Born ignorant, we desire to know. Desiring to know, we delight in the attainment of knowledge; and delighting in the attainment, we are at once rewarded for our exertions, and stimulated to continue and increase them.

THE DESIRE OF SOCIETY is manifested at a very early age. Attend," says Mr. Smellie (Phil. of Nat. Hist., p. 416), "to the eyes, the features, and gestures of a child, when another child is presented to it; both, instantly, previous to the possibility of instruction or habit, exhibit the most evident expressions of joy. Their eyes sparkle, and their features and gestures demonstrate, in the most unequivocal manner, a mutual attachment." It may be observed, too, that in all their amusements and sports, children are naturally social. And although man, in a more advanced and mature state, may be capable of bearing solitude, and may even, under peculiar circumstances, come to like it, yet still it may be said that, in general, he manifests a strong Desire of Society. He multiplies and prolongs the occasions of meeting with his fellow-men. The intercourse which is necessary to carry forward the business of life is but brief and limited, when compared with the long and happy hours which are spent in the family circle, at the festive board, or in the communion of thought and feeling, at literary, political, or religious associations. In short, Society or social intercourse, under various forms, is an object of natural and strong Desire to man. The important influence which this Desire has, in stimulating his activity and in advancing his intellectual and moral improvement, argues it to be an original element of his nature; and the laws and regulations to which it gives rise, in a state of civilization, instead of being, as Hobbes and others would represent them to be, evidences of a natural enmity between man and man, are the means which man takes to secure and sweeten the charities of family and friendship, amidst the endearments of which he is born, delights to live, and scarcely fears to die.

"And is he dead, whose glorious mind

Lifts thine on high?

To live in hearts we leave behind,

Is not to die."-Campbell.

This leads to the notice of another Desire which is natural to man, viz., THE DESIRE OF ESTEEM.

It is impossible to see human beings together, without seeing that they have a strong Desire for the good opinion of one another.

This Desire is manifested in the earliest years. The child, even before it attains to the use or understanding of articulate language, is soothed and pleased by the smiles of the nurse or mother, and is mortified by any indication of neglect. In the whole business of human life it is seen that a Desire to stand well with others is prevalent. Even they who are conscious that they have no strong claim upon the Esteem of their fellow-men, still flatter themselves with the hope, that there is something about them to save them from contempt, which is feared as the greatest of evils. And, for beings who have been born to live in society, it is most important that they should thus have been made sensible of the good or bad opinion of one another.

The Desire of Esteem is so strong as to stretch beyond death; a fact inconsistent with the theory which attempts to resolve this Desire into a love of the pleasure or advantage which the good opinion of others may procure for us. For, what pleasure or advantage can arise from posthumous respect or fame? Yet men often sacrifice their health, and even their life, in seeking to obtain them.

Similar remarks might be made with regard to the DESIRE OF POWER, or the principle of Ambition, and the DESIRE OF SUPERIORITY, or the principle of Emulation. These cannot be resolved into any other principles more simple, and may be considered as original elements of human nature.

Desire is characteristic of beings whose nature and condition are imperfect. It involves a sense of want or defect, and a tendency to some object or some act which is to relieve or supply it. Our Desires, therefore, may be as many and various as are our wants and defects, and the objects or acts which may relieve or supply them. But the different forms which Desires may assume, or the different names by which they may be denoted, in different circumstances, should not lead us to regard them as so many principles differing in kind. What is common to all forms and degrees of Desire is tendency towards some object or some act, which is to relieve some want, or to supply some defect, or to remove some uneasiness. And, in so far as the want, or defect, or uneasiness is inseparable from the nature and condition of man, the tendency towards what is to relieve, or supply, or remove it, may be regarded as originally belonging to his constitution as a human being.

༔་ Cupido dominandi cunctis affectibus flagrantior est."-TACITUS,

"Desires," according to Dr. Hutcheson (Essay on the Passions, sect. 1), “arise in our mind, from the frame of our nature, upon apprehension of good or evil in objects, actions, or events, to obtain for ourselves or others the agreeable sensation when the object or event is good; or to prevent the uneasy sensation when it is evil.” Of such Desires as manifest themselves as primitive tendencies, we can give no further account than to say, that they arise from the frame of our nature. Of the Desire of Society we can only say, man is a social being; while there are other living beings who delight in solitude. Our Primary Desires may, however, be characterised in the following way :

1. They are such as spring from the frame of our nature; that is, from our very constitution as human beings.

2. They are, therefore, universal; they are found not in individuals, or families, or tribes, or nations only, but in the whole humar.

race.

3. They are also permanent; they manifest themselves throughout the whole term of human existence; they appear in the earliest years, they gather strength with maturing manhood, and do not altogether disappear even in old age.

