commanders. He had fought bravely by the side of General Wellesley in 1803, and had received many tokens of distinction from the British Government, but he sighed for the independence of his country, and on being appointed minister by the Peshwa, manifested an inveterate hostility to the subsidiary alliance. He was usually called "the sword of the empire," and his death hastened the destruction of his master, in whose camp there ceased to be either order or confidence. The raja of Satara was rescued at the battle of Ashtee, and conducted to the palace of his ancestors, and installed on the throne of Sevajee, amidst the acclamations of the Mahrattas.

Surrender of Bajee Rao, 1818.

The discomfiture of the Peshwa's army at Ashtee satisfied many of the Mahratta chiefs of the hopelessness of his cause, and his army was daily dwindling away by desertions. But the raja of Nagpore, notwithstanding his engagements with the Resident, determined to make common cause with him, and Bajee Rao advanced to Chanda, expecting to be joined by him there, but the clandestine correspondence was discovered in time, and the design was frustrated. It would be tedious to detail the movements of the Peshwa after this, to the north, to the south, and to the east; they were regulated by the sole object of evading his pursuers, from whom, however, he seldom obtained more than a brief and accidental respite. Hunted out of the Deccan, he made a final move to the north, crossed the Taptee on the 5th May, and advanced to the Nerbudda, in the hope of reaching Hindostan, and benefiting from the power, or the mediation, of Sindia. But all the fords were guarded; the British armies were closing on him, and, seeing no chance of escape, he sent an agent on the 16th May to Sir John Malcolm at Mhow, with a letter, in which he appealed to the generosity of the British Government, and lavished his flatteries on "his oldest and best friend." Sir John was so greatly moved by this appeal that he deputed two of his assistants to the Mahratta camp to open a negotiation with the Peshwa. Lord Hastings condemned this imprudent step,

352

PENSION GRANTED TO BAJEE RAO.

[CHAP. because it fostered the impression that he was in a condition to treat, whereas, according to his own confession, his fortunes were desperate, and his first encounter with any British division must have annihilated his force. Sir John even went so far as to admit the Peshwa to a personal conference, in which the wily Mahratta brought all his eloquence and blandishments into full play. The British General's sympathy with fallen greatness overcame his political prudence, and he made concessions far beyond the necessity of the case. He promised him a personal allowance of eight lacs of rupees a-year, as well as a provision for the jageerdars in his camp, and gave a most improvident guarantee of the vast endowments of temples and brahmins, on which this superstitious prince had for fourteen years squandered the resources of the state, and which a native successor would at once have resumed. Lord Hastings, who had destined the Peshwa an allowance of two lacs of rupees a-year, was mortified at the prodigality of these terms, and in his letter to the Court of Directors justly observed "that in the hopeless circumstances in which the Peshwa was placed any terms granted to him were purely gratuitous, and only referrible to that humanity which it was felt your honourable Court would be desirous should be granted to an exhausted foe." The policy of Sir John's arrangements with the Peshwa has been the subject of much discussion, and some censure, but it is due to his memory to state that it received the approbation of Sir David Ochterlony, Sir Thomas Munro, Mr. Elphinstone, and Mr. Jenkins. They considered that the Peshwa might have indefinitely prolonged the contest if he had thrown himself, with the body of eight thousand men who still adhered to his fortunes, into Asseergur, the commandant of which had received the most positive injunctions from Sindia to succour him, and that his surrender, which at once terminated the war, was cheaply purchased even by this large annuity. He was conducted to Bithoor, a place of religious sanctity, sixteen miles from Cawnpore, and lived long enough to receive an amount of two crores and fifty lacs of rupees,

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CAPTURE OF FORTS.

353

the major part of which he bequeathed to his adopted son, Nana Sahib, who, finding the British Government unwilling to continue the pension, became the great demon of the mutiny of 1857. The Peshwa's brother, Umrit Rao, had received a pension of seven lacs of rupees a-year from Lord Wellesley, under circumstances altogether exceptional, and took up his residence at Benares where he enjoyed the allowance for twenty-one years. It is worthy of remark that the sum total received by the two brothers amounted to more than four crores of rupees, and it may fairly be questioned whether any instance of similar fidelity to engagements is to be found in the native history of India.

Capture of forts, 1818.

