the father over the person of his son ceased in the time of Tacitus and of the L. Salica, when the son was emancipated by special act of commendation, &c., so in later law, when these customs had become obsolete, it ceased when the son attained majority. On the other hand, as the common ownership of father and son, their common life in the same household, and the rights of control necessarily given to the father as the elder of those living in the same house, were not extinguished, - let us not say by commendation (for this supposes a separation from the household), but by the ceremony of the gift of arms or of cutting the hair, performed by the father himself; so, in later law, they were not extinguished by the attainment of majority, but continued till the son separated from the father's household. In fine, as the powers of the German father did not form any thing at all resembling the Roman patria potestas, is it not after all futile to seek in German law for any thing having the same effects as the Roman emancipatio? The very expression "emancipation" is as little suited to express what really took place in primitive Germany as it would be to express what happens to-day.

If we turn now to the Anglo-Saxons, it is, first of all, very significant that no mention is made anywhere in their laws or history of any ceremony of emancipation of the son by commendation, by cutting the hair, or by any special act. Only in Norman times does such appear in the foris familiatio, which is undoubtedly of Norman origin, and is entirely analogous to the separation of households in the later law of the continent. The silence of the Saxon sources in this respect gives, at the outset, a strong presumption that already from the first the father's power in Saxon England was assimilated to guardianship, and ended like it when the son attained majority; and evidence is not lacking to make this presumption a certainty. The period of majority in Anglo-Saxon law was first fixed at the completion of the tenth year; 1 but, later, the period of dependence was lengthened to twelve years. Even this came in time to be regarded as too early

2

an age to assume the responsibilities of manhood, and the later law shows a tendency to prolong the period to the completion of the fifteenth year, though there is no sufficient evidence that this ever became law in the Saxon age. Throughout Norman times, however, and still in the time of Glanville, this was the age of majority for all except those holding knight's fees. For these the Normans had introduced the period of twenty-one years.

That the father's control over the person of his son ended at the period of majority is clear from the following passages in the sources. Poen. Theod. XIX. § 26: “Puer usque in xv. annos sit in potestate patris sui; postea seipsum potest facere monachum si vult." Ecgb. Excerp. c. 96 (Thorpe II. p. 111): "Parvulus usque annos xv. pro delicto corporali disciplina castigetur; post hanc vero aetatem, quicquid deliquerit, vel si furatur, retribuat, seu etiam secundum legem exsolvat." Ine 7, § 2: "A boy of ten years may be privy to a theft." Æthelst. II. 1. Pr.: "That one spare no thief taken in the act over twelve winters and over eight shillings." Cnut II. 20 : "And we will that every freeman be brought into a hundred or a tithing, who wishes to be entitled to satisfaction and to wer, if any one slays him after he is twelve winters old." Cnut II. 21: "And we will that every freeman above twelve years make oath that he will neither be a thief, nor cognizant of a theft." Evidence more conclusive could not be desired. It is impossible to restrict the application of these passages to wards. They are general provisions applying to all freemen, whether orphans or sons of fathers still living. The boy, ten or twelve years old, can become a monk; can sell himself as a slave; can no longer be chastised. Henceforth he acts for himself, and is himself responsible for his acts. He must take oath to observe the laws, and enroll himself in one of the organizations provided for that purpose. What better commentary could be found on the words of Tacitus, "Ante domus, mox reipublicae"? And this personal and legal independence of the son, which Tacitus tells us was in his time acquired by the gift of arms in the assembly, is now acquired ipso facto by the attainment of majority. There is here no commendation, or cutting of the hair; no emancipation, scuto frameaque; no mention of a separation of households. Before the completion of the tenth or twelfth year, the boy is legally dependent. After the completion of the tenth or twelfth year, the boy is legally independent. He is no longer a boy, but a man possessed of all the rights and subject to all the duties that belong to complete manhood.

Nothing is said of the property relations between father and son. On this point, the Anglo-Saxon sources leave us entirely in the dark. Any control of the father over property acquired by the son would be inconsistent with the personal independence, which it has been shown the son enjoyed. It is clear from the charters that sons acquired a right of veto in alienations of the family estate. Probably until marriage sons continued as a rule to live with their father; and it would not be unnatural that the property of the mother, which during her life the father had administered as guardian and which after her death was inherited by the sons, should continue to be administered by the father until the marriage of the son led him to reclaim it. This administration would be in no way a right inherent in parental authority, but only a result of the custom of living in common: it would be dependent entirely upon the will of the son. There is nothing to show that the father had any legal rights over his son's property after the son attained majority.

As all women were legally dependent by reason of their sex, the attainment of majority could not have the same importance for girls that it had for boys. Daughters remained under their father's power until they married or went into a convent. Still the laws made a distinction between girls and adult women,1 and this distinction was not merely nominal, but had a legal effect. The age of majority for girls was probably the same as that for boys. The Penitentials of Theodore and Ecgberht give various ages of majority; 2 and, if we assume the earlier of these to be the correct one, girls attained their majority at the completion of the twelfth year, - the ordinary majority for boys during the greater part of the Saxon period. The effect of majority for women was to free their persons from the arbitrary disposal of the father.4 They could enter a convent if they chose, and they could no longer be sent to a convent or given in marriage against their will. This last, however, was the effect of majority only in the early law. It has been shown that in the later law even girls under age could not be married against their will. All other powers of the father over his daughter continued until she married or went into a convent. He administered her property as guardian, and had the use and enjoyment of it, and he represented her in court. But by far the most important power of the father was in the marriage of his daughter. Here the rights of every guardian of an adult woman unmarried were the same as those of the father, and what is said of the one will hold of the other. What these rights were will appear presently in the course of the discussion of marriage, - a subject which must now engage our attention.

In the earliest Anglo-Saxon laws, marriage appears in the form of a sale by the father or other guardian to the bridegroom. Ine, 31: "If a man buy a wife and do not pay the purchase price...;" Æthelb. 83: "If she is betrothed for money to another man...;" id. 31: "If a freeman lie with a freeman's wife, let him purchase her with his wergeld and let him provide another wife with his own money and bring her to him." Whether marriage was ever an actual sale of the woman's person, treated as a chattel, may be doubted. The high estimation in which women were held among the Germans, when they first appear in history, proves at least that, if this was ever the case, it must have been in very remote times. The mere fact that marriage took the form of a sale proves nothing. In a primitive society, legal conceptions and legal forms are few and simple. The same word is used to designate things in fact different. Thus, all kinds of protection were included by the Germans under the designation mund, but it does not follow that this protection was in all instances of the same nature. Paternal authority, power of husband over wife, of guardian over ward, may in the beginning have been alike, but it is not necessary to assume this from the use of mund to designate them all. The use of the form of sale for marriage does not prove that marriage was ever an actual sale, like any ordinary sale of chattels. This one legal form may have served several ends. It may have been used for contract, for conveyance, or for marriage, without its being necessary to assume that these were all of precisely the same nature. In fact, in the earliest AngloSaxon laws, marriage has a twofold aspect. In part, it exhihits the characteristics of an ordinary sale; in part, it differs very much from other sales, and appears as a transaction not merely of a mercantile, but of an ethical character. In the first place, it is certain that in historic times the thing transferred was not the person of the woman, treated as a chattel, but only the rights of guardianship. For these rights a real price was paid by the bridegroom to the guardian, and so far marriage resembled an ordinary sale. The strict formalities of a sale were also, throughout, observed. On the