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3. What our right is hath been before delivered; the finis cui and subject of a present right are not very accurately opposed.

4. The nature of merit infers an attendant right, Rom. iv. 4. Mr B.:

If this be your debt, you may say, “Lord, I have merited salvation in Christ, there. fore it is mine of debt. Christ hath of debt the right to pardon you; you have no debt," etc.

Ans. Very good, but I use no forms of prayer of other men's composing. Who said it was our debt? who says our right is actionable? The whole here intended is, that Christ meriting pardon of sins for the elect, it is just they should obtain it in the appointed season. Such another prayer as that here mentioned doth Mr B. afterward compose,

in a suitableness, as he supposes, to my principles ; but what may he not do or say!

Fourthly, He for whom a ransom is paid hath a right to his liberty by virtue of that payment.

Mr B.:

"All unproved, and by me unbelieved. If you pay a sum to the Turk for a thousand slaves, thereby buying them absolutely into your own power, I do not believe that they have any more right to freedom than they had before. If a prince pay a ransom for some traitors to the king his father, thereby purchasing to himself a dominion or a propriety over them, so that they are absolutely his, yet I think it gives them no more right than they had before."

Ans. 1. I suppose it is not yet determined that this business is to be regulated absolutely according to what Mr B. thinks or believes; for I must needs say that whether he believes it or no, I am still of the same mind that I was.

He for whom a ransom is paid hath a right to a deliverance, as to him to whom the ransom was paid. If Mr B. believe not this, let him consult the civil lawyers, with whom he is so conversant, tit. de pact.

2. I say that the law of redemption requires that the redeemed be at the disposal of the redeemer, where he hath no plea jure postiliminii ; and it is most certain that Christ hath a dominion over his elect (for a "propriety over them” I understand not); yet that dominion is the proximate end of the death of Christ, under the notion of a ransom, price, or purchase (which yet are of various considerations also), is the apãror frūdos of this discourse.

Having given this specimen of Mr B.'s answers to my instances, as an addition to the former explication given of my judgment in this business, I shall not farther trouble the reader with the consideration of what of that same kind ensues.

To tell the whole truth, I expressed the effects of the death of Christ in the manner above mentioned, to obviate that stating of his satisfaction and the use of it which I had observed to be insisted on by the Remonstrants in their Apology, and in other writings of theirs, but especially by Episcopius. For some time I met not with any great opposition made to the expressions of their imaginations in this business, but only what was briefly remarked by the Leyden professors in their “ Specimina." Of late I find Voetius reckoning it among the principal controversies that we have with the enemies of the cross of Christ. I shall set down his words about it, and leave them to the consideration of them who may

think themselves concerned in them.

His words in his disputation “ de Merito Christi," anno 1650, are:

“ Secunda controversia capitalis quæ Christianismo cum quibusdam heterodoxis (Remonstrantibus scilicet in Belgio, viris, si non Socinianæ, saltem dubiæ theologiæ) intercedit, est de merito Christi pro nobis, hoc est, vice et loco nostro, et sic in bonum nostrum actualiter præstito, seu de satisfactione plena ac proprie dictà a Christo sponsore, loco nostro justitiæ divinæ præstita: illi satisfactionem et meritum sic accipiunt quasi nihil aliud sit, quam partis offensæ talis placatio qua offenso hactenus satisfit, ut


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in gratiam redire velit cum eo qui offendit, et per quam Christus Deo Patri jus et voluntatem acquisiverit novum fædus ineundi cum hominibus."

So he. The expression of our dying with Christ is fallen upon again, p. 226; of which he desires leave to speak as confidently as myself. Truly, I thought he had not been to ask leave for that now. But why may he not use it without leave as well as others ? Some perhaps will say, “ Mira edepol sunt, ni hic in ventrem sumpsit confidentiam," to consider what he hath written already. But with this leave he falls a conjecturing at what I mean by that expression, to no purpose at all, as may be seen by what I have delivered concerning it. The like I may say, by the way, to the passage mentioned of the right which ariseth from the decree of God. It seems to me that what God hath decreed to do for any, that is or may be a real privilege to him, it is jus, ex justitia condecentiæ, that in the appointed season he should receive it. If Mr B. be otherwise minded I cannot help it; “habeo aliquid magis ex memet et majus,” than that I should attend to the disputes thereabout; nor will I stand in his way if I can choose, for he seems to cry, “Ad terram dabo et dentilegos omnes mortales faciam quemque offendero," Plaut. cap. iv. 1, 29.