The country which had been the scene of warfare was studded with forts, which continued to hold out after the submission of the princes. Many of them were of great strength, in positions almost impregnable, and would have baffled all the engineering skill of native generals, but they were reduced in a few months. The circumstances connected with the capture of two of them deserve individual record. The forts were garrisoned in many cases by Arab mercenaries. While the native armies in Hindostan had been supplied for several centuries by a constant stream of Afghans, the armies of the native princes in the Deccan were constantly recruited from Arabia and Abyssinia, through the various ports on the Malabar coast. In both cases the recruits equally exchanged a condition of poverty for prospects of wealth and distinction. The Arabs were held in high estimation by the princes for their resolution, courage, and fidelity, and received double the pay of Hindostanee sepoys. They served also as a counterpoise to the native soldiery, and assisted to check that spirit of mutiny which is indigenous in all Indian armies. The fort of Talneir was garrisoned by Arabs. The commandant was a member of a very distinguished Mahratta family, and not only gave up the fort, but surrendered himself to the General. The Arabs continued to hold the citadel, and a parley was held with them by the English officers, but as they were

354

TALNEIR-MALIGAUM.

[CHAP. mutually ignorant of each other's language, a misunderstanding arose which led to fatal consequences. The wicket was opened, and two officers of high rank entered, but the Arabs, who did not understand the movement, assailed them, and they lost their lives. The British troops without, exasperated at what they considered an act of treachery, rushed in and put the garrison, three hundred in number, to the sword, and the next morning Sir Thomas Hislop hung the unoffending commandant. The execution doubtless struck terror into the minds of the natives, and facilitated the surrender of other forts, but it was an act of unrighteous severity, and roused a feeling of just indignation in England. It was unworthy the British character, and has always been considered to tarnish the laurels of the General. The capture of Maligaum, on the other hand, exhibited an example of scrupulous good faith which served to elevate the British name. It was the chief fortress of the unfortunate province of Candesh, once filled with thriving towns and a flourishing population, but reduced to unexampled wretchedness by Holkar's rapacious soldiery, and the exactions of Bajee Rao's officers and his Arabs. The only terms offered in every case to these mercenary troops were the payment of their arrears and a free passage back to their native land; but they had little disposition to relinquish the enjoyments of India for the barren wastes of Arabia. They concentrated their strength at Maligaum, which they defended with the obstinacy of despair. After three weeks had been lost before it, a sufficiently powerful battering train was brought up; the chief magazine exploded; and the Arabs, seeing their position hopeless, made an offer to capitulate, but with the example of Talneir before them, required a written assurance of safety. The Mahratta moonshee, who drew up the document, exceeded his orders, and stipulated to do whatever might be beneficial to their interests, to pay all their arrears, and to conduct them to any destination they might select. The General, on discovering the mistake, was anxious to limit the execution of the promise to his

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ASSEERGUR.

355

own instructions, but Mr. Elphinstone determined to give the most generous interpretation to the engagement, and treated them with exemplary kindness. At length, the only fort remaining to be occupied was Asseergur. Sindia had furnished Lord Hastings with an order on the commandant to surrender it, but sent him private instructions to retain it and to afford every assistance to the Mahratta cause. He therefore harboured the raja of Nagpore, took charge of Bajee Rao's most valuable property, and offered him an asylum. He distinctly refused to surrender the fort, and it became necessary to invest it. The eyes of India were fixed on the siege as the expiring struggle of the Mahratta empire. A battery of thirty-four mortars and howitzers, and twenty-eight heavy guns, played on it incessantly for a fortnight with little hope of success; but the powder in the fort was at length reduced to three mauns, or two hundred weight, and the commandant felt himself obliged to capitulate. When he was told that his master would be not a little displeased by the neglect of his orders, he produced a letter from Sindia, ordering him to hold the fort, and give every assistance to Bajee Rao, with the significant remark,-"Should you not do so I shall be perjured." The only retribution inflicted on Sindia for this act of treachery was the retention of the fort. This was the last shot fired in the war, though it had virtually terminated within four months of its commencement.

Proceedings of the Home Authorities, 1818-20.

Mr. Canning moved the usual vote of thanks to Lord Hastings and the army in the House of Commons, in April, 1819, in a speech which doubled the value of this national recognition of their services; but he did not attempt to conceal his objections to the policy of Lord Hastings. He stated that the House and the country were in the habit of appreciating the triumphs of our armies in India with great jealousy; that, almost uniformly successful as our military operations had been in that part of the world, they had almost as uniformly been considered questionable in point of justice; that the