had an intereft in or influence over the electors.

In procefs of time, this certainty of returning their own man came to be looked upon as a fpecies of property, and as that idea gained ground, fo did the legislature become tender of invading it, upon the true constitutional principle of holding and preserving all private property facred and inviolable. There could not in reality be a groffer violation of the freedom of election, than to prevent the electors from chufing those, whom benevolence, affection, and gratitude should fuggest or point out as the most agreeable perfons to represent them in parliament. Upon the prefumptive force of fuch motives are indivi

duals very frequently, though very improperly, faid to command the votes of a borough;, for no phyfical nor moral, much lefs any legal or conftitutional reftraint or obligation of voting for a particular person, can by poffibility exift; and our acts of parliament have gone almoft to the utmost extent of human jurifdiction, in order to obviate and prevent the effects of any undue influence, bribery, and corruption upon the electors.

It is truly wonderful to confider the delicate, and at the fame time effectual remedy, which our admirable conflitution applies to

Perfons improperly faid to

command the votes of a borough.

The conftitutional remedy

against the inadequacy of re

prefentation.

this real or apparent evil. As the nation grew more populous, more opulent, and confequently as individuals grew more intriguing and ambitious, the effects of popular elections became more hurtful to the fobriety, peace, and industry of the community; the multiplication of fuch elections was an evident extension of the evil already felt and complained of; now if it be confidered, that the number of reprefentatives in parliament has been more than doubled fince Sir John Fortescue rested our fecurity for none but good laws being enacted upon the number of the members of parliament, who confented to them on behalf of the community, and that the population of the kingdom is certainly not proportionably 'increafed fince that time, it will be reasonable to infer, that as, including peers, there are about eight hundred members of parliament quorum affenfu the statutes are now formed, there can be no deviation from the ancient conftitutional intention and

fpirit of parliaments, unless the increase of the numerical proportion of the reprefentatives to the reprefented fhall be thought a violation or abufe of the conftitution. In order therefore to do away every idea of unequal representation between two boroughs very unequal in population and opu

lence,

lence, from the moment of the return of their respective members one becomes as much as the other a reprefentative for the whole people or community of Great Britain. * "Every member, though chosen by one particular district, when elected and returned ferves for the whole realm; for the end of his coming thither is not particular, but general; not barely to advantage his constituents, but the commonwealth; to advise his majefty (as appears from the writ of fummons) de communi confilio fuper negotiis quibufdam arduis et urgentibus, regem, ftatum, et defenfionem regni Anglia et ecclefia Anglicana concernentibus; and therefore he is not bound, like a deputy in the United Provinces, to confult with or take the advice of his conftituents upon any particular point, unless he himself thinks it proper or prudent fo to do." Upon this principle therefore it must be allowed, that eight millions of individuals (supposing this to be the population of England) are more fully reprefented by eight hundred † than

Blak. Com. b. i. c. 2.

+ Some people doubt whether the actual population of the kingdom be at all increafed fince that time; it certainly is not increafed in the proportion of eight to three.

by

effects of bri

bery.

by three hundred representatives, or perfons confenting to the acts of the legislature.

It is certain, that the practice of every human institution muft in fome degree fall fhort of the perfection of its theory; bribery and corruption are old hacknied themes of popular declamation, and it will ever increase and be louder in proportion to the difappointment, envy, and malice of the difThe fource and contented party. Lefs vociferous and lefs frequent would be the complaints against bribery, if the complainants did but recollect, that the root of the evil lay lefs in the offer, than in the acceptance of the bribe. It argues more corruption and depravity in a district, to find a hundred men ready to sacrifice their freedom and integrity for a trifling bribe, than to find one man impelled by his ambition to offer it. No punishment can be too fevere upon thofe, who hold out the bait to the multitude; but until the corrupt difpofition of electors be rectified, they will take care to render ineffectual the most vigilant and rigorous laws against the bribing offers of the elected. Ill therefore does it become those to complain of encroachments upon the conftitutional freedom of elections, whose voluntary and reflexed corruption completes the

guilt of the act, by which the conftitution is fo feverely wounded. I wish not to extenuate the guilt of bribery, nor fhall I endeavour to justify any design or attempt to deprive a voter of the freedom of his choice; but as the evil is absolutely effected by the elector, who under every circumftance of influence, fear, hope, or temptation, actually retains the freedom of his action, and therefore of his election, I must neceffarily conclude, that the only effectual prevention of the evil will be the correction of the corrupt difpofition of the electors; without this, every attempt or exertion of the magiftrate will be futile and ineffectual.

of electors.

It is not my intention to enter into the qualifications minute and particular qualifications of each elector for a reprefentative in parliament; fuffice it to say, that the conftitution fuppofes him to be fo independent in life, as not to be under the bias, controul, or influence of any one; therefore every elector for the knight of the fhire must have bona fide freehold lands in the fhire at least of the annual value of 405. which at the time of Hen. VI. when this qualification was firft required, was equivalent to 20%. in the prefent reduced value of money. By not accommodating this qualification to the prefent value of money, the conftitution very much enlarges the rights of electors beyond