regem, will enable us to form our mind very
fatisfactorily upon this great event. I shall
take for granted, what I prefume no one will
undertake to deny, viz. the right and pof-
fibility of a king's relinquifhing, abandoning,
or giving up that power, and those rights,
which had been given or deputed to him by
the community. Without, therefore, tak-
ing into confideration the reafons, motives, or
inducements, which brought over the prince of
Orange with an armed force into this coun-
try, we are to confider, and form our minds
upon the conduct and actions of king James
the Second, after that prince had once landed.
It will not fuffice to fay, that king James, at
that time, and under all circumftances, found
himself in a very embarraffed fituation; that
he had reafon to apprehend a general defec-
tion of his fubjects, and to fear for the per-
sonal safety of himself and his family; and that
confequently his flight, and abandonment of
the kingdom were to be looked upon, not as
the acts of a free agent, but as the compulsive
measures of the most dire neceffity; and
therefore that his flight out of the kingdom
never can be conftrued into an actual abdica-
tion or renunciation of his fovereignty. It A confiderable
is immaterial also to confider, what part of
his fubjects were ready and willing to adhere

to

Perfonal views

or motives of

king James not

to be confi-
dered.

part of
tion with him,

the na

The rights and daties of the

reciprocal.

to him and obey his commands. Hiftory tells us, that the whole navy of England were likely to remain ftaunch unto him; nor is there any reafon to imagine, that the army, which was commanded by lord Feversham, would have deferted from him; and it is more than probable, that had king James the Second, even at this time, fhewn the smallest degree of energy, fpirit, or rectitude in governing, he would have prevented the greateft part of the nation from joining with the prince of Orange.

No fort of comparison can be drawn beKing and people tween the rights and duties of a fovereign in his political capacity, and those of a subject in the natural capacity of an individual; for, as I have before obferved, the rights of the fovereign are, in fact, the duties of the fubject, and the duties of the fovereign are the rights and liberties of the fubject. Now no one can deny that the community have in themfelves an indefeasible right of preserving their own rights and liberties, and these in our community chiefly confift in the advantages of a limited and efficient monarchy; and if that be by any means done away or abolished, it neceffarily induces an actual diffolution of that government, by which the commu nity had agreed to be governed.

Anarchy

Anarchy is allowed by all writers to be the greatest political misfortune, which can befal a state, and the first principle of felfpreservation supplies every community with the right and the means of preventing and avoiding it. Attention to this laft principle will at one glance develop the neceffity, and justify the adoption of the revolution; for at that time the nation was in a state of the moft dreadful fermentation, and there could not be a ftronger neceffity for efficient energy in the executive power of government, in order to allay and counteract the ferment, which threatened the very fubverfion of the nation. In this critical pofture of affairs, every action of the fovereign will be perceived to draw with it the most important confequences; nor can we in paffing judgment upon them make any allowances for perfonal prejudice, or want of judgment, knowledge, refolution, or courage.

I fhall not resume the queftion, whether England or Scotland expreffed with more propriety the actual ceffation of king James's reign, when the former used the term abdication, and the latter forfeiture of the crown. The actual exercife of the executive powers of the fupreme magiftrate is abfolutely neceffary for the actual fubfiftence of the English diffolution of

The ceffation of

the excrcife of

the executive

power an actual

monarchy;

government.

The actions of

king James an

abfolute aban

donment of his fovereignty.

monarchy; if, therefore, king James the Second did, as far as he could, annihilate or even fufpend the operation of the fupreme executive powers, it must be allowed that he did all that he could to annihilate, for the time at least, the very existence of the English monarchy. We need therefore only to confider in what ftate this nation would have been, had it been left but for the space of one month in the fituation, in which king James endeavoured to leave it; and we shall from thence be able to form a fatisfactory judgment of the rights, which the nation fo abandoned had in them to fecure their own prefervation. He withdrew, in the person of the king, the whole executive power of government; he called in his writs, which were about to be iffued for convening a parliament; he difmiffed his judges; he threw the great feal of England into the river; he difbanded the army without pay; and let loofe a lawlefs armed force upon the nation. Now if a fupreme executive magiftrate, upon whom all fubordinate magiftrates depend, if the administration of juftice, if armed force on certain occafions be requifite for preferving our present conftitutional form of government, it is felf-evident, that a king who has by overt and unequivocal acts attempted to 8 deprive

deprive the community of thefe neceffary means of fupport and preservation, must be allowed to have done whatever he could to diffolve the government, and involve the nation in anarchy and confufion. In this light the warmest devotee to the house of Stuart cannot furely deny, that king James the Second by these acts ceafed, while their effects could laft, to be that fupreme executive power, which our conftitution requires the king to be. The actual duration of thefe effects could not by poffibility be known to the nation; and therefore as a community, upon the common principle of felf-prefervation, they had the indefeafible right of adopting fuch measures, as they thought moft conducive to attain that end. For if a government be actually diffolved for one hour, by the act of the governor, the primeval rights of the governed to chufe, fquare, and model their own government, revive in the fame extent, as they enjoyed them before the formation of the government fo diffolved. And upon these principles we must at this day candidly allow, that our ancestors, in 1688, did actually possess the right to make a new limitation of the crown, and to annex a new condition to the tenure of it.

If

Right of the nnmodel the go

tion to new

vernment

wholly at the

revolution.