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A brute is an animal no less sensible of pain than a man. He has similar nerves and organs of sensation; and his cries and groans, in case of violent impressions upon his body, though he cannot utter his complaints by speech or human voice, are as strong indications to us of his sensibility of pain, as the cries and groans of a human being whose language we do not understand. Now as pain is what we are all averse to, our own sensibility of pain should teach us to commiserate it in others, to alleviate it if possible, but never wantonly or unmeritedly to inflict it. As the differences amongst men in the above particulars are no bars to their feelings, so neither does the difference of the shape of a brute from that of a man exempt the brute from feeling; at least, we have no ground to suppose it. But shape or figure is as much the appointment of God, as complexion or stature. And if the difference of complexion or stature does not convey to one man a right to despise and abuse another man, the difference of shape between a man and a brute cannot give to a man any right to abuse and torment a brute. For he that made man and man to differ in complexion or stature, made man and brute to differ in shape and figure. And in this case likewise there is neither merit nor demerit; every creature, whether man or brute, bearing that shape which the supreme wisdom judged most expedient to answer the end for which the creature was ordained.
With regard to the modification of the mass of matter of which an animal is formed, it is accidental as to the creature itself; I mean it was not in the power or will of the creature to choose whether it be of one shape or of the other; or whether it be inhabited or animated by the * soul of a brute or the * soul of a man; the substance or matter of which the creature is composed, would be equally susceptible of feeling. It is solely owing to the good pleasure of God that we are created men; or animals in the shape of men. For, He thatt formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, that he might become a living soul, and indued with a sense of feeling, could, if he had so pleased by the same plastic power, have cast the very same dust into the mould of a beast; which being animated by the life-giving
* It is of no consequence as to the case now before us, whether the soul is, as some think, only a power, which cannot exist without the body; or as is generally supposed a spiritual substance, that can exist distinct and separate from the body.
† Gen. 2.7. VOI, III.
2 H .
breath of its Maker, would have become* a living soul in that form; and" in that form would have been as susceptible of pain, as in the form of a man. And if, in brutal shape, we had been indued with the same degree of reason and reflection which we now enjoy; and other beings, in human shape, should take upon them to torment, abuse, and barbarously ill treat us, because we were not made in their shape; the injustice and cruelty of their behaviour to us would be self-evident; and we should naturally infer, that, whether we walk upon two legs or four; whether our heads are prone or erect; whether we are naked or covered with hair; whether we have tails, or no tails; horns, or no horns; long ears, or short ears; or whether we bray like an ass, speak like a man, whistle like a bird, or are mule as a fish; nature never intended these distinctions as foundations for right of tyranny and oppression. But perhaps it will be said, that it is absurd to make such an inference from a mere supposition that a man might have been a brute, and a brute might have been a man; for, the supposition itself is chimerical and has no foundation in nature; and all arguments should be drawn from fact, and not from fancy of what he might be, or, might not be. To this I reply, in few words, and in general; that all cases and arx• guments, deduced from the important and benevolent precept of doing unto, as we would be done unto; necessarily require such kind of suppositions: that is, they'suppose the case to be otherwise than it really is. For instance a rich man is not a poor man; yet, the duty plainly arising from the precept is this: the man who is now rich ought to behave to the man who is now poor in such a manner as the rich man, if he were poor, would be willing that the poor mang if he were rich, should behave towards him. Here is a case which in fact does not exist between these two men, for the rich man is not a poor man, nor is the poor man a rich man; yet the supposition is necessary to inforce and illustrate the precept; and the reasonableness of it is allowed. And if the supposition is reasonable in one case, it is reasonable, at least not contrary to reason, in all cases to which this general precept can extend, and in which the duty enjoined by it can and ought to be performed. Therefore, though it be true that a man is not a horse; yet as a horse is a subject within the extent of the precept; that is, he is capable of receiving benefit hy it, the duty enjoined in it extends to the man and amounts to
* Gen. 1. 30.
this ---Do you, that are a man, so treat your horse as you would be willing to be treated by your master in case that you were a horse. I see no absurdity nor false reasoning in this precept, nor any ill consequence that would arise from it, however it may be gainsayed by the barbarity of custom.
In the case of human cruelty,* the oppressed man has a tongue that can plead his own cause, and a finger to point out the aggressor; all men that hear of it shudder with horror; and, by applying the case to themselves, pronounce it cruelty with the common voice of humanity, and unanimously join in demanding the punishment of the offender, and brand him with infamy. But in the case of brutal cruelty, the dumb beast can neither utter his complaints to his own kind, nor describe the author of his wrongs; nor, if he could, have they it in their power to redress and avenge him.
