given to any before they are born I have not said, though they are given to him before they are born, or that he is given to them in order of time before they do believe; but this I say, that faith and forgiveness of sin are given them for his sake; which when Mr B. disproves, or pretends so to do, I shall farther consider it, as being a matter of importance. With his strife of words (if I can choose) I shall no more trouble myself.

This process being made, sect. 3, Mr B. lays down the conclusion as contrary to them before, which, as he informs me, are maintained by myself and others:

"No man now living was justified, pardoned, or absolved actually from the guilt of sin and obligation to death, at the time of Christ's death or undertaking, or from eternity, or at any time before he was born, or did believe."

After I know not how many arguments brought forth to confirm this position, my arguments against it are produced and answered; but what the learned man means I profess I know not, unless "disputandi prurigine abreptus," he cares not what he says, nor against whom, so he may multiply arguments and answers, and put forth books one upon another. In that very book of mine which he animadverts upon, I use sundry of those very arguments which here he useth, to prove the same assertion, for the substance of it, as Mr B. hath here laid down; and this I had assured him as to a former mistake of his. My words are, p. 33 [p. 449]:

"As for evangelical justification, whereby a sinner is completely justified, that it should precede believing, I have not only not asserted but positively denied, and disproved by many arguments. To be now traduced as a patron of that opinion, and my reasons for it publicly answered, seems to me something uncouth."

Farther now to acquit myself from that which nothing but self-fulness, oscitancy, and contempt of others, can possibly administer any suspicion of, I shall not turn aside.

Yea, but I have said that "the elect, upon the death of Christ, have a right to all the fruit of the death of Christ, to be enjoyed in the appointed season." Because this is made the occasion of so many outcries of Antinomianism, and I know not what, I shall direct the reader to what I have affirmed in this case, and leave it with some brief observations to his judgment, having somewhat else to do than to engage myself in a long wordy contest with Mr B., who, knowing not of any difference between himself and me, would very fain make one; wherein he may possibly find his labour prevented hereafter, and a real difference stated between us, if any of his rare notions fall in my way.

The discourse is, p. 69 line 23, unto p. 72 line 24 [462-468].

The sum of all is this: Upon the death of Christ, that is, on the consideration of the death of Christ, upon his undertaking (for surely I suppose it will be granted that his death was no less effectual upon his undertaking to them who died before his incarnation than afterward upon his actual accomplishment of that undertaking) to be a mediator and redeemer, it becomes just, right, and equal, that all the good things which are the fruits of his death should be in a due and appointed season made out to them for whom he died in their several generations.

What says Mr B. to this? "Suppose this be so, yet they are not actually absolved, but only have a right to it. Who said they were? Do I offer to make any such conclusion? do I dispute against Mr B.'s position, or for justification upon or at the death of Christ, or his undertaking? "Homini homo quid interest?"

But I say, there being such a right to these good things, they have a right to them. "Crimen inauditum Caie Cæsar!" Did I not also say how I understood

that expression? Though I used it to make out the thing I intended, yet did I not say directly that that right was not subjectively in them;—that is, that it was not actionable, as I expressed it, that they could not plead it; but it was as above? Yea, "but then this is no more but non injustum est." This is false, as I have showed. Many divines think that this was the estate between God and sinners antecedently to the consideration of the death of Christ, or might have been without it, namely, that it was not unjust with God to pardon and save them. By the death of Christ there is a jus of another nature obtained, even such as I have described in the treatise Mr B. opposeth. But then "God doth not give those good things to us upon condition." I say he doth not, taking condition in its strict and proper sense in respect of God, though he hath made one thing to be the condition of another. All graces are alike absolutely purchased for us, but not alike absolutely received by us; the economy of the gospel requires another order. The first grace, Mr B. confesseth, is bestowed upon us absolutely and without condition; and this grace is the condition of the following privileges, as to the order of communication. And all the difference between us is about the sense of the word "condition" in that place; which, when I have nothing else to do, I will write a volume as big as this is about.

