Free Will and LuckMele's ultimate purpose in this book is to help readers think more clearly about free will. He identifies and makes vivid the most important conceptual obstacles to justified belief in the existence of free will and meets them head on. Mele clarifies the central issues in the philosophical debate about free will and moral responsibility, criticizes various influential contemporary theories about free will, and develops two overlapping conceptions of free will--one for readers who are convinced that free will is incompatible with determinism (incompatibilists), and the other for readers who are convinced of the opposite (compatibilists). Luck poses problems for all believers in free will, and Mele offers novel solutions to those problems--one for incompatibilist believers in free will and the other for compatibilists. An early chapter of this empirically well-informed book clearly explains influential neuroscientific studies of free will and debunks some extravagant interpretations of the data. Other featured topics include abilities and alternative possibilities, control and decision-making, the bearing of manipulation on free will, and the development of human infants into free agents. Mele's theory offers an original perspective on an important problem and will garner the attention of anyone interested in the debate on free will. |
Contents
| 3 | |
2 Free Will and Neuroscience | 30 |
3 Libertarianism Luck and Control | 49 |
4 Frankfurtstyle Cases Luck and Soft Libertarianism | 81 |
5 A Daring Soft Libertarian Response to Present Luck | 105 |
Objections and Replies | 137 |
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Common terms and phrases
ability able act freely action and moral actual world agency agent causation agent-causal agnostic akratic action alternative possibilities Ann’s argued basically free actions believe Beth Beth’s big bang Bob’s brainwashing causally determined chance chapter claim Clarke coin flip compatibilism compatible conditions for free cross-world deciding at noon decision Dennett desire deterministic world deterministically caused difference DSLs entail Ernie event-causal libertarian exercise Fischer and Ravizza Frankfurt-style Fred free agents free and morally Galen Strawson Humean I-able intention to flex intentionally issue John Fischer Kane killing kind laws of nature libertarian view Libet manipulation matter of luck Mele modest libertarianism morally responsible action morally responsible agents otherwise past and laws Pereboom performed Phil Philosophical Plum possible world present luck promise proximal intention reactive attitudes reason relevant requires S-able scenario soft libertarianism sponsibility steal the car story sufficient conditions Suppose terministic things toss the coin unsheddable values