A DISCOURSE upon Rom. xii.3.

Not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think foberly, according as God bath dealt to every man the meaSure of faith.

1. divided from one another, as in opinions;

Here is nothing wherein men are fo much

and nothing wherein they more unanimoufly confpire, than in thinking well of themfelves. This is a humour of fo catholick a stamp, and univerfal empire, that it may feem to challenge a place among thofe elements of our conftitution, thofe effentials of our nature which run throughout the whole kind, and are participated by every individual. For fhould a man take the wings of the morning, and travel with the fun round the terreftrial globe, he would hardly find a man either of a judgment fo difficult to be pleas'd, or of accomplishment fo little to recommend him, that was not notwithstanding fufficiently in love with himfelf, however he might diflike every thing else about him; and without queftion, that arrogant and peevish Mathematician who charged the grand Architect with want of skill in the mechanism of the world, thought he had play'd the artift well enough in himself; and as to the harmony of his own frame, acquitted the Geometry of his Maker.

2. And as men are thus naturally apt to think well of themselves in general, fo there is nothin

whe

Differt, de Method. p. I.

wherein they indulge this humour more, than in the opinion they have of the goods of the mind; andamong thefe, there is none which has fo great a fhare of their partiality, as their intellectual faculty. The defire of knowledge is not more natural, than the conceit that we are already furnish'd 'with a confiderable meafure of it; and tho' a particular fect were characteriz'd by that appellation, yet all mankind are in reality Gnofticks. For (as 'tis ingeniously obferv'd by the excellent Cartefius) nothing is more equally diftributed among men than the intellectual talent, wherewith every one fancies himself fo abundantly ftock'd, that even thofe who have the most unfatiable defires, and whom providence could not fatisfie in any one thing elfe, are notwithstanding, as to this difpenfation of Heaven, well enough content, complain not of the dull planet that influenc'd their nativity, or wifh their minds more richly endow'd than they are. And altho' there are a generation of men who ufe to be very eloquent in fetting out the degeneracy of human nature in general, and particularly in decyphering the fhortnefs of our intellectual fight, and the defects of our now diminifh'd understanding, yet fhould a man take them at their word, and apply that verdict to themselves in particular, which they fo freely beftow upon the whole fpecies, I dare not undertake that he shall not provoke their refentment: And perhaps notwithstanding the liberal, tho' otherwise just complaints of the corruption of human nature, could all mankind lay a true claim to that estimate which fome pafs upon themfelves, there would be little or no difference betwixt laps'd and perfect hu manity; and God might again review his image with paternal complacency, and ftill pronounce itgood.

3. Nor is it at all to bewonder'd, that felf-conceitedness fhould be of fuch an unlimited and tranfcendental nature, as to run through all forts and claffes of men, fince the cause of it, felf-love, has

fuch

fuch an univerfal jurifdiction in our hearts Tis most natural and neceffary for every man (and indeed for every intelligent being) to be a lover of himself; and to cover what foever any way te ds to the perfection of his nature. And as 'tis neceffary for every man to be thus affected towards hinfelf, fo is this the only difpofition of mind wherein man acts with conftancy and uniformity. Our other paffions have fometimes their total intermiffions, and at beft their increases and decreafes; but this is always at full, and ftands drawn out to the utmoft ftretch of its capacity. No man loves himself more at one time than at another, and that because he always loves himself in the highest degree that is poffible. More than all good he cannot wish to himself, and lefs than all he will not; nay, I had almoft pronounc'd it impoffible for Omnipotence it felf, which ftays the proud waves of the ocean, and blocks up its violent efforts with bars and doors, to fay unto this paffion, Hitherto fhalt thou come but no farther, Job xxxviii. 10. or to fet any other bounds to it befides thofe of all poffible good.