This is that I say, Christ hath purchased all good things for us; these things are actually to be conferred upon us in the time and order by God's sovereign will determined and disposed. This order, as revealed in the gospel, is, that we believe and be justified, etc. Faith, whereby we believe, is bestowed on us absolutely, always without condition, sometimes without outward means. This faith, by the constitution of God, is attended with the privileges contended about; which are no less purchased for us by Christ than faith itself. Yea, the purchase of our justification or acceptation with God is, in order of nature, antecedent in consideration to the purchase of faith for us. If Mr B. hath a mind to oppose any thing of this (which is all that as yet to this business I have declared), let him do it when he pleaseth; and if it be tantidem, as he speaketh, I shall give him a farther account of my thoughts about it. But he would know what I mean by "Christ's undertaking for the elect." Let him consider what I have delivered about the covenant between the Father and Son in this business, and he will know at least what I intend thereby. He will see how Christ, being then only God, did undertake the business to do it, not as God only; and withal the wideness of that exception, that the prophecy of Isaiah was written a long time after, and could not give any such right as is pretended. A right is given there in respect of manifestation, not constitution. Isaiah in that prophecy speaks of things to come as past, verses 5, 6, and of things past and present as to come; it reveals, not constitutes a covenant. But he saith, we use to distinguish between the undertaking and accomplishment. Divines use to say that upon man's fall Christ undertook satisfaction, but it was in the fulness of time that he accomplished it. How, therefore, he accomplished it in the undertaking, I do not well see. But that he did perfectly accomplish what he undertook I easily grant. But how you learned divines distinguish I know not. This I know, that such poor men as myself do believe that, as to the efficacy of satisfaction and merit, Christ's undertaking was attended with no less than his actual accomplishment of what he undertook, or we know not how to grant salvation to the saints under the old testament. It was concerning their efficacy as to merit, not their distinction between themselves, that I spake.

These things being premised, Mr B. proceeds to answer my arguments, which were produced to prove that upon the death of Christ there was a right obtained for the elect to all the benefits of his death, this right residing in the justice of God, or in the equalling of these things by divine constitution (as I fully declared in the place by Mr B. opposed). Upon the interposing of some expressions, in the

process of my discourse, of the grant being made to the elect, and mentioning of their right (which in what sense they were to be taken I expressly declared), Mr B. takes advantage to answer them all with this intendment put upon them, that they aimed to prove a subjective personal right, which at any time they may plead, when the utmost that my words can be extended unto is, that they have it ex fædere, not realiter, for the subject of it I place elsewhere. Now, if Mr B. will send me word that he supposes he hath answered my arguments as they were proposed to my own purpose, I will promise, if I live, to return him an answer. In the meantime, I shall have no itch to be scribbling to no purpose. Ego me, tua causa, ne erres, non rupturus sum." Yet of the whole he may for the present be pleased to receive the ensuing account, both as to the nature of a jus and its application.

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For the description of jus, Mr B. relies on Grotius; and something also he mentions out of Sayrus. Grotius, in the first chapter of his book "De Jure Belli et Pacis," in the sections transcribed (in part) by Mr B. and some others, expresses, in his way, the distinction given at the beginning both of the Institutions and Digests about jus, and those also which they handle under the head" de statu." So do all men commonly that write of that subject. How exactly this is done by Grotius, those who are learned in the law will judge. For my part, I am so far at liberty as not to be concluded by his bare affirmation either as to law or gospel. Yet neither doth he exclude the right by me intended. He tells us, indeed, that facultas, which the lawyers call sui, is that which properly and strictly he intends to call jus. But the other member of the distinction he terms aptitudo; which though in a natural sense it respects the subject immediately, yet he tells you that in the sense of Michael Ephesius, which he contradicts not, it is but rò æpírov, "id quod convenit," which respects only the order of things among themselves. And though out of Aristotle he calls it also ağ, yet that word (as he also afterward expounds it out of Cicero) is of much a lower signification than many imagine. This rò xpírov is that which I assert; and Sayrus' definition of jus ad rem may also be allowed.