In the case of human cruelty there are courts and laws of justice in every civilized society, to which the injured may make his appeal; the affair is canvassed, and punishment inflicted in proportion to the offence. But alas! with shame for man, and sorrow for brutes, I ask the question? What laws are now in force, or what court of judicature does now exist, in which the suffering brute may bring his action against the wanton cruelty of barbarous man? The laws of Triptolemus are long since buried in oblivion, for Triptolemus was but a heathen. No friend, no advocate, not one is to be found amongst thet bulls nor calves of the people, to prefer an indictment on behalf of the brute. The priest passeth by on one side, and the Levite on the other side; the Samaritan stands still, sheds a tear, but can no more; for there is none to help: and the poor, wretched, and unbefriended creature is left to mourn in unregarded sorrow, and to sink under the weight of his burthen. But
suppose the law promulgated, and the court erected. The judge is seated, the jury sworn, the indictment read, the cause debated, and a verdict found for the plaintiff. Yet what cost or damage? What recompense for loss sustained? In actions of humanity, with or without law, satisfaction may be made. In various ways you can make amends to a man for the injuries you have done him. You know his wants, and you may relieve him. You may give him clothes, or food, or money; you may raise him to a higher station,
* This term the author uses to express the cruelty of men unto men; and that of brutal cruelty, to express the cruelty of men unto beasts.
+ Psalm 68. 20.
and make him happier than before you afflicted him. You may be feet to the lame, and eyes to the blind. You may entertain him, keep him company, or supply him with every comfort, convenience, and amusement of life, which he is capable of enjoying. And thus may you make some atonement for the injury which you have done unto a man; and by thy assiduity and future tenderness, thou mayst perhaps obtain his pardon, and palliate thine own offence. But what is all this to the injured brute? If by thy passion or malice, 9. sportive cruelty thou hast broken his limbs, or deprived him of his eyesight, how wilt thou make him amends? Thou canst do nothing to amuse him. He wants not thy money nor thy clothes. Thy conversation can do him no good. Thou hast obstructed his means of getting subsistence; and thou wilt hardly take upon thyself the pains and trouble of procuring it for him, (which yet by the rule of justice thou art bound to do.) Thou hast marred his little temporary happiness, which was his all to him. Thou hast maimed or blinded him for ever; and hast done him an irreparable injury.
LOVE AND GENIUS. By a lady, lately resident in this city, but now sojourning in Baltimore. These few lines are marked by a turn of thought rarely found in little pro
ductions of the kind. The mind that produced them has more in it; and we heartily wish it would more liberally deal out its productions to us.
Love meeting Genius t'other day,
(I don't remember in what grove)
your aim, friend Love?"
My power, without your aid, is weak;
Her 'kerchief she with tears is steeping;
She looks most beautiful when weeping!
For April, 1811.
MR. COOKE'S NIGHTS. 1 Monday 1st, Richard the Third-Adopted Child. 2 Wednesday 3d, Man of the World-Weathercock. 3 Friday 5th, King Lear-Sylvester Daggerwood. 4 Saturday 6th, New Way to Pay Old Debts-Killing No Murder. 5 Monday 8th, Henry the Fourth-Of Age To-Morrow.. 6 Wednesday 10th, Merchant of Venice-Spoiled Child. 7 Thursday 11th, Macbeth-Too Many Cooks. 8 Saturday 13th, Douglas-Love a la Mode. 9 Monday 15th, Every Man in his Humour-Highland Reel..For the
benefit of Mr. Cooke.
MR. COOKE'S SECOND ENGAGEMENT. 10 Wednesday 17th, King Lear-Modern Antiques. 11 Friday 19th, Man of the World-Prisoner at Large. 12 Saturday 20th, Richard the Third-Scheming Lieutenant.
MR. COOKE'S THIRD ENGAGEMENT. (Playing with Mr. COOPER.) 13 Friday 26th, Othello-Old Maid. 14 Saturday 27th, Gamester-Ways and Means. 15 Monday 29th, Venice Preserved-Don Juan. For the benefit
Mr. Warren. 16 Tuesday 30th, Othello-Irishman in London. In the interval between Mr. Cooke's second and third engagements, there
were two benefits. April 22d, Castle Spectre-Lady of the Rock.-Mr. Pullen's benefit. April 24th, The Robbers-Children in the Wood.-Mr. Calbraith's benefit.
MR. COOKE IN SIR PERTINAX MAC SYCOPHANT. We are now to accompany Mr. Cooke from his first and second nights, on both of which he performed Richard (playing the second more carelessly and therefore not so well as the first to his third, on which he performed Sir Pertinax Mac Sycophant, in MACKLIN'S satirical comedy of THE MAN OF THE WORLD, one of the most vigorous dramatic productions of the last century,