thority, that we must now refer. The genealogy of Chrift is traced to Adam;-Why then not trace the rights of man to the creation of man? Because there have been upftart-governments, thrusting themselves between, and prefumptuously working to unmake man.

If any generation of men ever poffeffed the right of dictating the mode by which the world fhould be governed for ever, it was the firft generation that ever exifted-and, if that generation did not do it, no fucceeding generation can fhew any authority for doing it, nor fet up any. The illuminating and divine principle of the equal rights of man-for it has its origin from the maker of man-relates, not only to the living individuals, but to generations of men fucceeding each other. Every generation is equal in rights to the genera tions that preceded it, by the fame rule that every individual is born equal in rights with his contemporary.

Every history of the creation, and every traditionary account-whether from the lettered, or unlettered world, however they may vary in their opinion or belief of certain particulars, all agree in establishing one point-the unity of man-by which I mean, that man, confidered as man, is all of one degree, and confequently, that all men are born equal, and with equal natural rights, in the fame manner as if pofterity had been continued

by

by creation inftead of generation-the latter being the only mode by which the former is carried forward, and, confequently, every child born into the world, must be confidered as deriving its exiftence from GOD. The world is as new to him, as it was to the firft man that exifted, and his natural right in it is of the fame kind.

The Mofaic account of the creation, whether taken as divine authority, or merely hiftorical, is fully up to this point-the unity or equality of man. The expreffions admit of no controverfy: "And "God faid, let us make man in our own image: "in the image of God created he him-male and female created he them." The distinction of fexes is pointed out, but no other diftinction is even implied. If this be not divine authority, it is hiftorical authority, and fhews that the equality of man, fo far from being a modern doctrine, is the oldeft upon record.

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It is alfo to be obferved, that all the religions. known in the world are founded, fo far as they relate to man, on the unity of man, as being all of one degree. Whether in heaven, or in hell, or in whatever ftate man may be fuppofed to exift hereafter, the good and the bad are the only diftinctions. Nay, even the laws of governments are obliged to flide into this principle, by making degrees to confift in crimes, and not in perfons. It is one of the greatest of all truths, and of the highest

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highest advantage to cultivate. By confidering man in this light, and by inftructing him to confider himself in this light, it places him in a close connection with all his duties, whether to his Creator, or to the creation, of which he is a part; and it is only when he forgets his origin, or, to use a more fashionable phrase, his birth and family, that he becomes diffolute.

It is not among the least of the evils, of the prefent exifting governments in all parts of Europe, that man, confidered as man, is thrown back to a vaft diftance from his maker, and the artificial chafm filled up by a fucceffion of barriers, or a fort of turnpike-gates, through which he has to pass. The duty of man is not a wilderness of turnpikegates through which he is to pass by tickets from one to the other. It is plain and fimple; and confifts but of two points-his duty to God, which every man must feel-and, with respect to his neighbour—to do as he would be done by.

If those to whom power is delegated do well, they will be respected; if not, they will be despised, And, with respect to whom no power is delegated, but who affume it, the rational world can know nothing of them.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

OF CIVIL RIGHTS.

We

HITHERTO ERTO we have spoken only, and that but in part, of the natural rights of man. have now to confider the civil rights of man, and to fhew how the one originates out of the other.

Man did not enter into fociety to become worfe than he was before; nor to have lefs rights than he had before, but to have those rights afcertained, and better fecured. His natural rights are, the foundation of all his civil rights. But in order to pursue this diftinction with more precifion, it will be neceffary to mark the different qualities of natural and civil rights: a few words will explain this.

Natural rights are thofe which appertain to man in right of his exflience. Of this kind are all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind; and also, all thofe rights of acting, as an individual, for his own comfort and happiness, which are not injurious to the natural rights of others.

Civil rights are thofe which appertain to man, in right of his being a member of fociety. Every civil right has, for its foundation, fome natural right pre-exifting in the individual, but to which his individual power is not, in all cafes, fufficiently competent.

competent. Of this kind are all thofe which relate to fecurity and protection.

From this fhort view, it will be easy to distinguish between that clafs of natural rights which man retains after entering into fociety, and those which he throws into common ftock as a member of fociety. The natural rights which he retains are, all those in which the power to execute is as perfect, in the individual, as the right itself. Among this class, as is before mentioned, are, all the intellectual rights, or rights of the mind. Confequently, religion is one of thofe rights.

The natural rights which are not retained, are, all thofe in which, though the right is perfect in the individual, the power to execute them is defective. They answer not his purpose. A man, by natural right, has a right to judge in his own cause; and fo far as the right of the mind is concerned, he never furrenders it—but what availeth it him to judge, if he has not power to redrefs? He therefore depofits this right in the common stock of fociety, and takes the arm of fociety, of which he is a part, in preference, and in addition, to his own. Society grants him nothing. Every man is a proprietor in fociety, and draws on the capital as a matter of right.

From these premises, two or three certain conclufions will follow :

First, That every civil right grows out of a na

tural