But for others, jus artificially is ars boni et æqui, Ponz. de Lamiis, num. 14, tom. xi. Jus Gregor. p. 2, and D. D., cap. i. Celsus; though some dispute against this definition, as Conanus, Comment. Jur. Civil. lib. i. cap. i. That which is æquum is the subject of it. So the comedian, " Quid cum illis agas, qui neque jus, neque bonum, neque æquum sciunt," Terent. Heauton. iv. 1, 29;-all terms equipollent. And in this sense, one that is not born may have a jus, if it be in a thing that is profitable to him: "Quod dicimus eum qui nasci speratur pro superstite esse, tunc verum est, cum de ipsius jure quæritur, alias non prodest, nisi natus sit," Paulus de Verbor. Significat.; which one interpretation will overbear, with me, a hundred modern exceptioners, if they should deny that a man may be said to have a right unless he himself be the immediate subject of the right, as if it were a natural accident inherent to him. So is it in the case proposed by Cicero in secundo [libro] de Inventione, 42: "Pater-familias cum liberorum nihil haberet, uxorem autem haberet, in testamento ita scripsit, 'Si mihi filius genitus fuerit unus, pluresve, is mihi hæres esto.'" The father dies before the son is born; a right accrues to him that is not born. Such a right, I say, there is, although this right is not immediately actionable. Gaius tells us that "actio est prosecutio juris sui." This jus suum is that which Grotius calls facultas, and is jus proprie et stricte dictum. And this jus suum I did not intend in that I said it was not actionable: and therefore, whereas Conanus says that "nullum est jus, cui non sit aut a natura, aut a lege data quædam obligatio, tanquam comes et adjutrix," Comment. Jur. Civil. lib. ii. cap. i., which obligation is the foundation of action, it is evident that he intends jus proprie et stricte dictum; for Gaius distinguisheth between jus utendi, fruendi, and jus obligationis, D. lib. i. 1, 8, which he could not do if all and every 39

VOL. XII.

right had an obligation attending it. And such is that right whereof we speak. If any one thinks to plead it, he will be like him whom the lawyers call "agentem sine actione," of whom they dispute “an liceat ei experiri," and whether his plea be to be admitted; concerning which the variety of cases and opinions are repeated by Menochius de Arbit. Judic. lib. i. qu. 16, 2.

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And such a jus as this ariseth "ex contractibus innominatis:" for as “jus ex innominato contractu oritur, quum ex parte debentis, implere id quod convenerat, impletum est," Ludovic. Roman. Consul. lxxxvi. p. 23; so ex contractu innominato, non transeunt actiones sine mandato," as Bartholus tells us: for though the covenant between Father and Son, whence this right ariseth, be not in itself of the nature of a "contractus innominatus, do ut des," yet to them it is of that import. Hence the Socinians, who are skilled in the law, though they wholly suspend the actual obtaining of remission of sins upon the fulfilling of the conditions required, do yet grant that a plenary jus or right of obtaining forgiveness of sins was given to all in the death of Christ: "Jam vero quidnam mediator fœderis, ab una paciscentium parte legatus, et ipsius sponsor constitutus, ac quoddam veluti testamentum ejus nomine constituens, qua talis est, aliud præstat, quam ut jus alteri parti, et jus quidem plenum largiatur, ad fœderis hujus, aut testamenti promissa consequenda; obstringit nimirum atque obligat promissorem qui ipsum obligaverat ad servanda fœderum promissa, eaque rata prorsus habenda," Crell. de Caus. Mort. Christi, p. 9. So, in the common speech of the ancients, Budæus tells us that "bonum jus dicere" is as much as that which is now vulgarly expressed, "requesta tua rationabilis est." If there be an equity in the thing, there is a jus belonging to the person. Any thing that made it equitable that a man should be regarded, they called his jus; whence is his complaint in Plautus, finding himself every way unworthy: "Sine modo et modestia sum, sine bono jure atque honore:" Bachid. and Paulus, in lib. iii. ff. de servitut. urb. præd., "Ne jus sit vicino invitis nobis altius ædificare." It were very facile, both from lawyers and most approved authors, to multiply instances of this large acceptation of the word jus, or right. And whether the grant of the Father and purchase of the Mediator, before mentioned, be not sufficient to constitute or denominate such a jus or right in them for whom and whose profit and benefit the grant is made, I question not. Again, consider that of Paulus, lib. xi. ad Edict. D.D. de verb. signif. tit. 16: "Princeps bona concedendo, videtur etiam obligationem concedere;" which adds a propriety to the "jus,” as was showed before. Yet that it should be presently actionable doth not follow: "Actio est jus persequendi in judicio, quod sibi debetur," Institut. lib. iv. de action. Every "jus ad rem" is not "jus persequendi in judicio;" whence is the gloss of Aldobrandinus on that place: "Nec facias magnam vim ibi; quia cum multas habeat significationes hæc dictio jus, ut ff. de inst. et jus 1: p. et, si, hoc est unum de significatis ejus, ut dicatur jus agendi vel persequendi." Besides, it must be quod sibi debetur, that is, actionable, the obligation whence that debitum arises being, as the lawyers speak, mater actionis. But yet even "debere" itself is of so large and various signification in the law, both in respect to things and persons, as will not admit of any determinate sense unless otherwise restrained, ff. de verb. signif. b. pecuniæ, sect. 8, si. Yea, and on the other side, sometimes a plea may lie where there is no debitum : "Quandoque ago etiam ad id quod mihi non debetur; R. de pact. 1, si pacto quo pœnam; nam ibi non ago ad id quod est debitum, sed ad id quod ex nudo pacto convenit:" that Mr B. may know what to do with his schemes of actions, produced on the account of my assertions.

