fpeak of thofe rights, which are attributable to The exercife of man in the civilized ftate of fociety. Thus every rights imports the neceffity of difcuffion of the actual exercife of the Rights fociety. " of Man imports neceffarily the contempla tion of the focial civil man, and no other. And accordingly, Mr. Payne, having derided the futile and inept attempt to deduce the Rights of Man from any given period of antiquity, fays, "The fact is, that portions of antiquity, by proving every thing, establish nothing. It is authority against authority all the way, till we come to the divine origin of the Rights of Man at the creation. Here our enquiries find a refting place, and our reason finds a home. If a difpute about the Rights of Man had arofe at the distance of an hundred years from the creation, it is to this fource of authority they must have referred, and it is to the fame source of authority, that we must now refer." Having thus diftinctly marked the line of difference between the state of nature and the state of civil fociety, I fhall proceed to ftate fully and clearly what rights are attributable to, or inherent in man in this state of nature. When writers talk of the tranfition of man p. 87. Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France, + Payne's Rights of Man, p. 45. from from one of these states to the other, they do not mean to allude to any given time or occafion, in which mankind actually paffed from the one to the other; but they do it by way of methodizing their ideas upon the subject; as philofophers, in difcuffing the nature of man, or any other created being, first confider the existence, before they enter upon the peculiar properties or attributes of the existing being, upon this axiom, that prius eft effe, quam effe talis; although it be known to every one, that the physical existence and specific modification of every created being are in reality simultaneous. In the like manner do they mention, in this supposed tranfition, the retention of fome of their rights, and the furrender of others. «From this short review, it will be eafy to distinguish between that clafs of natural rights, which man retains after entering into fociety, and thofe, which he throws into common stock, as a member of society. Of the distinction of these two sorts of rights I fhall hereafter have occafion to take notice." In this theoretic state of pure nature, the moft perfect equality of mankind must neceffarily exist; because it represents man in a general abstract point of view, that effentially pre Payne's Rights of Man, p. 49. cludes Men viewed in the abstract as equal, are to be confidered ef fentially in the ftate of nature. cludes all thofe circumftances, which, in the civilized state of fociety, form the various grounds of distinction, fuperiority, and preeminence, amongst individuals. *The fundamental idea of man, in this ftate of nature, must have been that of equality with his fellow creatures; and, as a rational being, he must have been impreffed with a conscious idea of his fuperiority over all irrational objects; and, by inference, he must have inclined rather to a fimilar precedency over his fellow creatures, than to a fubmiffion to them; for the effects of weakness, apprehenfion, and fear, which fome philofophers have attributed to man in the ftate of nature, must have arifen from the internal fenfe of, and reflection upon mortality, and the principle of felf prefervation; not from an original or innate tendency to fubjection to any created object. The idea of fuperiority was prior in man to that of dependence. The latter could never have occurred to him, till he had found out his wants, till he had felt his Independence infufficiency to fupply them. Independence ftate of nature. then was effential to the state of nature; and hence is deduced the original right of option, effential to the * Letter to Sir George Savile upon the Allegiance of a British Subject, by the Author. Printed in 1778. to to whom each one fhall chufe to furrender his independence by a voluntary fubmiffion and fubjection. What natural rights are fup. pofed to be retained by man, after his tranfi tion from the state of nature to that of fo In this theoretical, or fuppofed tranfition of man from the state of nature to the ftate of fociety, fuch natural rights, as the individual actually retains independently of the fociety, of which he is a member, are said to be retained by him, as a part of those rights, which he is fuppofed to have poffeffed in the state of nature. Such are the free and uncontrouled power of directing all his animal motions; fuch the uninterrupted communication and intercourfe of the foul with its Creator; fuch the unreftrained freedom of his own thoughts: for fo long as an individual occafions no harm, and offers no offence to his neighbour, by the exercife of any of these rights, the fociety cannot controul nor check him in the free exercise of them. «The natural rights, which he retains, are all thofe, in which the power to execute is as perfect in the individual, as the right itself. Among this class, as is before mentioned, are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind; confequently, religion is one of those rights. The natural rights, which are not retained, are all those, • Payne's Rights of Man, p. 49. ciety. in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute it is defective: they answer not his purpose. A man, by natural right, has a right to judge in his own caufe; and fo far, as the right of the mind is concerned, he never furrenders it; but what availeth it him to judge, if he has not power to redrefs? He therefore depofits this right in the common ftock of fociety, and takes the arm of fociety, of which he is a part, in preference and addition to his own. Society grants him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in fociety, and draws on the capital as a matter of right." *"We have now, in a few words, traced man from a natural individual to a member of fociety; and fhewn, or endeavoured to fhew, the quality of the natural rights retained, and of those which are exchanged for civil rights." But in this tranfition, the fur rendered or exchanged rights were fo irrevocably transferred from the individual to the body at large, that it no longer remained at the liberty or option of individuals to reclaim, either in the whole, or in part, thofe rights, which had fo become unalienably vefted in the community. |