ment is known by its energy, and that is nothing more, than the efficacy and facility, with which the executive power can enforce the laws. The laws are the direct emanations of the fovereignty of the whole; the consent of every individual of the community is formally included in each of the laws; and the contempt and violation of them is therefore more properly infulting to the nation, who have made the laws, than to the magiftrates, whofe duty it is to execute them. The law is the unanimous will of the whole community; for the conclufion of the whole by the act of the majority does away the prefumptive poffibility of a diffenting individual. In this great truth is engendered the peculiar vigour of our conftitution. Because our laws are framed, totius regni affenfu, as Fortefcue obferves; therefore is the whole kingdom indifpenfably bound to the obfervance of them. From this affent of each individual arifes a right and intereft, which the community poffeffes collectively and individually, in the actual performance of the covenant and engagement, which at the paffing of every law each individual enters into for the performance and obfervance of it. Although the government itself is faid to be founded in the original compact between the governors and and governed; yet the fubfiftence of the government depends not only upon the continuation of that original contract, but in this mutual and reciprocal covenant, engagement, or contract of every individual to abide by and enforce his own voluntary act and deed; for it is a first principle of our conftitutional policy, that every law of England is the free, unbiaffed, and deliberate act of every English man. It is but to fuch a political government as ours, that these, I may almoft fay, metaphyfical truths can be applied; they have no foundation in the first principle of the civil law, quod principi placuit, legis habet vigorem. As the will of the prince is not under the controul of the people, they have no participation in the act impofed upon them; and its coercive obligation can be urged against the people upon no other ground, than that of a fervile, timid, or compulsive acquiefcence in the arbitrary dictates of an uncontrolable power. The operative coercion and energy of a British act of parliament can never be fo clearly feen, as when viewed in antithefis to the defpotic mandates of an arbitrary monarch. If we could bring ourselves even to conceive a contract or compact between a people and an abfolute defpotic fovereign, Hh3 yet Our laws bind ing upon each individual, be caufe every one alfents to their paffing. This reafon ap- plies not to ar vernments. : yet as the whole legislative power rests solely in him, it neceffarily and effentially precludes the very poffibility of any mutual and reciprocal covenant, engagement, or contract of the individuals with each other; and this is the vivifying fap, that pervades every fibre of our conftitution. Into what an extravagant error do not they fall, who attempt to justify by the fpirit of the English conftitution the oppofition and refiftance of individuals to the establishment of its government? For if there can tion of England exift upon earth a government of human The conftitu peculiarly adapted to enforce fubordi nation. inftitution, that emphatically and effentially condemns and precludes fuch anomalous efforts of the difcontented members of a community to disturb or fubvert the eftablifhment of the whole fociety, it is the conftitution of Great Britain. In arbitrary regal governments, where the will of the fovereign makes the law, the aggrieved fubject is immediately challenged by the oppreffive mandate of his fovereign to protect his own natural rights by perfonal refiftance. There is no intervening lenitive between his judgment and his feelings; the mental condemnation of an unreasonable command is as quickly fucceeded by the impulfe to refift it, as the report fucceeds the flash of a discharged mufquet. quet. Nothing fhort of the ftricteft paffive obedience and non-refiftance can enfure to an arbitrary fovereign the univerfal fubmiffion of his fubjects. In regal governments was this doctrine engendered, fostered, and reared; and when our kings wifhed or attempted to erect themselves into regal arbitrary fovereigns, they attempted at the fame time to tranf plant it into this country; but the foil and climate of a political government, such as ours happily is, were little congenial with the nature of the plant. In the unnatural heat of exceffive prerogative under the Tudors and Stuarts it was forced into a puny exotic fhoot, that drooped, withered, and decayed, when exposed to the natural foil and open free air of the English conftitution, Few or none of my readers are ignorant of the fatal effects, which have proceeded from the rancorous differences and disputes upon this doctrine, that formerly divided and difgraced our unhappy country. It has stained with blood and infamy the field, the judicature, the fenate, and the church. Of this, as of most other party differences in this country, it may moft truly be said, "The heat of honeft men being once raised, and the cooler * Yorke's Confid. on the Law of Forfeiture, p. 3. lity of paffive obedience and non-refistance ment. paffions of artful men diffembled by a fpecious zeal for public good, the calm voice of reafon and the law finds no attention; and perfons of lefs understanding, incited by example, add greatly to the weight of that clamour, which for a time has ever been too The impoffibi- ftrong for argument." Thus if we confider but coolly and impartially what is and ever in our govern- was the real doctrine of paffive obedience and non-refistance, we fhall find, that it could never by poffibility have been applicable to, or practicable in the English government; for in the political form of our government, no king could ever iffue commands, nor demand obeiffance in any thing, which exceeded or contradicted the law of the land." The confequences of fuch a frame of government are obvious. That the laws are the rule to both, the common measure of the power of the crown, and of the obedience of the fubject." The conftitution can know no obedience, where there is no power to command; but there is no power given by our constitution to the king to command beyond the law; and therefore the conftitution can never have had in contemplation fuch paffive + Mr. Lechmere's first Speech in Dr. Sacheverel's Trial. obedience |