This for the word and my use of it. I hope, in the things of God, about words I shall not much contend. I had rather, indeed, insist on the propriety of words in the originals, their use in the law and amongst men, so all be regulated by the

analogy of faith, than square the things of God to the terms and rules of art and philosophy; to which, without doubt, they will not answer. Let any man living express any doctrine of the gospel whatever in the exactest manner, with artificial, philosophical terms, and I will undertake to show that in many things the truth is wrested and fettered thereby, and will not bear an exact correspondence with them; yet hence are many of our learned strifes, which as they have little of learning in them, so for my part I value them not at a nut-shell, properly so called. This being premised, his answers to my arguments may very briefly be considered.

My first argument is, It is justum that they should have the fruits of the death of Christ bestowed on them, therefore they have jus unto them; for "jus est quod justum est."

1. Mr B. denies the consequence, and says though it be justum, yet they may not be subjects of this jus. To this I have answered by showing what is jus in general, and what is their jus, and where fixed.

2. He questions the antecedent; for the confirmation whereof, and its vindication from his exceptions, I refer the reader to what I had written of the covenant between the Father and the Son some good while before I saw Mr B.'s animadversions, or [knew] that they were public.

My second is, That which is procured for any one, thereunto he hath a right; the thing that is obtained is granted by him of whom it is obtained, and that to them for whom it is obtained. To this it is answered,—

1. In the margin, "That I should make great changes in England if I could make all the lawyers believe this strange doctrine." But of what the lawyers believe or do not believe Mr B. is no competent judge, be it spoken without disparagement, for the law is not his study. I, who, perhaps, have much less skill than himself, will be bound at any time to give him twenty cases out of the civil and canon law to make good this assertion; which if he knows not that it may be done, he ought not to speak with such confidence of these things. Nay, amongst our own lawyers (whom perhaps he intends), I am sure he may be informed that if a man intercede with another to settle his land by conveyance to a third person, giving him that conveyance to keep in trust until the time come that he should by the intention of the conveyer enjoy the land, though he for whom it is granted have not the least knowledge of it, yet he hath such a right unto the land thereby created as cannot be disannulled. But,

2. He says, "That the fruits of the death of Christ are procured for us finaliter, not subjective."

Ans. They are procured for us objectivè, are granted "ex adæquatione rerum," and may make us subjects of the right, though not of the things themselves which it regards; may, I say, though I do not say it doth. The following similitudes of horse and a king have no correspondency with this business at all. Of the right of horses there is nothing in the law; in the latter, there is nothing omitted in the comparison but merit and purchase, which is all.

my

Thirdly, All the fruits of the death of Christ are obtained and procured by his merit for them for whom he died.

Mr B.::

"1. Not all, not the same measure of sanctification for one as for another; not faith for all for whom he died as for his elect.

"2. He procured it for us as the finis cui, not subjects of the present right."

Ans. 1. The substance of the fruits of the death of Christ and the ultimate end belong to his purchase; the measure and degrees of them to the Father's sovereign disposal, ad ornatum universi,

2. It is most false that Christ did not purchase faith for all for whom he died.