tional freedom, but to all the rules and principles of morality itself. On the contrary, from them alone can I trace a principle of coercion and coaction over the multitude. But before I

enter minutely upon each feparate branch of the legislature, it will be requifite to form a juft and precife idea of the nature and ge neral effects of this commiffion, or gift of power to them all jointly: we have, I hope, proved, that it was done by the confent and approbation of the community; and I have not as yet met with any writer, who has attempted to prove, that the hereditary peers of this realm, or a given number of elected commoners poffefs any particle of legislative authority, independently of the community. Many indeed have, by deducing the royal power and prerogative immediately from Almighty God, attempted to place the king above and wholly independent of the community. The proper place for examining this doctrine will be, in confidering the rights, powers, and prerogatives of the king: I fhall, however, for the prefent prefume, what I hope hereafter to prove, that as the law makes and qualifies the king, and the nation or community makes the laws, fo the king cannot be wholly above nor independent of the laws or the community.

When

The foregoing

principles produce coercion over the people.

of power gives

as duties;

When I fay, that all the political power, which is poffeffed by the king, lords, and commons in this nation, is the free gift of the people, in the fame breath I admit, that by this gift the conftitution and government of this country are brought to the highest poffible degree of perfection, of which any human inftitution of this nature is capable. Superficially, indeed, muft they view this inveftiture of power, who fancy, because the power is a trust, that magiftrates therefore have The delegation duties, but no rights. The perfection of a gift Fights, as well depends not only upon the excellency of the boon, but also upon the efficacy of the means, by which the receiver is enabled to defend, preferve, and improve the enjoyment of it, I have before faid, that the community can only act for its welfare and prefervation; and it is truly admirable to contemplate the wif dom and fagacity, with which, by our conftitution, each branch of the legislature is enabled to defend and preferve the rights and powers, which have been refpectively delegated to them. The object of this delegation of power was, to render the diffolution of the government as difficult as poffible; and the perfection of its execution is that ftupendous equipoife of power, that renders it almoft morally impoffible, that one branch of

and prevents the diffolution of government.

the

«To

the legiflature fhould out-balance another,
Thus do we obferve, from experience, that
whatever be their derangement in a tem-
porary convulfion of the ftate, they are fure
to return, with peace and order, to their an-
cient level. And as in nature, the ferene fun-
fhine, which immediately fucceeds a storm,
adds peculiar luftre to the objects, which it
irradiates, fo moft difturbances in our state.
have terminated in adding light and vigor to
our conftitutional rights and liberties. This
is the halcyon view of our political confti-
tution, which Dr. Kippis reprefents imme-
diately after the revolution of 1688:
be favoured with a form of government, of
which liberty is the bafis, is the greatest of
all temporal bleffings; and the nations, on
which fo noble a gift has been bestowed, ap-
pear with peculiar glory in the hiftory of the
world. It has been the happiness of Britain
to poffefs this benefit in a high degree of
perfection. The fyftem of our government
is not fingly a democracy, an ariftocracy, or
a monarchy; but an excellent compofition
of the three. It adopts the advantages of
these several schemes, and rejects their incon-
veniencies; it affumes the equality of a de-

Dr. Kippis's Sermon preached at the Old Jury en the 4th of Nov. 1788, p. 24, 25.

mocracy,

Pleafing view tion, by Dr.

of our conftita

Kippis.

The right of

the legiflature to alter the go

verninent.

mocracy, without its confufion; the wisdom and moderation of an ariftocracy, in fome respects, without its feverity in thers; and the vigour of a monarchy without its tyranny; and it admirably provides for the diftinct exercise of the judicial authority. Hence, it prefents a plan of power, which produces more true freedom, than perhaps has yet been enjoyed by any community, in any period."

The rights, which attended this donation or inveftiture of power, I fhall endeavour more particularly to illuftrate, when I feparately confider each branch of the legiflature. I fhall firft however, beg leave to premise fome leading obfervations, concerning the revolution and its principles and effects. As a member of the contented majority of this community or nation, I must from henceforth view and confider the fupreme legislative power completely vested in our parliament, and in them am I to seek the unalienable rights of the people, whom they completely reprefent; for in them the fovereignty of power to alter, change, amend, and improve the conftitution and government of the community indefeafibly refides. Whatever mental objections I may conceive against the truth of this propofition, as a

member

member of the community I am bounden, under the penalties of high treafon (and the community have a right to bind me) to keep

my opinion to myself: for" if any perfon High treafon to fhall, by writing or printing, maintain and deny it. affirm, that the kings or queens of this realm, with and by the authority of parliament, are not able to make laws and ftatutes of fufficient validity to limit the crown, and the descent, inheritance, and government thereof, every such person fhall be guilty of high treafon." This act is as coercive upon me at this moment, as it was binding upon all my predeceffors, who were living at the time of its paffing into a law. The act neither gives nor declares any new rights, but emphatically imports fuch a reverential and awful conviction, that the fupreme or fovereign right and power of forming and changing our government, ever did and ever muft refide in the people, that makes it treasonable (not to think) but to express a thought to the contrary.

* 4th Ann, c. viii. and 6th Ann, c. vii.

CHAP.