The Desires which are Primary and natural to man are but few; those which grow up in a state of civilisation, and are subservient to the Primary and Natural Desires, are almost innumerable.

CHAPTER III.

PASSION AND AFFECTION.

"No peculiar place has been set apart by me," says Dr. Brown (Lect. 65), “for the Passions; the reason of which is, that our Passions are truly no separate class, but merely a name for our Desires, when very vivid and very permanent."

Mr. Stewart says (Outlines, sect. 4), "This word Passion does not belong exclusively to any one class of our active principles; but is applicable to all of them, when they are suffered to pass the bounds of moderation. In such cases, a sensible agitation or commotion of the body is produced, and our reason is disturbed; we lose, in some

measure, the power of self-command, and are hurried to action by an almost irresistible impulse."

66

Dr. Reid distinguishes between Desire and Affection, by saying that our Desires have things, not persons, for their object." "But," says he (Act. Pow., Essay iii. pt. ii. ch. 3), “there are various principles of action in man, which have persons for their immediate object, and imply, in their very nature, our being well or ill affected to some person, or at least to some animated being. Such principles I shall call by the general name of Affections, whether they dispose us to do good or hurt to others." "By the word Passion," he says (ch. 6), "he does not mean any principle of action different from Desires and Affections; but such a degree of vehemence as is apt to produce sensible effects upon the body, or to darken the understanding and weaken the power of self-command."

Dr. Hutcheson (Essay on the Passions, p. 1) describes the Affections and Passions as "these modifications or actions of the mind, consequent upon the apprehension of certain objects or events, in which the mind generally conceives good or evil” (p. 26). "When the word Passion denotes anything different from Affection, it includes a strong brutal impulse of the will, attended by some violent bodily motions, so as to prevent all deliberate reasoning."

In accordance with these explanations, the word Passion denotes a vivid and turbulent state of liking or disliking, attended by correspondent effects upon the bodily frame, and upon the powers of reason and self-command. Affection denotes a more calm and lasting state of liking or disliking, and has always a person or living being for its object. Taken in connection with these two terms, the word Emotion, according to Dr. Cogan, means the sensible effect upon the bodily frame by which a Passion or Affection may indicate its existence and character. Fear is a Passion. Gratitude is an Affection. The Emotion in Fear is paleness of countenance, or stiffening of the hair, &c.

In Passion and Affection there is implied Desire. If the object of a passion be agreeable, we desire to obtain it; if it be disagreeable, we desire to avoid it. If we are well-affected towards any person, we desire his society and seek his benefit; if we are ill-affected towards any one, we desire to avoid his company, and, perhaps, to do him hurt. Hence it is that all the Passions and Affections may be reduced to two, and may be regarded, in all their varieties, as so many forms of the primitive or mother principles of Love and

Hatred, Appetence and Aversion, or more generally still, of Inclination to, or from, an object.

Before any form or degree of Desire, Passion, or Affection, can be awakened, some object or event must be known; and between that object or event and our nature and condition as human beings, there must be some adaptation. The bare knowledge of a thing is no reason why we should either seek or shun it. Before we do so we must have an Emotion-that is, we must be moved in reference to it. It must affect our Sensitivity, in consequence of some adaptation between it and us. There must be some natural tendency carrying us towards it; making us uneasy in the want of it, and pleased with the attainment of it. But what is spontaneous in the first instance may afterwards be reflective; and, when a natural tendency has once been developed, then we may come, on the ground of experience, to estimate the pleasure and the pain, the good and the evil, which objects and events are fitted to give us. And, according to this estimate, one thing is sought and another is shunned, one Desire is checked and another is cherished, one Passion is yielded to, and another is resisted, one Affection is indulged, and another is restrained.

In this advanced and mature stage of their development, our various states of feeling come to be connected with the conceptions which we form of objects and events, as good or evil, and as likely to give us pleasure or pain. Hence it is, that Dr. Hutcheson, while he refers our several natural Desires and Passions to so many several internal senses, or positive determinations of our nature, still describes them as arising in our mind upon the apprehension of Good or Evil in objects, actions, or events. Mr. Locke says (Essay on Hum. Understand., book ii. ch. 20), "Pleasure and Pain, and that which causes them, Good and Evil, are the hinges on which our Passions turn; and if we reflect on ourselves, and observe how these, under various considerations, operate in us; what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal sensations (if I may so call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our Passions."

Sir William Hamilton says (Metaphys. Lect. 44, 5, 6), "As the feelings are not primitive and independent states, but merely states

6 Quod latet ignotum est; ignoti nulla cupido.

Εκ του όραν γιγνεται το έραν.

Looking begets liking.

"I'll lock to like, if looking liking move."-Shakespeare.