After this I find not myself particularly smitten, until he comes, at the close of the chapter, to talk of idem and tantidem, unless it be in his passage, p. 274. That which makes me suspect that I am there intended is his former imputation of some such thing unto me, namely, that I should say that the deputation of Christ in our stead is an act of pardon. But I suppose that I have so fully satisfied him as to that surmise, by showing that not only my sense, but my expressions were, not that the deputation of Christ was our pardon, but that the freedom of pardon did in part depend thereon, that I will not take myself in this place to be concerned, because I cannot do it and prevent the returnal of a charge of some negligence on this person, whose writings seem sufficiently to free him from all just suspicion thereof. In the close of this discourse (with the method of a new line) Mr B. falls upon the consideration of the payment made by Christ in our stead, or the penalty that he underwent for us, and pleads that it was not the idem that was due to us, but tantundem. Although some say this difference is not tantidem, as some speak, it seems yet he is resolved of the contrary, and that this one assertion is the bottom of all Antinomianism. Seeing I profess myself to be contrary minded, I suppose it will be expected that I should consider what is here to the purpose in hand insisted on by Mr B. What I intend by paying the idem, or rather undergoing the idem, that we should have done, I have so fully elsewhere expressed that I shall not stay the reader with the repetition of it. But, says Mr B., this subverts the substance of religion: idoù 'Pòdos, idoù andnuz. Now you shall have the proofs of it. Saith he,–

“ The idem is the perfect obedience or the full punishment of the man himself, and in case of personal disobedience, it is personal punishment that the law requires,--that is, supplicium ipsius delinquentis."

Ans. But the idem that we should pay or undergo is perfect obedience to the law, and proportionable punishment, by God's constitution, for disobedience. This Christ paid and underwent. That the man himself should undergo it is the law originally, but the undergoing or doing of it by another is the undergoing of the idem, I think. It is personal punishment that the law originally requires; but he that undergoes the punishment (though he be not personally disobedient) which the law judgeth to him that was personally disobedient, undergoes the idem that the law requires.

The idem is supplicium delinquenti debitum by whomsoever it be undergone, not supplicium ipsius delinquentis only. He proceeds:

u The law never threatened a surety, nor granted any liberty of substitution ; that was an act of God above the law: therefore Christ did not undergo the idem."


I deny the consequence; nor is the least shadow of proof made of it. The question is not whether Christ be the sinner, but whether he underwent that which was due to the sinner. He adds:

“ If, therefore, the thing due was paid, it was we ourselves morally or legally that suffered."

I know not well what is meant by “morally;" but, however, I deny the consequence. The thing itself was paid by another for us, and the punishment itself was undergone by another in our stead.

That which follows falls with that which went before, being built thereon:“It could not be ourselves legally,” saith he, “because it was not ourselves naturally."

Though for the security of the hypothesis opposed there is no need of it, yet I deny this proposition also, if taken universally. A man may be accounted to do a thing legally by a sponsor, though he do it not in his own person. But he says,

“ If it had been ourselves legally, the strictest justice could not have denied us a present deliverance, ipso facto,' seeing no justice can demand any more than the idem quod debitur'(as Mr B.'s printer speaks.)

But,-1. It is supposed that all legal performance of any thing by any one must be done in his own person.

2. It supposes that there is such an end as deliverance assigned, or assignable, to the offender's own undergoing of the penalty, which is false.

3. The reasons and righteousness of our actual deliverance, at the time and in the manner prescribed by God (and, as to the latter, revealed in the gospel), upon Christ's performance of personal obedience and undergoing the penalty due to us in our stead, which are founded in the economy of the Trinity, voluntarily engaged into for the accomplishing the salvation of the elect, I have elsewhere touched on, and may, if I find it necessary, hereafter handle at large.