4. Now man being fuch an infinite lover of himfelf, is easily brought to believe that he is really mafter of many of thofe excellencies and perfections which he fo paffionately wifhes among the inventory of his poffeffions. For there is this notorious difference betwixt felf-love and the love of others, that whereas the love of others fuppofes an opinion of their excellency, the love of our felves begets it. We love others becaufe we think well: of them, but (fo prepofterous is the method of felf-love) we think well of our felves because we first love our felves. So that now upon the whole, confidering how neceffarily and vehemently every man is carried on to the love of himself, and what a natural product felf-conceit is of felf-love, 'tis much to be fear'd, that as we cannot fet any bounds to the love of our felves, fo we fhall hardly fet due ones to our opinions of our felves, and confequently, the most mortify'd and refign'd man

of

of us all, has no reafon to think himself unconcern'd in this admonition of the Apostle,

Not

to think of himself more highly than he ought to think; but to think faberly, according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith.

5. 'Tis fuppofed that the Apostle in these words, had refpect to the then prevailing herefie of the Gnofiks, a fort of men that pretended to great heights of divine knowledge; and upon that prefumption grew fo haughty and infolent, as to def pife dominions and speak evil of dignities; and withal fo carelefs and fecure, as to defile the flesh, and indulge themselves in all manner of fenfuality; as you may fee their character in the Epifle of St. Jude. Nay, of fuch turbulent ungovernable principles, and profligate manners were these men, that fome of the learned (and particularly an eminent Divine of our own church) Dr. Hammond. have adventured to write upon their foreheads Myftery, and to place them in the chair of Antichrift. As an antidote therefore against this poifon, the Apoftle (2 Cor. xii. 7.) who through the abundance of revelation had himself been in danger of being exalted above meafure, and experimentally knew how prone human nature is to fwell and plume upon a conceit of its own excellencies, thought it expedient to advise his charge at Rome (the place which Simon Magus, the author of that fect had made choice of to be the fcene of his magical operations) to moderate and fober thoughts of themselves; and being to teach them a lesson of humility, he modeftly ushers it in with a preface of his commiffion and authority, For I fay (fays he) through the grace given unto me, to every man that is among you, not to think of himself mare highly, &c.

6. The difcourfe which I defign upon these words fhall be comprised withia thefe limits.

Firft, I obferve, that we are not at our own liberty, to entertain what opinions we pleafe concerning our felves; but that we ought to regulate them by fome fandard. Which I collect from

the

the former part of the text.

Not to think of himfelf more highly than he ought to think, but to think. Soberly.

7. Secondly, I obferve, that the ftandard whereby we are to regulate our opinions concerning our felves, are thofe excellencies and perfections which we are really endow'd with; which I collect from the latter part of the text, According as God has dealt to every man the measure of faith.

8. And in the third place, I fhall confider the abfurdities and ill confequences of tranfgreffing this ftandard; whereby it fhall appear how highly reasonable this admonition of the Apoftle is; and fo conclude with a practical application of the whole in relation to our felves, and the prefentoccafion.

9. I begin with the first propofition, that we are. not at our own liberty to entertain what opinions we please concerning our felves; but that we ought to regulate them by fome ftandard.

10. The acts of the understanding may be thought as free from all law, as the acts of the will are from all neceffity. And accordingly, men may fancy they have a toleration to abound in their own fenfe, and (provided their actions be conformable to the rule) to think what they pleafe. Now fince a man cannot be accountable for an opinion. of himself in particular, unlefs it be firtt granted that he is under a law, as to the acts of his underftanding in general, before I can proceed any farther, I find it neceffary to lay down this preparatory pofition, that we are under an obligation as to the acts of our understanding, or (which is all. one) that we are accountable for them. Nay, perhaps I may venture higher, and affirm, that the. understanding is not only under obligation, but. that 'tis the primary and immediate fubject of it. For that must be the primary and immediate fubject of all obligation which is fo of liberty. Now, that this cannot be the will, I fuppofe will be acknowledg'd a clear confequence, if the will neceffarily follows the practical dictate of the under

ftanding.