case of any damage done by him, he fail not to make reparation." It is an absolute duty that no man hurt another, and it is a duty conditional upon the fact of one man having done hurt to another that he make Reparation or Restitution.

The duty of Reparation consists in restoring things, as far as

1 "Justitiæ primum munus est ut ne cui quis noccat, nisi lacessitus injuria."- CICERO, De Officiis, lib. i. cap. 7.

possible, to that state in which they would have been but for our injustice. And most assuredly, as soon as we see that we have done anything injurious to our neighbour, we must see at the same time that it is our duty, in as far as possible, to repair it. This is a duty, however, which men are frequently prevented from discharging by feelings of selfishness and false shame; and cases have been put, in which it is argued that Restitution may be dispensed with.

1. The case of absolute inability.-Life may be taken away, but cannot be restored, or property destroyed that cannot be replaced. And as no man can be under obligation to do what is impossible -nemo tenetur ad impossibile—it is argued that Restitution may be dispensed with. But, although the Reparation cannot be complete, it is binding to the very utmost which may be in the power of him who has done the wrong.

2. It sometimes happens that when an injury has been done, the party injured is unwilling that anything should be done towards repairing it. In such cases, it is argued that Restitution may be dispensed with, in accordance with the maxim-volenti non fit injuria. But this maxim may be carried too far. First to do an injury to another, and then to trust to his dispensing with Reparation, is doubly wrong. We may accept the remission of a debt, as we may accept the conferring of a favour. But both must be done freely. Before the duty of Restitution can be dispensed with, the claim to it should be cheerfully relaxed on the part of our neighbour, and we should be satisfied that he will sustain no serious inconvenience from the relaxation of it.

3. It is said, That we are absolved from repairing any injury to our neighbour when we have received equal or greater injury from him. But in returning evil for evil we are doing wrong. We have a right to resist and repel wrong, and in doing so we do no wrong to our neighbour, and owe him no Restitution. But if we go beyond the limits of reasonable resentment, and return excessive or injurious retaliation, Reparation is not to be dispensed with, any more than with reference to a first injustice.