That which is feared in this business is, that if the idem be paid, then, according to the law, the obligation is dissolved and present deliverance follows. But if by “the law” be meant the civil law, whence these terms are borrowed, it is most certain that any thing, instead of that which is in the obligation, doth, according to the rules of the law, dissolve the obligation, and that whether it be paid by the principal debtor or delinquent, or any for him. The beginning of that section, “ Quibus modis tollitur obligatio,” lib. iii. Instit., will evince this sufficiently. The title of the section is,

“Si solvitur id quod debetur, vel aliud loco illius, consentiente creditore, omnis tollitur obligatio, tum rei principalis, quam fide-jussoris.”

The words of the law itself are more full:

“ Tollitur autem omnis obligatio solutione ejus quod debetur; vel siquis consenti. ente creditore ALIUD pro alio solverit ; nec interest quis solverit, utrum IPse qui debet, an Alius pro eo: liberatur enim et alio solvente, sive sciente, sive ignorante debitore, vel invito, ea solutio fiat. Si fidejussor solverit, non enim ipse solus liberatur, sed reus."

So that there is no difference in the law whether “solutio” be “ ejusdem" or “tantidem;" and this is the case in the things that are ex maleficio, aut quasi," as may be seen at large in the commentators on that place.

To caution all men against the poison of Antinomian doctrines, now so strenuously opposed by Mr B., and to deliver students from the unhappy model of theology which the men of the preceding contests have entangled themselves and others withal, Mr B. seriously advises them to keep in their minds and “ carefully to distinguish between the will of God's purpose and his precepts or law,” his determining and commanding will, in the first place; the ignorance whereof, it seems, confounded the theology of Dr Twisse, Pemble, and others.

Nextly, that “they would carefully distinguish between the covenant between the Father and the Son about the work of his mediation, and the covenant of grace and mercy confirmed to the elect in his blood.”


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Now, if these two distinctions, as carefully heeded and as warily observed as we are able, will prove such an antidote against the infection, for my part in all probability I shall be secure, having owned them ever since I learned my catechism.

Και ταύτα μεν δή ταύτα. And so am I dismissed. This may perhaps be the close of this controversy; if otherwise, I am indifferent. On the one side it will SO. I delight not in these troubled waters. If I must engage again in the like kind, I shall pray that He from whom are all my supplies would give me a real humble frame of heart, that I may have no need, with many pretences and a multitude of good words, to make a cloak for a spirit breaking frequently through all with sad discoveries of pride and passion, and to keep me from all magisterial insolence, pharisaical, supercilious self-conceitedness, contempt of others, and every thing that is contrary to the rule whereby I ought to walk.

If men be in haste to oppose what I have delivered about this business, let them (if they please, I have no authority to prescribe them their way) speak directly to the purpose, and oppose that which is affirmed, and answer my reasons in reference to that end only for which by me they are produced and insisted on.

Because I see some men have a desire to be dealing with me, and yet know not well what to fix upon, that I may deliver them from the vanity of contending with their own surmises, and, if it be possible, prevail with them to speak closely, clearly, and distinctly, to the matter of their contests, and not mix heterogeneous things in the same discourse, I will briefly shrive myself, for their satisfaction.

First, then, I do not believe that any man is actually justified from eternitys because of that of the apostle, Rom. viii. 28–30. But yet what is the state of things in reference to the economy of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, engaged in from eternity for the salvation of sinners, with that fountain union that is between Christ and his body in their predestination, I shall desire a little more time to deliver myself unto.

Secondly, I do believe that there was a covenant, compact, or agreement, between Father and Son for the salvation of the elect by his mediation; which, upon sin's entering into the world, had an efficacy and effect of the very same nature with that which it hath when he hath actually accomplished what was on his part required for the end proposed to him, and that therefore in the Old Testament his death is spoken of sometimes as past, Isa. liii. 4-6; and that to make this covenant in its constitution to be contemporary to its revelation, or the promises of it to be then made to Christ when the church is acquainted that those promises are made, is a wide mistake.

But under what consideration the elect lie unto God upon the transaction of this original covenant with the Mediator, I desire liberty for a while, as above.

Thirdly, I do not believe that the elect that live after the death of Christ are all actually in their own persons justified and absolved at his death, because the wrath of God abides on men that believe not, John iii. 36; but yet what to the advantage of the church is inwrapped in the discharge of their great Representative, who died in their stead (for that I believe also, and not only “ for their good”), I desire respite for my thoughts, as formerly.

