Falfe preten fions of modern

illuminators to

the knowledge

of our conftitu

tion and laws.

Amongst thofe, who may honour these sheets with a perufal, fome may be unwilling to fubmit to a bare expofition of these conftitutional prerogatives or rights of the crown; for their fatisfaction I fhall refort to the most ancient and refpectable authors of antiquity, who will be allowed at least to have known, what was looked upon and holden to be the law of their days; though the reafon, ground, and propriety of the law have only been revealed to the illuminating theorifts of the prefent generation. Between five and fix hundred years ago, at the very time when our ancestors, in their love and zeal for the liberties of the conftitution, bequeathed to us their rights in their famous charter under Henry III. Bracton, as he tells us of himself, for the information at least of pofterity, applied his mind with much attention and labour to fcrutinize, disclofe, and arrange in order the actions, opinions, and

Our ancestors judgments of his worthy ancestors. At no period can I trace any veftiges of that extreme darkness and ignorance, which Drs.

anxious to tranfmit the reafons and principles of our conftitution.

* Ad inftructionem faltem minorum, ego Henricus de Bracton, animum erexi, ad veterà judicia juftorum perfcrutanda diligenter, non fine vigiliis & labore, facta ipforum confilia & refponfa, & quidquid inde notatu dignum inveni, in uram fummam redigendo, &c. page 1.

Price and Priestley infinuate our ancestors have been conftantly kept in. Bracton, who was a judge under Henry III. proves, that this was not the fpirit of the government of his days; nor does the great charter of our liberties, which is the firft written formal act of parliament tranfmitted to us from our ancestors, bespeak any fuch spirit, wish, or intention, that then actuated the reprefentatives of the nation. A very conftitutional writer of the prefent century goes further, by denying almoft the poffibility of the charge. As the worst evils of fociety flow from fhort- fighted or perverted judgments, the conftitution (with a policy peculiar to itfelf) encourages every method of popular inftruction. Freedom of debate in parliament tends to clear and lay open the grounds of public proceedings; and the liberty of the prefs is as naturally fitted to the fupport of a good government, as to the ruin of a bad one. Measures, which carry with them a fallacious appearance of lenity, are expofed by this mean; and thofe, which carry with them the form of severity, but have the fubftance of strength and safety, are set in their juft light, for the approbation of the people."

• Yorke's Confiderations on the Law of Forfeiture, P. 4.

Our conftitu

tion formed to

instruct.

The king's fuperiority in the State.

I feel therefore the confoling force of conftitutional fanction, even in my humble efforts to disclofe and explain the true fenfe, fpirit, and principles of it to my country

men.

Under the evident attention to the difference between the mediate and immediate appointment of power by God, Bracton fays of the king in his political capacity; *« Every body is under him, and he is under nobody, unless it be under God. He has no equal in the realm, because he would then lofe his command, fince amongft equals there can be no one fuperior. But much more ought he not to have any one fuperior to, or more powerful than himself, for fo would he become inferior to his own fubjects, and thofe who are inferior cannot be equal to fuch, as are more powerful than themselves. The king therefore ought not to be fubject to

* Bract. c. 8. "Omnis quidem fub eo, et ipfe fub nullo, nifi tantum fub Deo. Parem autem non habet in regno fuo, quia fic amitteret præceptum, cûm par in parem non habeat imperium. Item nec multò fortius fuperiorem, nec potentiorem habere debet, quia fic effet inferior fibi fubjectis, & inferiores pares effe non poffunt potentioribus. Ipfe autem rex, non debet effe fub homine, fed fub Deo et fub lege, quia lex facit regem; attribuat igitur rex legi, quod lex attribuit ei, videlicet, dominationem & poteftatem; non eft enim rex, ubi dominatur voluntas & non lex."

any

any man, but only under God and the law, because the law makes the king. Let the king therefore give to the law, what the law gives to the king, that is, authority and power; for there can be no king, where ar bitrary will rules and not the law."

It is not poffible to lay down and account for the first principles of our constitution more diftin&tly, than this confiderate and unbiaffed author does; he first establishes the authority of Almighty God, who enjoins jure divino fubordination to magiftracy; then the actual appointment of the people by his permiffion; and lastly the efficient fovereignty of the king by virtue of the appointment of the people. He uses the collective word lex for the legislative body, which evidently is the reprefentative body of the nation; and he gives his reason, why the king is fub Deo and fub lege, because lex (that is the legislative body, or the people) facit regem. It is clear, that he here fpeaks of the fecondary cause, lex, otherwife he must have faid, ipfe fub nullo nifi tantùm fub Deo, quia Deus facit regem. And although in four different places he calls the king Dei vicarius, the vicar, or lieutenant, or vicegerent of Almighty God; yet he fo fully explains the meaning of this term or expreffion, that the most wilful obftinacy X 4 alone

How the king is God's vicar upon earth.

alone can mifconceive or mifreprefent it. "Therefore the king muft exercise his legal power, like the vicegerent or minister of God upon earth, for fuch power only is of God; the power of committing injury is the power of the devil, and not of God; and the king will become the minifter either of God or of the devil, according to whofefoever works he fhall have done. Therefore whilft he acts justly and by law, he is the vicegerent of the eternal king, but he is the minifter of Satan, whilft he declines to injury. For he is called a king (or ruler) from ruling according to law, and not from actually reigning; for he is really a king, whilft he acts according to law, but he becomes a tyrant from the moment he oppreffes the people committed to him by violent arbitrary power*." He continues to urge the neceffity of the king's governing by law upon the ftrength of the old reason of his owing his crown to the law,

* Bract. cap. 9. f. 107. "Exercere igitur debet rex poteftatem juris, ficut Dei vicarius & minifter in terra, quia illa poteftas folius Dei eft; poteftas autem injuriæ, diaboli eft non Dei ; & cujus horum operum fecerit rex, ejus minifter erit, cujus opera fecerit. Igitur dum facit juftitiam, vicarius eft regis æterni; minister autem diaboli, dum declinet ad injuriam. Dicitur enim rex a benè regendo, & non a regnando; quia rex eft, dum benè regit, tyrannus dum populum fibi creditum violentâ opprimit dominatione,"

or