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A Letter concerning Love and Mufick.

I.

SIR,

"T

O the firft of your enquiries concerning the true idea of love, and particularly that between man and woman, and wherein it ftands diftinguish'd from luft, my answer in fhort is this, that love may be confider'd either barely as a tendency toward good, or as a willing this good to fomething capable of it. If love be taken in the firft fenfe, 'tis what we call defire; if in the fecond, 'tis what we call charity, or benevolence.

2. Then as to defire, there is either an intellectual or a fenfual defire, which denomination is not here taken from the faculty, (fince in that refpect all defire is intellectual), but from the quality of the object. That I call here an intellectual defire, whofe object is an intellectual good; and that a fenfual defire, whofe object is a fenfual good. And this is that which Plato either meant, or should have meant, by his two loves, or Cupids, the celeftial and the vulgar. The latter of these is what we call luft.

3. But then this again fignifies either abstractly and indifferently, viz. a bare defire of corporal pleasure, or elfe concretely and immorally, viz. a defire or longing after corporeal pleasure in forbidden and unlawful inftances,

4. These things being thus briefly premifed, my next refolution is this: That the ordinary paffion of love, that which we mean when we fay, fuch a man, or fuch a woman is in love, is no other than plain luft, if luft be taken according to the fift fignification; namely, for a fenfual defire, or a tendency toward a fenfual good. But if luft be

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taken in the latter fenfe, as a defire of corporeal pleasure in unlawful inftances, that which our Saviour meant when he faid, He that looks upon a woman to luft after her, &c. Then 'tis not neceffary that the paffion we here fpeak of fhould be luft; because then 'twould be a fin to be in love, and consequently, there would be a neceffity of finning in order to marriage; because no man is supposed to marry, but whom he thus loves.

5. And now to your fecond enquiry, whether mufick be a fenfual or intellectual pleafure: Before this can be determin'd, the idea of a sensual and intelle&tual pleasure must be stated.

6. For the better conceiving of which it is here to be confider'd, that fince matter is not capable of thought, it must be the foul only that is the proper fubject both of pleasure and pain. And accordingly it will be neceffary to fay that the true difference between intellectual and fenfual pleasure does confift not in this, that intellectual pleasure is that which is perceiv'd by the foul, and fenfual that which is perceiv'd by the body; for the body perceives not at all. Nor yet (as I once reprefented it in this very account) in this, that fenfual pleasure is when the body is primarily affected, and the foul fecondarily, or by participation; and that intellectual pleafure is when the foul is primarily affected, and the body fecondarily, or by participation; (the foul being the only true percipient in both) but rather in this, that fenfual pleasure is that which the foul perceives by the mediation of the body, upon the occafion of fome motion or impreffion made upon it; whereàs intellectual pleasure is that which the foul perceives iminediately by it felf, and from her own thoughts, without any fuch occafion from the body.

7. Now according to this measure it feems most reafonable to define the pleasure of mufick to be properly intellectual. For tho' found fingly and abfolutely confider'd (which is the material part of mufick) be a fenfation, that is, a fentiment in the foul refulting from some movement of the body,

and

and fo the pleasure that arifes from the hearing it be accordingly a fenfual pleafure, as truly, tho' not fo grofly, as fmelling or tafting is; yet the harmony and proportion of founds (which is that wherein mufick formally confifts) is an abstract and intelligible thing, and the pleasure of it arises not from any bodily movement, (as the other does) but from the foul it felf contemplating the beauty and agreement of it. To which beauty and agreement, that it is in founds is purely accidental, fince the foul would be pleased with the fame proportion wherever it finds it. Nor is it proper to Tay that we hear mufick; that which we hear is only the found, which is a fenfation in our felves; but the mufick part we properly think and contemplate as an intelligible beauty, in like manner as we do the beauty of truth. And confequently, the pleasure of it must be as much intellectual as that of the other is. To all which it may be added in the last place, that mufick confifting formally in proportion, and proportion pleafing only as understood; the pleasure of it muft needs be intellectual, as refulting from thought and underftanding, as all other intellectual pleasures do.

8. And thus, Sir, you have my fentiments, with as much brevity and clearness as I could ufe, and it may be, as the matters would bear. I have now nothing farther to add, but to renew the affurances of my being

Your Friend and Servant,

菜菜菜菠菜菜蔬菜弟

A Letter concerning Friendship.

SIR

Ŏ your question, whether in propriety of fpeaking, there may be a ftrict friendship between a man and his wife? I answer firft, that the folution of this question depends upon another, viz. What are the requifites effentially neceffary to the exercife of friendship? And this queftion likewife depends upon another, viz. What is the true notion or idea of friendship? This being rightly ftated, 'twill be eafy to difcein what are the effential requifites; and confequently, whether man and wife are capable terms in this relation or no?

2. Now as to the idea of friendship, I anfwer firft in general, that friendship is nothing elfe but benevolence or charity, under fome certain modifications, or accidental circumftances. Accidental I mean as to charity, though neceffary and effential to friendship. But now what thefe certain modifications are, is next to be confider'd. 'Twould be too tedious a work to infift here upon other mens opinions; and therefore I fhall only briefly deliver my own, which is, that all the modifications of charity neceffary to the conftitution of friendship, may be well enough reduced to thefe three: 1. That it be in a special manner intenfe. 2. That it be mutual; and 3. That it be manifest, or mutually known. Charity, when cloathed with thefe three modifications, immediately commences friendship. More than thefe it need not have, but of these not one may be fpared, as will easily appear, if you examine them feverally.

3. Now from this idea of friendship 'tis very obvious to deduce what are the requifités neceffary to friendship, not in reference to its idea (for that's

already

already ftated) but in reference to its exiftence and actual exercise; that is, in one word, what are thofe difpofitions or aptneffes in the subject, whether as to perfon, ftate, or condition, which may render it capable of friendship, according to the foremention'd idea. Now, I fay, what these are may be cafily collected from the idea it felf, as will appear, if we confider it diftin&tly, according to those three modifications. For Firft, whereas friendship is faid to be charity in a special manner intense; hence I collect first, that it cannot be but between good men, because an ill man cannot have any true charity, much lefs fuch an intenfe degree of it, as is requifite to friendship. So that viitue in general is one requifite. Secondly, Hence I collect, that a friend must not be only according to the character Lucan gives of Cato-rigidi fervator honefti, rigidly virtuous and honeft; but he must be alfo xensos dvng, a man of a liberal, fweet, obliging temper; one of those good men of whom 'tis faid in Scripture, (by way of contradiftinction to the righteous, or rigidly honeft) that fome would even dare to dye for them. For tho' I may have common charity; nay more, a great esteem for a man of plain honefty and integrity, yet I can never love him with that special intenfenefs of affection which belongs to friendship, unless he be alfo of a beneficent, kind and obfequious temper. So that good nature is another requifite. Thirdly, hence I collect, that there must be alfo (at leaft in a competent proportion) an agreeableness of humours and manners; for unless the materials be of an apt and correfpondent figure, the building can neither be compact nor lafting; so that likenefs of difpofition is another requifite. 4. Hence I collect, that true friendfhip cannot be among many. For fince our faculties are of a finite energy, 'tis impoffible our love can be very intense when divided among many. No: the rays muft be contracted to make them burn. So that another requifite is, that the terms of this relation be few in number.

4. Thefe