Fourthly, I do believe that Christ underwent the very same punishment for us, for the nature and kind of it, which we were obnoxious unto, and should have undergone had not he undertaken for us, and paid the idem that we should have done, 2 Cor. v. 21, Gal. ïï. 13.

Fifthly, I believe that upon the death of Christ, considering what hath been said before concerning the compact or agreement between God and the Mediator about that matter, it became just and righteous, with reference to God's justice, as supreme governor and moderator of the creatures and all their concernments, that those for whom he died should all be made partakers of all the good things


which Christ by his death procured for them, in the season appointed by the sovereign will of God; but that this right, though indissoluble, is so actually vested in them as to be actionable in the gospel without faith, I believe not.

Sixthly, I believe that all spiritual blessings, mercies, privileges whatever, are fruits of the death of Christ, and that, notwithstanding the order wherein they stand one to another, they all depend immediately on its causality, though “respectu termini” they have not a natural immediation.

Seventhly, I profess that we are absolved, pardoned, and justified, for Christ's sake, and therefore that Christ is reckoned to us, or made righteousness to us, in order of nature antecedently to all those things which for his sake we do receive, and are made partakers of with and by him, etc.

For a close of all, I must profess that I will not contend with any man who discovers in himself such a resolution Siow drapunétro, that if he be pressed, rather than let it go, he will go backward, and attempt áximnta umir, and to question common received principles, knowing the multitude of errors and abominations that the church of God hath been pestered withal by men of this principle and practice. Hence are the beginnings of men modest, but their endings desperate; hence is Arminianism ended in Episcopianism, and Arianism in Socinianism, and in many, Socinianism in Mohammedanism and atheism. If I find this resolution and spirit in any man, he shall rather enjoy his own present conceits than by me be precipitated into worse abominations. Nor shall I (the Lord assisting) be un

mindful of that of the apostle, 1 Τim. vi. 3-5, E7 τις ετεροδιδασκαλεί, και μη προσέρχιται υγιαίνουσι λόγοις τοϊς του κυρίου ημών Ιησού Χριστού, και τη κατ' ουσίβειαν διδασκαλία, τιτύφωται, μηδέν επιστάμενος, αλλά νοσών περί ζητήσεις και λογομαχίας, εξ ών γίνεται φθόνος, ίρις, βλασφημίαι, υπόνοιαι πονηραι, παραδιατριβεί, etc. ; as also that of the same apostle, Tit. iii. 9, Μωράς δε ζητήσεις, και γενεαλογίας, και έρεις, και μάχας νομιχάς περιίστασο: εισι gàp dowpeacīs xæà pétamo. If I must contend with any, as I am resolved for the matter #poriuãy árábbar, so for the manner of handling it, it shall not be my endeavour to cloud and darken things easy, trite, common in themselves, with new, dark, artificial expressions, but rather to give plainness and perspicuity to things hard and difficult, confirming them with the authority of Scripture, opened by the import of the words insisted on and design of the Holy Ghost in their contexture. Nor will I contend with any whose motto is that of him in Plautus, “Dicat quod quisque vult, ego de hac sententia non dimovebor," or that hath thoughts of his own notions like those of him in Nævius, who cried out, “ Primum quod dicebo recte, secundum quod dicebo eo melius.” And as my aim is to know Christ and him crucified; to exalt him, and ascribe to him the pre-eminence in all things; to discover the whole of our salvation, and glory of God thereby, centred in his person and mediation, with its emanation from thence, through the efficacy of the eternal Spirit; and all our obedience to receive life, power, and vigour from thence only, knowing that it is the obedience of faith, and hath its foundation in blood and water: 80 I equally abhor all doctrines that would take self out of the dust, make something of that which is worse than nothing, and spin out matter for a web of


and consolation from our own bowels, by resolving our acceptation with God into any thing in ourselves; and those that by any means would in. tercept the efficacy of the death and cross of Christ from its work of perpetual and constant mortification in the hearts of believers, or cut off any obligation unto obedience or holiness that by the discovery of the will of God, either in the law or gospel, is put upon the redeemed ones of the Lord.

Τάς δε μωράς και απαιδεύσους ζητήσεις παραιτού, ειδώς ότι γεννώσι μάχες, 2 Τim. ii. 23,

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